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Abstract 
 
The present thesis considers the  relation between  Jacques Derrida and G.W.F. Hegel. In 
his Positions Derrida noted that differance is ‘at a point of almost absolute proximity to 
Hegel,’ and that he had ‘attempted to distinguish [differance] from Hegelian difference at 
the point at which Hegel, in the greater Logic, determines difference as contradiction only 
in order to resolve it.’ Nevertheless, scholarship on the relation between the two thinkers 
has largely neglected the detailed consideration of the relation of Derrida’s thinking to 
Hegel’s logic of essence, where the categories of difference and contradiction are located. 
This has often led to a simplification, from both Hegelian and Derridean perspectives, of 
the relation between Hegel and Derrida. Through a reading of Hegel’s logic of essence 
and of Derrida’s early texts in particular, the thesis first aims to determine the nature and 
degree of the proximity indicated by Derrida and then considers the manner in which the 
two thinkers depart from one another.     
The proximity between Hegel and Derrida is drawn out through an analysis of 
Hegel’s notion of reflection and his logic of identity and difference. This logic is compared 
with the ‘graphics’ of identity and difference elaborated by Derrida in his Limited Inc. I 
claim that Derrida departs from Hegel in thinking difference as the displacement of 
opposition. Nevertheless, I claim that in relating Hegel and Derrida to one another, it 
cannot be a question of simply comparing two logics or two philosophies, for Derrida 
does not and cannot have a general logic or ‘philosophy’ of ‘differance.’ Derrida thus 
departs from Hegel also insofar as he puts into question the possibility of, and the desire 
for, a general onto-logic.  
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Introduction / Conclusion 
 
1. Beginnings and Returns 
 
The starting point of the present study will have been a remark that came to Derrida 
during the course of an interview:   
 
I have attempted to distinguish différance […] from Hegelian difference, and have 
done so precisely at the point at which Hegel, in the greater Logic, determines 
difference as contradiction only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, to lift it up […] 
into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis. 
Différance (at a point of almost absolute proximity to Hegel […]: everything, what is 
most decisive, is played out, here, in what Husserl called “subtle nuances,” or Marx 
“micrology”) must sign the point at which one breaks with the system of the 
Aufhebung and with speculative dialectics (P 44/59-60).    
 
Hegel’s analysis of difference is given in the second book of his Science of Logic, The 
Doctrine of Essence. Derrida indicates here that the nature of his relation to Hegel—and 
by extension the nature of his own thinking—might be significantly illuminated through 
an exploration of his proximity to and ‘departure’ from Hegel’s logic of essence. Indeed, 
he adds that the ‘conflictuality of différance […] can be called contradiction only if one 
demarcates it by means of a long work on Hegel’s concept of contradiction.’ Yet Derrida 
himself did not undertake either this long study or a broader exploration of the relation 
between his thinking and Hegel’s Logic—at least not directly.  
2 
 
 Likewise, in the scholarship on the relation between Hegel and Derrida, the 
relation of Derridean ‘differance’ to Hegel’s Logic, and to the logic of essence in 
particular, has not been treated in detail.1 This has perhaps contributed to a frequent 
simplification of the relation between the two thinkers from both ‘Derridean’ and 
‘Hegelian’ perspectives. While, from the one perspective, Hegel is often painted as the 
Identitätsphilosoph par excellence, for whom difference is only ever a moment of an 
absolute identity that is tacitly present from the outset, Derrida, from the other, is 
presented as the thinker of pure difference who would have failed to pay attention to 
Hegel’s elementary lesson that pure difference = pure identity; he would thus turn out to 
be a profoundly ‘metaphysical’ and reactionary thinker. It is in this way that a simple and 
misleading conflict is staged between Hegel and Derrida. 
  Yet Derrida’s remark indicates that his departure from Hegel—if such it is—can 
only take place through a slight displacement of the Hegelian logic. As Joseph Cohen 
notes, it would then be too simplistic to regard Derrida simply as opposing—i.e. 
                                                          
1 Some of the works that have touched on this relation include: Karin de Boer, ‘Différance as Negativity: 
The Hegelian Remains of Derrida’s Philosophy’, in A Companion to Hegel, ed. by Stephen Houlgate and 
Michael Baur (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); Manfred Frank, What Is 
Neostructuralism?, trans. by Sabine Wilke and Richard Gray (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989); Catherine Kellogg, Law’s Trace : From Hegel to Derrida (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); 
Wendell Kisner, ‘Erinnerung, Retrait, Absolute Reflection: Hegel and Derrida’, The Owl of Minerva, 26 
(1995), 171–86; Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, Studies in 
Continental Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); John Llewelyn, ‘A Point of Almost 
Absolute Proximity to Hegel’, in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. by 
John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); J. Protevi, ‘Derrida and Hegel: Différance and 
Unterschied’, in Jacques Derrida, Vol. 1, ed. by Christopher Norris and David Roden (London: Sage, 
2003), pp. 331–46; Kevin Thompson, ‘Hegelian Dialectic and the Quasi-Transcendental in Glas’, in Hegel 
after Derrida, ed. by Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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‘positioning’ himself against—or attempting to leap out of Hegelianism.2 In the present 
study it will rather be a question of attending to the manner in which Derrida could be 
said to inhabit Hegel otherwise, to dwell on that which Hegel’s thinking both gestures 
toward and presupposes, but at the same time shrinks back from and represses. Of 
course, we cannot assume at the outset that this slight détournement of the Hegelian 
logic might not have significant repercussions.  
 In pursuing Derrida’s remark in Positions, the present study is then rather 
belated. But its belatedness perhaps also gives it the possibility of returning otherwise to 
the Hegel-Derrida relation, of conceiving this relation in a manner that might not have 
been possible in the heat of the moment. This is of course not to claim that this 
reconceptualisation should be in any way ‘definitive.’  
 
2. The Gift of Hegel 
 
Rather than outlining the terms of an opposition, the present study might be read as 
tracing the inheritance of a debt or the reception of a gift. When viewed through the lens 
of the Science of Logic, what might we suggest, then, that Hegel gives to Derrida?  
First of all, in the first book of the Logic—the Doctrine of Being—Hegel gives an 
immanent critique of immediacy—of what Derrida will term ‘presence.’ What is critiqued 
under the heading of immediacy is the notion that things are what they are simply by 
themselves, without relation to other things. By the end of the logic of being, such simple 
                                                          
2 Joseph Cohen, ‘The Event of a Reading: Hegel “with” Derrida’, in Hegel’s Thought in Europe: Currents, 
Crosscurrents and Undercurrents, ed. by Lisa Herzog and George Pattison (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), p. 251. Cf. also Derrida’s remarks on the inadequacy and self-satisfaction of such 
position-taking in P 96/131-2.  
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immediacy has been seen to ‘sublate’ itself, which means that, in truth, things are what 
they are only through their relations to other things, and so are nothing prior to these 
relations. For Hegel, this means that their identity does not precede their difference. And 
this itself means that the critique of immediacy is also a critique of the notion of an 
‘origin’ that would not already have displaced itself by ‘showing itself’ within this process 
of mediation.    
 Hegel thus conceives essence as this ‘originary’ process of mediation or reflection. 
Now in truth, nothing precedes this process, and yet, the process still seems to have to 
presuppose that there was initially something there to be mediated—an ‘origin’—in order 
for it to get going at all. Essence thus appears to be troubled by a ‘past’ that it has not 
succeeded in shaking off. This ‘past,’ however, is not simply a leftover of the immediacy 
of being that has not fully disappeared, for in truth it does not precede the process of 
reflection ‘on’ it. Indeed, as we see in chapter 1, it is this reflection itself which, as it were, 
generates the ‘illusion’ that something preceded it. What seems to be referred back to is 
thus a ‘past that has never been present,’ a revenant which returns for the first time. 
Though it is not named as such in Hegel’s text, the notion of such a remainder will have 
been the second aspect of Hegel’s gift to Derrida.     
 Now it is precisely because the ‘illusion’ of this origin arises through the 
movement of reflection itself that reflection can never definitively ‘catch up with’ and 
overcome it. As soon as it has done so—as soon as it has explained the remainder away 
as in truth ‘only’ an illusion, the remainder returns again. It thus acquires the strange 
status of a ‘necessary illusion.’ Since the basic structure of reflection runs through Hegel’s 
entire logic of essence, the latter is then continually haunted by the very spectre that it 
conjures up. The sphere of essence is therefore marked by an unsettling Nachträglichkeit. 
This takes the form of a disruption of the unity or the closure of reflection: though the 
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remainder does not lie outside reflection, it also cannot be made fully transparent to any 
given reflection, and thus leaves itself open to being subsumed under, but never 
definitively captured by, many different reflections. We might then describe it as the 
‘outside inside,’ or the ‘quasi-transcendental,’ which gives rise to a contaminating form of 
difference: a difference that is neither the simply ‘external’ difference between 
immediately given terms, nor the wholly ‘internal’ difference between the moments of a 
totality.   
 
3. Forking Paths 
 
3.1. Hegel’s Sublation of the Remainder 
 
How, then, does Hegel’s Logic respond to this remainder, to this spectre that it has 
conjured up? It does so not by living with it, but by repeatedly conjuring it away. This 
takes place through what in chapters 2 and 4 I call the all-or-nothing character of the 
dialectical movement in the sphere of essence, which leaves no space or time for the 
remainder to persist in. Almost as soon as the remainder appears, it comes to be 
determined as that which falls outside of reflection and so gives rise to wholly external 
difference (diversity), only for this external difference to collapse into wholly internal 
difference (opposition and contradiction). This all-or-nothing movement serves to guard 
against the contaminating effect of the remainder, and in the moment of contradiction it 
‘overcomes’ the remainder by re-establishing the unity of reflection or the identity of 
identity and difference.   
The remainder will return again and again throughout the sphere of essence in 
the form of the difference of identity and difference, and this movement from diversity to 
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opposition and contradiction will be repeated. Yet with each new passage through 
contradiction the remainder is ‘reduced’ ever further until it vanishes entirely. At this 
point, the logic of essence gives way to the logic of the concept—to the complete identity 
of identity and difference. The concept thus reconstitutes the simple presence critiqued 
in the logic of being, not as this simple presence, but as self-presence—as the complete 
transparency of the self to itself. This eternal self-presence is no longer troubled by a 
‘past’ that it cannot catch up with; as we see in chapter 5, it has overcome the diachrony 
of essence to such an extent that it can even be said to give itself its own ‘history.’     
 
3.2. Derrida’s ‘Ingratitude’ 
 
How, then, does Derrida respond to the gift of Hegel? He does so not by faithfully taking 
up what Hegel believed himself to be bequeathing, but by attending to what in this gift is 
not given—to what is not ‘obvious’ or ‘self-evident.’ Derrida responds, then, by dwelling 
on the remainder to which the Logic fails to give time and which it rushes past in its desire 
for reconciliation. He attends to that which Hegel’s Logic gestures towards, but which 
only appears between its lines—to what Hegel ‘saw without seeing’ or simply could not 
see: ‘Thus he must be followed to the end, without reserve, to the point of agreeing with 
himself against himself and of wresting his discovery from the too conscientious 
interpretation he gave of it’  (WD 328/381).  
 Derrida’s interminable response to Hegel thus consists in thinking through this 
blind spot and pausing to consider where the remainder might lead us if it is not passed 
over. This thinking through of the remainder leads to a form of negativity that is neither 
abstract nor absolute—a ‘negativity without reserve’—and a difference that resists and 
displaces its determination as either simply ‘external’ or wholly ‘internal.’ In chapter 3 I 
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therefore suggest that Derrida departs from Hegel in coming to think a form of ‘diversity’ 
that is not the symmetrical ‘own other’ of opposition, and so does not simply collapse 
into opposition but continually exceeds it.   
 Nevertheless, it would be too simple to regard Derrida as simply working out 
another logic from the remains of or the scraps left behind by Hegel’s Logic. To think that 
this could be the case would be to fail to take the measure of Derrida’s ‘ingratitude.’ For 
what is gestured toward but repressed within Hegel’s Logic is a form of difference that, in 
being essentially multiple, cannot be ‘faithfully’ presented within any pure onto-logic, 
insofar as the latter must treat and name difference as such. What the thinking of the 
remainder ultimately calls into question, then, is the very possibility of such a logic, which 
is why in chapter 3 I also claim that Derrida does not and cannot elaborate a general 
‘philosophy,’ one whose principle would be ‘differance.’  
 This also means that the question of the difference between Hegel and Derrida is 
not ultimately a theoretical question, one that could be treated in a ‘neutral’ manner. It is 
rather a question of desire and repression. If an onto-logic can constitute itself only by 
passing over and repressing the remainder, then the question becomes that of the desire 
for such a systematic project, and the desire for a ‘way out’ of it. Through a reading of 
Glas in chapter 6 I therefore show that the question of Derrida’s reception of the gift of 
Hegel opens on to the question of Derrida’s and Hegel’s respective responses to the 
unreason of that which ‘gives to thinking’—to that which both gives rise to thinking and 
continues to animate and potentially haunt thinking. There I consider how, for Derrida, 
the Hegelian response to this gift is to take it ‘as given,’ in a manner that conceals a desire 
to make the gift fully transparent—to make it one’s own and ultimately give it to oneself. 
I contrast this with a Derridean response to the gift which attempts to avoid such an 
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appropriation, which rather affirms that that which gives rise to thinking does not let 
thinking ‘rest,’ and so leaves what the gift will have been still to come. 
  
9 
 
Chapter 1: The Opening of Essence: Reflection 
 
 
Part 1. From Being to Essence 
 
1.1. The Doctrine of Essence in the Context of Hegel’s Science of Logic 
 
In the following, I shall give a reading of the first chapter of Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence, 
which is the middle book of his Science of Logic. This book is preceded by the Doctrine of 
Being and followed by the Doctrine of the Concept. Through this reading I shall attempt 
to bring into relief certain key aspects of Hegel’s conception of essence, while also 
indicating their proximity to certain elements of Derrida’s thought. This proximity itself 
will be more fully explored in chapter 3.    
Before discussing the opening chapter of the Doctrine of Essence in detail, 
however, certain preliminary remarks are in order concerning the manner in which I shall 
treat Hegel’s Logic as a whole and the place of the Doctrine of Essence within it. In the 
following I shall consider the Logic as an ontology which unfolds the fundamental 
categories of being. These are at the same time the fundamental categories of thought, 
insofar as, for Hegel, the Logic begins from the standpoint of Wissenschaft, or the identity 
of thought and being—a standpoint that may be attained either by following the course 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit or through the ‘resolve’ to think presuppositionlessly (SL 
68-70/LS 56-59). The Logic presents these categories in a strict order: it begins with the 
most abstract category—that of pure being—and progresses to ever more concrete and 
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comprehensive categories of being.1 Each new category is generated by, as Stephen 
Houlgate notes, rendering explicit what is implicit within the foregoing category.2  
While the Logic in this way only comes to its ultimate truth by moving forward, as 
Hegel famously notes, this is at the same time a movement back ‘into the ground’ (SL 
71/LS 59-60).3 Each new category constitutes the truth or, loosely speaking, the ‘ground’ 
of the categories that have preceded it, insofar as it comprehends them as ‘moments’ of 
a more complex structure. It cannot simply prescind from these prior categories, but 
must account for their prior seeming truth on its own terms. Likewise, each new ‘sphere’ 
of the Logic, such as the Doctrine of Essence, must account for the general form of being 
which characterised the previous sphere.  
Yet in addition to being an ontology, the Logic is also a critical work. This is so, 
firstly, with respect to the individual categories of being within all three spheres of the 
Logic. For Hegel, all of these categories are necessary to a complete account of what 
being proves to be. Nevertheless, the unfolding of all that is implicit in these categories 
allows Hegel to criticise those modes of thought, and those historical philosophies, which 
cling only to certain aspects of each category, and which therefore remain ‘one-sided.’ 
                                                          
1 It should be noted here that all of the books or ‘spheres’ of the Logic are concerned with being, though 
only the first is named the Doctrine of Being. The different books are distinguished by the fundamental 
form of being that each deals with, as will become clear in the following.   
2 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, in A Companion To 
Hegel (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), pp. 139–58 (p. 139). 
3 ‘It must be admitted that it is an important consideration—one which will be found in more detail in 
the logic itself—that the advance is a retreat into the ground, to what is primary and true, on which 
depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which the beginning is made’ (SL 71/LS 59-60). 
This paradoxical movement will be treated in the second part of chapter 5, with a view to the Logic as a 
whole.  
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Such modes of thought are associated in general with what Hegel terms the 
‘understanding’ [Verstand] as opposed to ‘reason’ [Vernunft]. In the logic of being, for 
example, the understanding abstracts the finite from the infinite; in the doctrine of 
essence, it unquestioningly adheres to the principle of identity, A = A; and in the logic of 
the concept it conceives the universal as abstract rather than concrete. As we shall see, 
the key deficiency of the understanding is its failure to think the dynamic unity of any 
given category with its contrary.  
Secondly, while the understanding is criticised within all of the three spheres of 
the Logic, its mode of thinking is more suited to grasping the categories of being as they 
appear in the logic of being and, to a lesser extent, the logic of essence, than it is to 
grasping the categories of the logic of the concept. The categories of being and essence 
are not in themselves ‘false’; they are necessary moments of the unfolding of being. 
Nevertheless, the form of being that is common to all of the categories in the sphere of 
being or the sphere of essence does not represent the ultimate or entire truth of being; 
the latter is only reached with the transition to the logic of the concept. At the level of its 
different spheres, then, the Logic provides an immanent critique of those forms of 
thinking that cling to a seinslogisch or a wesenslogisch conception of being. It does so by 
bringing to light the contradictions inherent in the categories of these spheres, and 
ultimately, the contradictions inherent to these spheres as a whole. In the logic of being, 
this constitutes an immanent critique of a conception of being as immediacy; in the logic 
of essence, of being as reflection. To this extent, then, I would agree with Michael 
Theunissen that the first two books of the Logic (the ‘objective logic’) unfold partly as a 
critique of ‘metaphysics’ as ‘objectifying thinking.’4 It is only in the logic of the concept 
                                                          
4 Michael Theunissen, Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, 2nd edition 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 24–27. 
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(the ‘subjective logic’) that the ultimate truth of being comes to be presented on its own 
terms, or in and for itself.  
On this basis, we can gain an understanding of how the Wesenslogik both 
expounds ‘the truth of’ essence while at the same time bringing to light its contradictory 
character, and thereby highlighting the ‘one-sidedness’ of the historical conceptions of 
essence that have attempted to repress this contradiction. On the one hand, essence 
designates that which is not the immediate determinations of something and which is 
indifferent to the changes in these determinations that are brought about through 
something’s interactions with other things. We might call this the Platonic-Aristotelian 
conception of essence as that which is what it is kath’ hauto, or in virtue of itself.5 On the 
other hand, essence also designates that which cannot remain indifferent to these 
determinations, since then it would not be the essence of something in all its 
particularity—it would not fully account for that thing. In this respect, essence does not 
prescind from the immediate determinations of something, but is only the process of 
their differentiation and mediation. Rather than minimising this contradiction by 
repressing the latter aspect of essence, Hegel emphasises it, and develops his conception 
of essence by confronting this tension directly. On the one hand, the essence of 
something is indeed not its immediate determinations; on the other hand, as we shall 
see, Hegel shows that genuinely not being the immediate determinations of something 
means not being immediately different from these determinations.    
In the Encyclopaedia Hegel writes that the Doctrine of Essence is the most 
difficult part of his philosophical system (Enc § 114). This, as we shall see, is partly due to 
the paradoxes to which the contradictory nature of essence gives rise. But we should 
                                                          
5 Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 2, p. 1626 (Metaphysics, 1029b14). 
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note here that it is also due to the manner in which essence has to be thought as the 
truth, and thus the reconceptualisation, of the sphere of being. This forces Hegel, in giving 
his account of essence, to use terms like ‘immediacy’ in such a way that it is not always 
clear whether they are being used in their seins- or wesenslogisch senses. Let us now 
explore this transition and reconceptualisation in detail.   
 
1.2 The Becoming of Essence: Immediacy and Mediation  
  
Essence does not come to supplant being but is rather that which being, in Houlgate’s 
words, ‘proves to be.’6 In this sense, essence is ‘the truth of being’ (SL 389/LW 3). 
Nevertheless, essence constitutes a ‘new’ logical sphere insofar as it arises only when 
being loses its hitherto most basic determination: that of immediacy. Immediacy is both a 
‘positive’ and a ‘negative’ concept. On the one hand, if something is immediate it is what 
it is by itself (in the following I shall call this positive immediacy). On the other hand, as 
Houlgate notes, immediacy also has a negative connotation. That something is what it is 
‘by itself’ also means that it is what it is because it is not mediated by something else (it is 
im-mediate). But this implies that it is also constituted by its negative relation to what it is 
not, and in this respect its immediacy has what Hegel calls a determinate aspect (I shall 
therefore call this determinate immediacy).7  
                                                          
6 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 140. 
7 Cf. Stephen Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, in German 
Philosophy Since Kant, ed. by A. O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 21. It should 
be noted that, ‘positive’ and ‘determinate’ immediacy are never simply distinct from one another. 
Distinguishing the two forms of immediacy in this way, however, will help to clarify the nature of the 
different moments of essence in Hegel’s account.  
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Immediacy, as one might infer from this description, is a contradictory concept. If 
something is what it is only if it is not what it is not then its very being is already mediated 
by what it is not. Indeed, this contradiction surfaces throughout Hegel’s logic of being in 
the relation between categories such as something and other or the finite and the 
infinite, and its resolution at any given moment constitutes the transition to a new 
category which contains the previous two contrary terms within itself. Nevertheless, we 
might say that the sphere of being as a whole suffers from a bad memory, for this 
mediation is not internalised (er-innert) within the new category that forms the beginning 
of each dialectical movement, so an immediate difference again resurfaces between this 
new category and its other. Mediation thus remains merely implicit throughout the logic 
of being until we reach the end of its third section, entitled ‘Measure.’ At this point, the 
two general categories which have formed the basis of all the other categories in this 
sphere, namely ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ are seen to be mediated by one another.  
Quality designates the immediate unity of being and non-being which, following 
the restless movement of becoming at the opening of the Logic, first allows the 
immediacy of pure being to take on a determinate way of being—that is, to be what it is 
partly through a negative relation to what it is not. The logic of quality becomes a logic of 
quantity when, at the end of the analysis of ‘being-for-self,’ the difference between 
logical determinations becomes no longer one of kind, but of magnitude. This does not 
mean that quality disappears, but rather that any change can henceforth only take place 
with reference to a presupposed stable quality, which would be logically prior to, and the 
‘basis’ of, the quantitative differences between terms.  
In the logic of measure, however, this logical precedence of quality over quantity 
is overturned when it becomes clear that a change in quantity can produce a change in 
quality, such as when water is heated to 100° Celsius or the population of a state 
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becomes so large as to require a different form of government. Thus, if quality always has 
a certain quantity, and if quantity can affect quality, then quality never was simply 
independent of quantity: quality, as the quality it is, must always have been determined 
or mediated by quantity from the outset. This does not amount to a reversal of logical 
priority, however, for there is equally no quantity that is not already relative to a certain 
quality; it rather implies the mutual mediation of quality and quantity.  
Each is then only what it is through the other. If this is so, however, it is no longer 
possible to say that each is clearly distinct from the other. Indeed, although there must 
remain a certain distinction between the two in order to speak of one mediating the 
other at all, each must be said to only find itself in the other. As Hegel puts this in the 
Encyclopaedia: ‘quality is indeed in-itself [an sich] quantity, and conversely, quantity is in-
itself quality, too. Hence, in that the two determinations pass over into one another in the 
process of measure, each of them only becomes what it already is in-itself’ (Enc § 111). 
Because quality and quantity are the two most general categories of the logic of being—
the two of which all the others are specific forms—their mutual mediation signals the 
collapse of the immediacy of being tout court. The conclusion of the logic of being and the 
starting point of the logic of essence is thus, as Houlgate notes, that being has proved to 
be non-immediacy.8  
In particular, what has collapsed here is immediacy in its determinate sense, for 
quality and quantity have proved to be incapable of maintaining their distinction from 
one another—of remaining not the other. In this case, the collapse of immediacy must be 
conceived as the negation of negation. This does not amount to the simple doubling of 
negation, but to the self-relation of negation, insofar as quality and quantity both negate 
their own negative relation to each other. In the following we shall see that the paradoxes 
                                                          
8 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 140.  
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and contradictions of essence all have their root in the ontological ambiguity of a 
negation that negates itself, i.e. a negation that must be both negation and not negation. 
We now need to follow Hegel in exploring the different senses in which such negation can 
be understood.  
 
1.3 The Activity of Being 
 
Before doing so, we might step back to consider what the collapse of the distinction 
between quality and quantity already indicates about the nature of Hegelian essence. The 
transition, Hegel notes, is a form of inwardisation or recollection [Er-innerung] from out 
of the immediacy of being (SL 389/LW 3). Essence is thus the ‘memory,’ lacked by being, 
that can hold two contrary terms together in order to think their mutual mediation. As we 
shall soon see, the non-immediacy of being therefore comes to be conceived as a process 
of reflection which posits and contains within itself the terms that in the sphere of being 
seemed to be immediate. In the literature on Hegel’s account of essence, the nature of 
this reflection is disputed. On a reasonably influential reading, reflection is conceived as a 
process of thinking which mediates and thereby unifies the seemingly immediate 
determinations. As Béatrice Longuenesse writes:   
 
the transition from “Being” to “Essence” is the transition from determinations which 
seem to exist by themselves and to be immediately presented in “things,” to the 
revelation that the apparently most “immediate” determinations are always 
constituted and organized in the context of a unified process of thinking.
9
  
                                                          
9 Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 7. Cf. also Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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Such a reading, however goes against certain unambiguous remarks of Hegel’s concerning 
reflection. In so doing, it risks construing Hegel as a 'subjective’ rather than an ‘absolute’ 
idealist. Furthermore, it misses what is really interesting about the transition to essence. 
In his introductory remarks on essence, Hegel states that the movement of mediation is 
‘the movement of being itself’ (SL 389/LW 3). Commenting on the transition to essence 
he states that ‘this reflection of the differences into their unity is not the product of the 
external reflection of a subjective consciousness, but [it is] the very nature of the 
differences of this unity to sublate themselves, with the result that their unity proves to 
be absolute negativity’ (SL 384/LS 430, trans. modified10).  
Commentators such as Stephen Houlgate, Jean Hyppolite and Dieter Henrich are 
more attentive to the fact that the Doctrine of Essence is not the point at which a subject 
comes to reflect on being, but at which being comes to reflect on (or simply to reflect) 
itself.11 Indeed, Henrich connects the transition to essence to Hegel’s discussion of the 
concepts of substance and subject in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel 
there writes of his philosophical system, that, ‘everything turns on grasping and 
expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject’ (Ph 10/22-23). For the 
true to be subject is, Hegel remarks, for it to be ‘the movement of positing itself, or […] 
the mediation of its self-othering with itself’ (Ph 18/23). Essence, as Henrich notes, is thus 
the point in Hegel’s logical thought where we see being begin to determine itself as 
                                                          
10 Miller has, ‘not merely the product of the external reflection of the subjective thinker,’ whereas 
Hegel’s German is ‘nicht die äußere Reflexion des denkenden Bewußtseins.’   
11 Cf. Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’; Jean Hyppolite, Logic 
and Existence, trans. by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997); Dieter Henrich, ‘Hegel’s Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung’, in Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die 
Logik der Reflexion, Hegel Studien, Beiheft 18 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978). 
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subject: it is no longer inert and simply self-identical, but rather that which actively 
relates itself to itself through the determinations that it gives itself.12 We can now see, 
then, that the significance of the transition to essence is in fact the reverse of that 
presented by Longuenesse, as is succinctly captured by George di Giovanni:    
 
At this point of the Logic […] the object has begun to exhibit a reflective structure, in 
virtue of which it can perform vis à vis its own manifestations the synthesizing 
function for which thought was solely responsible in the dialectic of being.
13
   
 
Part 2. Essence and Schein 
 
2.1 One Step Forward…The Essential and the Unessential 
 
Rather than beginning with a conception of non-immediacy as reflection, or even 
mediation, however, Hegel’s account of essence first seems to step back into the sphere 
of being. Essence as non-immediacy is first of all taken up as the immediate negation of 
being. As such, it takes the form of the essential over against the unessential. As Hegel 
writes, ‘Essence that issues from being seems to confront it as an opposite; this 
immediate being is, in the first instance, the unessential’ (SL 394/LW 7).  
Why such a step backward should be made is not made clear by Hegel. 
Nevertheless, in a manner that recalls his analysis of the finite and the infinite in the 
Doctrine of Being, Houlgate indicates that the initial simple negation of being by essence 
                                                          
12 Henrich, p. 208. This and all subsequent translations of this paper are my own.  
13 George Di Giovanni, ‘Reflection and Contradiction. A Commentary on Some Passages of Hegel’s 
Science of Logic.’, Hegel Studien, 8 (1973), 131–61 (p. 133). 
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can be seen as part of the unfolding of all that is implicit in the notion of non-
immediacy.14 As we shall see, this moment of simple negation never entirely vanishes 
from essence, but it will come to be seen as a moment of a wider reflection in which the 
sense of such negation is transformed.  
Though such simple negation may be a necessary moment of essence, however, 
Hegel’s isolation of it here also allows him to criticise those conceptions of essence that 
do not move beyond it. Such conceptions, governed by the understanding, would take 
essence to be the simple cancellation of all the immediate determinations of things. 
Hegel writes that such abstractions determine essence as ‘a being in which everything 
determinate and finite is negated. It is thus the indeterminate, simple unity from which 
what is determinate has been eliminated in an external manner’ (SL 389/LW 3).  
Hegel finds fault with this conception of essence as the essential in contrast to 
the unessential not because it falls short of a pre-given notion of reflection, but because it 
contradicts itself. In being simply not immediacy it is itself immediate; it stands over 
against being, Hegel writes, ‘only as [an] other’ (SL 390/LW 8). Rather than negating 
immediacy, then, it has only reconstituted it. As there would be no formal ontological 
difference between essence conceived in this way and immediate being, Hegel contends 
that there could be no necessary (i.e. immanent) reason for calling the one essential and 
the other inessential.   
If essence is the truth of being, then the problem with conceiving essence as the 
essential is that this fails to grasp the absolute lack of immediacy that being has proved to 
be. Being is only conceived as negative, as Hegel notes, ‘in relation to essence, not in and 
                                                          
14 Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, p. 23; Stephen Houlgate, 
The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 
2006), p. 403. 
20 
 
for itself’ (SL 394/LW 8). In truth, however, as Hegel reminds us a little further on, 
‘Essence is the absolute negativity of being; it is being itself, but not only determined as 
an other, but being that has sublated itself both as immediate being and also as 
immediate negation, as negation that is burdened with otherness’ (SL 395/LW 9, trans. 
modified).15 It is from an acknowledgement of being as not merely unessential, but rather 
as an Unwesen or Schein that the next, more adequate conception of essence will have to 
set out.   
 
2.2 Der Schein and das Scheinen16 
 
Being is now taken up as that which has sublated itself, and which is only in its 
sublatedness.17 In other words, it is taken up as that which cannot be genuine immediacy 
but only seeming immediacy (der Schein). Nevertheless, Hegel notes that even in this 
sublated form, being still seems to be distinct from essence (SL 395/LW 9). We can see 
                                                          
15 In Miller’s translation, the omission of ‘only’ in ‘not only determined as an other’ distorts the 
complexity of Hegel’s analysis here, for, as we noted above, negation will never entirely lose its 
immediate aspect, even within the sphere of essence.  
16 Miller’s translation of Schein as ‘illusory being’ too strongly suggests that what is in question here is a 
bloßer Schein—a mere illusion. Di Giovanni’s translation of Schein as ‘shine,’ retains an important 
connotation of the German term (one which allows Hegel to connect it so easily to the concept of 
reflection), but takes too much emphasis away from the sense of Schein as ‘seeming.’ While ‘seeming’ 
may in some cases function as a translation of Schein, however, it blurs the distinction between der 
Schein and das Scheinen, where the former is a moment within the latter. Accordingly, I shall generally 
leave Schein untranslated, and will translate Scheinen by ‘seeming.’   
17 Throughout the present study, I follow Miller’s translation of Aufhebung as ‘sublation.’ As Hegel 
famously remarks, Aufheben means both ‘to nullify and ‘to preserve.’ Yet at this point in Hegel’s 
derivation of essence, it is the nullification of the sphere of being that is in question.    
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why this should be if we consider the structure of Schein more closely. That Schein is only 
as sublated means that it is ‘only by means of its negation’ (SL 396/LW 9). It does not 
precede its being negated, yet at the very moment that it is negated, it flashes up as that 
which is negated. This is what gives it its seeming immediacy over against essence, though 
in truth this immediacy is always already sublated.18   
Since being has thus been shown to be a ‘nullity’ or a negative which ‘sublates 
itself and withdraws into essence,’ the question is no longer how being can seem to be 
distinct from essence. As Houlgate notes, Hegel’s attention now turns to the question of 
how, even though it is the truth of being, essence itself can seem to be distinct from 
being, i.e. how it can seem to be immediately self-sufficient. Indeed, Hegel states that ‘all 
that has to be shown is that the determinations which distinguish [Schein] from essence 
are determinations of essence itself, and further, that this determinateness of essence 
which Schein is, is sublated in essence itself (SL 397/LW 11).  
  As Henrich observes, section two of the chapter, ‘Schein’ thus involves identifying 
the nothingness [Nichtigkeit] of Schein with what Hegel terms the negativity of essence.19 
The latter concept is rather abruptly introduced at this point in Hegel’s derivation of 
essence, so in order to see how Hegel arrives at it, we will need to reconsider the nullity 
or nothingness that being has proved to be. For if essence is nothing other than the truth 
                                                          
18 With a view to Derrida, we might then describe Schein as a ‘trace’ which only appears in its 
disappearance and disappears in its very appearance. Schein seems to represent a falling away from 
immediacy or the diminution of an initial ‘presence,’ yet in truth this is an immediacy that never was, 
but is only projected backward, after the fact. This is not the place to pursue this thought, however; for 
it is not until a little later in the course of the logic of essence that Hegel shows that, in truth, essence 
does not ‘emerge’ from being, but rather itself projects the illusion that being preceded it.  
19 Henrich, p. 245. 
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of being, then its negativity must be another aspect of the structure that can also be 
described as a nullity.  
 
2.2.1 Accounting for the Schein of Immediacy 
 
Schein, as we have seen, is the determinate immediacy or the ‘negative’ that is only in 
being negated. But this means that it can no longer be conceived as being negated from 
the ‘outside’: its negation has become internal to it, such that it is negated in itself. It 
must therefore be conceived as self-relating negation. Yet the latter can be regarded from 
two ‘angles.’ On the one hand, it is self-relating negation or a negative relation to self. 
Seen from this angle, it is the nullity of Schein. On the other hand, it is self-relating 
negation, or ‘a relation of negation only to itself’ (SL 398/LW 12). Seen from this angle, 
the self-relating negation is the ‘negativity’ of essence which constantly remains with or, 
as Hegel puts it, ‘goes together with’ itself. Because it relates only to itself it seems to be 
simply immediate and thus to be distinct from the nullity of being, that is, from Schein.   
But it is important to note that essence as negativity is not the simple coincidence 
of the negation with itself and thus its collapse into positive immediacy. If this were so, it 
would only constitute a return to the simple immediacy of being and would again become 
an immediate, determinate essence over against being. At this point, the self-relating 
negation that essence has proved to be must rather be thought as a process of self-
relation. Essence, then, is not more ‘profound’ than being, but more dynamic; it is 
nothing but the continual and circular process in which negation relates to itself first by 
dividing itself and becoming determinate, and then coinciding with itself. Furthermore, as 
the process of self-relating negation—a process which encompasses both of these 
moments and in which essence remains with itself even in its division—essence takes on 
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what Hegel calls a ‘reflected immediacy.’ It is this new form of immediacy, which is gained 
only through the movement of reflection, that accounts for, but is not itself reducible to, 
what seemed to be essence’s simple immediacy over against being.    
In this process that essence has proved to be, Schein now figures as a moment, 
such that, as Houlgate remarks, essence can be thought as ‘projecting’ Schein.20 Schein is 
the moment within the self-relation of negation when negation is divided from and 
opposed to itself. As Hegel writes, ‘The immediacy of the determinateness in Schein over 
against essence is consequently nothing other than essence’s own immediacy; but the 
immediacy is not simply affirmative [seiend], but is the purely mediated or reflected 
immediacy’ (SL 397/LW 11).   
In interpreting Schein as the determinate or distinctly negative moment of this 
process, the reading I have given goes against that of Henrich. For Henrich, Schein 
amounts to the reconstruction within essence of the positive immediacy of being. It is 
conceived as the positive moment that is produced when negation cancels itself out, even 
if this moment is destined to immediately vanish.21 Nevertheless, though the Logic is not 
always unambiguous on this point, in numerous passages Hegel clearly emphasises the 
determinate nature of Schein. To take just one of these, he writes, for instance, that 
‘Schein is essence itself in the determinateness of being. Essence seems [hat einen Schein] 
because it is determinate within itself and thereby distinguished from its absolute unity’ 
(SL 398/LW 12).22    
 
                                                          
20 Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, p. 28. 
21 Henrich, p. 264. 
22 A little earlier Hegel states that Schein is ‘the determinacy of being against mediation: being as 
moment’ (SL 397/LW 11).      
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2.2.2 Dialectical Reversal 
 
Schein, we have seen, is thus no longer negated by essence, but is in truth only a 
‘phenomenon’ generated by essence itself. As Hegel states, Schein in essence is not the 
Schein of an other, but ‘Schein as such [an sich], the Schein of essence itself’ (SL 398/LW 
12, trans. modified). Nevertheless, as Houlgate makes clear, this does not mean that 
essence can be thought as something that is distinct from, but generative of, Schein;23 
rather, it is ‘nothing but the very process of seeming’ itself. Houlgate elaborates on this in 
the following way:  
 
All there is, is the process of seeming itself—the process whereby sheer negativity 
first seems to be immediacy, then seems to be distinct from its own seeming 
immediacy, and finally dissolves this distinction and reveals itself to be nothing but 
seeming as such.
24
  
 
At a certain level, this does not mean that essence is the same as Schein. Essence is rather 
the process of seeming [das Scheinen] whereas Schein is one moment of this process. 
Nevertheless, at a more subtle level, even this distinction breaks down, for it is ultimately 
impossible to isolate one moment of this process without it immediately becoming the 
other—and so without it showing itself to be the whole of the process. This is what allows 
Hegel to indicate, in the final paragraphs of his account of Schein, a dialectical reversal 
between the ‘moments’ represented by Schein and essence. Of the former, he writes that 
it is  
                                                          
23 Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, p. 28. 
24 Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, pp. 28–9. 
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a non-self-subsistent being which is in its own self sublated and null. As such, it is the 
negative turning back to itself (das in sich zurückgehende Negative), the non-self-
subsistent. This self-relation of the negative or of non-self-subsistent being is its 
immediacy; it is an other than the negative itself…[it] is purely self-related negativity, 
the absolute sublating of the determinateness itself (SL 398/LW 12). 
 
Essence, on the other hand, ‘the self-subsistent, as self-related immediacy, is equally 
sheer determinateness and moment and is only as self-related negativity’ (SL 398/LW 12). 
This reversal amounts to the notion that that which is least self-subsistent, that which can 
least lay claim to its own being, proves to be most self-subsistent and that that which 
seemed most self-subsistent is in fact least stable in its being.  
At the end of Hegel’s account of ‘seeming,’ it becomes evident that there is then 
only one process of the self-relating negation, or negativity—a circle in which certain 
moments can be momentarily glimpsed, but which immediately vanish at the very 
moment they are distinguished. To this extent we might then see these moments as 
different ways in which self-relating negation might be conceived—as either self-relating 
negativity or negative self-relation, to borrow John Burbidge’s terms.25    
 
2.2.3 Seeming and the Trace 
 
We can now look back and consider how far Hegel’s conception of essence has already 
departed from a notion of essence as that which underlies and possesses a certain 
mastery over the immediate determinations of things. Hegelian essence, as Houlgate 
                                                          
25 John W. Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), 
p. 65. 
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remarks, both generates and undermines the illusion that there is a foundation to 
being.26 It generates the illusion because the self-sublation of Schein seems to ‘point 
back’27 to that which is simply-self equal; in other words, the negation of the negation 
indicates an underlying positive term. But it undermines it insofar as this seeming positive 
self-equality immediately sublates itself and becomes determinate, or ‘seems’ within 
itself, and in truth only is positively immediate insofar as it remains with itself throughout 
this whole process of self-division and self-coincidence.28 Essence, as Houlgate writes, is 
thus only the ‘movement from one seeming to another, from seeming to seeming.’29   
This movement ‘from seeming to seeming,’ moreover, clearly bears distinct 
similarities to the movement of the Derridean trace. Like Schein, the trace ‘points back to’ 
an immediacy which seems to underlie it, but what seems to underlie it is only another 
trace, another Schein. Hegelian seeming might then seem to be equivalent to the 
movement of Derridean differance as a chain of displacement which ceaselessly moves 
from one trace to another, without coming to rest at a final term which would be what it 
is by itself. Nevertheless, despite the strength of the resemblance, it can only be pushed 
so far. For even though the process of seeming contains a moment of division, this 
                                                          
26 Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s Critique of Foundationalism in the Doctrine of Essence’, p. 20. In this way, Hegel’s 
‘method’ here might be thought to foreshadow Derrida’s deconstructive practice, insofar as it takes one 
historically dominant interpretation of a concept and shows it to be a moment of a wider process that 
that moment does not govern.    
27 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Why Hegel’s Concept Is Not the Essence of Things’, in Hegel’s Theory of the 
Subject, ed. by D. G. Carlson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 21.  
28 Essence could therefore be said to exhibit two forms of positive immediacy: the positive immediacy 
that seems to underlie its seeming, and the positive immediacy of the movement as a whole insofar as 
that movement remains a process of self-relation throughout.  
29 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 141.  
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division is still a self-division in a process which remains a self-relation at all times. As di 
Giovanni puts this, the movement ‘remains with itself no matter which limited term one 
may want to abstract from it.’30 This is why this movement is circular and why Hegel will 
come to conceive it as reflection. As we shall see in chapter 3, the movement of 
Derridean differance cannot be conceived as such a self-relation, but rather as the 
dissolution of self-identity.  
 
Part 3. Reflection 
 
Essence has now proved to be a form of self-relation which continually moves from self-
coincidence to self-division, and which as soon as it arrives at either of these poles, 
doubles back on itself. Accordingly, essence is now conceived as reflection. The 
movement of reflection is self-contained insofar as there can no longer be anything that 
lies outside it. This is because immediacy has proved to be in truth only reflected 
immediacy, ‘only this very equality of the negation with itself, the negated negation, 
absolute negativity […] immediacy is only this movement itself’ (SL 399/LW 14, trans. 
modified).  
 Whereas the first part of the first chapter of the Doctrine of Essence was 
concerned with how essence emerges from being, the second part doubles back on itself 
and shows how the seeming immediacy of the sphere of being is an ‘effect’ generated by 
the movement of essence as a process of self-determination. As we shall see, however, 
essence fails to be absolutely self-determining. For reflection finds that that which it 
posits through its movement, it also has to presuppose as prior to, and the origin of, this 
                                                          
30 George Di Giovanni, ‘Reflection and Contradiction. A Commentary on Some Passages of Hegel’s 
Science of Logic.’, Hegel Studien, 8 (1973), 131-61 (p. 140). 
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movement. Nevertheless, this presupposition itself proves not to have preceded the 
reflection that has posited it. The presupposition itself has a presupposition, and so 
requires what we might call the ‘origin of the origin.’  
Reflection in its positing thus comes up against what we might call a remainder (a 
reste or restance) of the sphere of being which prevents it from being a purely active 
process of self-determination. But because this presupposition itself turns out not to 
precede the reflection that seems to reflect ‘on’ it, it is a remainder in a highly complex 
sense. Indeed, taking up Houlgate’s hint,31 we might say that the remainder here is a 
revenant in the precise sense of Derrida’s Specters of Marx: it is the ‘return’ of that which 
does not precede its returning, and which therefore ‘returns’ for the ‘first time’ (S 10/31). 
In other words, it is ‘a past that has never been present.’  
As Markus Gabriel notes, then, there is an essential belatedness or 
Nachträglichkeit to Hegelian essence.32 It is just because reflection’s presupposition does 
not precede reflection that reflection cannot definitively catch up with or ‘get behind’ the 
remainder, and so remains ‘haunted’33 by the spectre that it conjures up, by this nie 
aufgehende Rest. This Nachträglichkeit itself rests on the logical diachrony of essence, in 
which the ‘present’ of its self-determination is immediately thrown back on to its ‘past,’ 
and this past is immediately thrown forward toward the present. Essence is not a smooth 
passage but rather a jolting or jerking movement between these two moments. At certain 
points along the path of essence, the diachrony between these two moments is brought 
together into the simultaneity of positing and presupposing, but due to the resistance of 
                                                          
31 Houlgate, ‘Why Hegel’s Concept Is Not the Essence of Things’, p. 22. 
32 Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology : Essays in German Idealism (London: Continuum, 2011), p. 
133. 
33 Cf. Houlgate, ‘Why Hegel’s Concept Is Not the Essence of Things’, p. 22.  
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the remainder, this simultaneity immediately comes apart again. The remainder might 
therefore be considered essence’s quasi-transcendental condition, or its condition of 
possibility and impossibility.  
Nevertheless, through the course of the logic of essence, the remainder is 
progressively reduced; and it is when it vanishes entirely that essence becomes the 
concept. One might then be tempted to interpret the reduction of the remainder as the 
reduction of reflection’s presupposition to its own position. Yet this would be too simple. 
The concept, as we shall see, is indeed self-determining. But it is not simply self-
determining in the manner that essence, as it were, ‘wishes to be,’ but fails to be. Indeed, 
Hegel’s immanent critique of essence should rather be seen as a critique of such a simple 
sense of self-determination. In the sphere of the concept, it is rather the case that, to use 
Jean Hyppolite’s terms, ‘creation’ is simultaneous with ‘comprehension.’34 As we shall see, 
this does not mean that the concept does not still privilege self-determination, nor that a 
certain repression is not necessary in order for the concept to be reached. In chapters 2 
and 4 we shall consider how this conjuration of the remainder takes place through an ‘all-
or-nothing’ dialectical movement which does not let the remainder persist as the ‘outside 
inside’; for now, however, let us turn to the logic of reflection in more detail.   
 
3.1. Positing or ‘Absolute’ Reflection 
 
3.1.1 Positing  
 
Since it has no starting point outside itself and only is what it is in what we might call its 
‘self-assertion,’ Hegel terms the first form of reflection he considers, ‘positing [setzende] 
                                                          
34 Hyppolite, p. 182. 
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reflection.’ In introducing this form of reflection, Hegel underscores its contradictory 
nature: the immediacy that the process of positing acquires through its self-relation, as 
the ‘going together’ (zusammengehen) with itself of negation (or the negative), is also a 
negative relation to self.   
This movement of self-negation is described by Hegel as a returning movement.35 
As he writes, ‘The self-relation of the negative is, therefore, its return into itself; it is 
immediacy as the sublating of the negative, but immediacy simply and solely as this 
relation or as the return from a negative’ (SL 401/LW 15). Now Hegel’s use of the term 
‘return’ [Rückkehr] may appear strange here, insofar as the premise of positing reflection 
is precisely that nothing precedes this movement. As I read him, however, Hegel is 
attempting to draw attention to the paradoxical character of reflection. Because the 
movement of self-relating negation acquires a certain immediacy in virtue of being a self-
relation, it appears as a movement of return to the immediacy that ‘previously seemed to 
be the starting point of the reflective movement’ (SL 401/LW 15). In truth, however, we 
know from Hegel’s analysis of Schein that no such immediacy can precede the reflective 
movement: we know that the negation is always already in itself negated. Thus Hegel 
notes that, in truth, it is only in returning that reflection is ‘that which begins or returns’ 
(SL 401/LW 16, trans. modified).  
The immediacy that is thus ‘posited’ in this movement, and which ‘previously 
seemed to be’ the origin of the movement, is called by Hegel positedness or posited being 
[Gesetztsein]. Posited being is that which Schein has become now that it has proved to be 
                                                          
35 Houlgate criticises Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Rückkehr as ‘return,’ since it is only in the ‘return’ 
itself that that which would be ‘returned to’ would be created. Houlgate thus prefers ‘turning back’ 
(Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 143). I retain ‘return’ here, 
however, in order to emphasise the paradoxical character of this movement.  
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only the Schein of essence itself. Like Schein, posited being is then a form of determinate 
immediacy. This is made clear by Hegel when he writes that it is ‘immediacy purely as 
determinacy’  (SL 401/LW 15, trans. modified), and ‘determinacy as negation in general 
[überhaupt]’ (SL 406/LW 22, trans. modified). Posited being is ‘negation,’ or the 
‘negative,’ however, only insofar as the negative is only in already being negated. To this 
extent, its immediacy is ‘reflected,’ since posited being is only as a moment generated 
within the movement of reflection.  
 
3.1.2. Presupposing 
 
As we have seen, reflection has no starting point outside itself. At the same time, 
however, its movement is a ‘reflection-into-self’ only as the negation of the negative. In 
this movement, Hegel notes, reflection only comes to coincide with itself through its 
negation ‘of the negative as negative’ (SL 401/LW 16). But this suggests that it is not pure 
positing after all, and in fact has a presupposition. It has to presuppose this negative as 
(immediately) negative in order for the movement to begin at all. Thus, contrary to how 
things initially seemed, reflection does indeed seem to have to presuppose ‘that from 
which it is the return’ in order to return (SL 401/LW 16).  
In taking this presupposition of positing reflection, along with Houlgate,36 to be 
the very negative that is negated in positing reflection, my reading here again goes 
against Henrich’s. In line with his interpretation of seeming as positive immediacy, 
Henrich takes the presupposition of positing reflection to be a reconstruction, within 
essence, of the positive, not the determinate, immediacy of being. Henrich’s reasoning is 
the following: reflection, for Hegel, is the sublation of the negative. This negative is the 
                                                          
36 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 144. 
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other of reflection and so stands in an immediately negative relation to reflection. But in 
sublating this negative as negative, reflection also sublates the negative’s negative 
relation to reflection,37 and leaves it as what we might call a ‘pure positive’ that is 
indifferent to reflection. The presupposition is then posited as not posited because the 
relation cancels itself as a relation in the relation itself. Though the presupposition is 
generated by reflection, it thus seems to fall outside the circle of reflection.38  
Henrich’s reading, then, is based on a particular reading of Hegel’s statement that 
reflection is the negation of the negative as negative. For Henrich, the statement means 
here that reflection precisely negates the negative character of the negative, making it 
positive. Now Henrich’s reading is not ‘wrong’; the problem with it is rather that he is one 
step ahead of Hegel’s development. As Houlgate notes, this dimension of reflection only 
comes to the fore in Hegel’s discussion of the next form of reflection: external 
reflection.39 In positing reflection, another dimension of this structure is emphasised, 
namely, that reflection is the negation of the negative as that which must first of all be 
taken as immediately negative.   
 
3.1.3 The Presupposition of the Presupposition, or the Origin of the Origin 
 
In the final paragraphs of Hegel’s analysis of reflection, this seemingly immediate 
negative that positing reflection seems to have to presuppose is itself shown to have to 
presuppose positing reflection. This is because the very immediacy that the negative 
seems to possess has already been shown in the transition to essence to be self-sublating. 
                                                          
37 Henrich, p. 278. 
38 Henrich, p. 274. 
39 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 144. 
33 
 
As Houlgate puts this: ‘we know that the reflexive negative never is simply negative but is 
self-negating from the start.’40 Like Schein, the presupposition is only what it is—
negative—in being negated or as a nullity. Like Schein too, it therefore does not precede 
its being negated, yet at the very moment that it is negated, it seems to be immediate 
because it flashes up momentarily as that which is negated. The presupposition, then, 
only seems to fall outside the circle of reflection, since it only falls outside the circle from 
within it. 
We then return to the opening of positing reflection, since it has become clear 
that ‘what is thus found [Dieses Vorgefundene] only comes to be through being left 
behind; its immediacy is sublated immediacy’ (SL 402/LW 16). To this extent we might 
then say, following Houlgate, that that which is presupposed is in truth pre-posited 
(Voraus-gesetzt).41 Indeed, Hegel states that reflection ‘setzt sich voraus.’ Ultimately, of 
course, this amounts to saying that the presupposition is in truth only posited being: 
‘Reflection, as absolute reflection is essence that seems within itself and presupposes for 
itself only seeming, positedness’ (SL 402-3/LW 17).   
This does not mean, however, that the presupposition simply vanishes and that 
reflection closes on itself. Rather, the presupposition itself has been found to presuppose 
positing. Yet positing will again come to presuppose it, and so on, ad infinitum. Reflection 
is therefore described by Hegel as an ‘absolute recoil [absoluter Gegenstoß]’ within itself 
insofar as it ceaselessly moves from positing to presupposing (SL 402/LW 17).   
Furthermore, this ceaseless movement takes place because, due to the 
contradictory nature of essence as the self-relation of negation, each of the moments is 
immediately the other in being itself, for each ‘is only itself, in that it is the negative of 
                                                          
40 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, pp. 144–5. 
41 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 145. 
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itself’ (SL 402/LW 17). Hegel thus writes of reflection that its ‘arrival at itself is the 
sublation of itself and self-repelling, presupposing reflection, and its self-repelling is its 
arrival at itself’ (SL 402/LW 17, trans. modified). It is this contradiction which gives rise to 
the Nachträglichkeit proper to essence that comes to the fore here. For the 
presupposition, as we have seen, does not precede positing, it only ‘will have been’ prior 
to positing through the movement of positing itself. As Houlgate writes, ‘The reflexive 
negative, one might say, thus comes to have been simply negative in the very movement 
in which it turns into affirmative immediacy.’42 Likewise, positing will have been prior to 
the presupposition.  
 
3.2 External Reflection  
 
3.2.1 A New Presupposition 
 
From the absolute recoil or, as Henrich puts it, ‘endless circling’ of positing reflection, a 
new form of reflection develops, which Hegel calls ‘external reflection.’ Like positing or 
absolute reflection, it too has a presupposition, but unlike positing reflection, its 
presupposition is not the negative that forms a moment within reflection, but a form of 
simply positive immediacy that seems wholly indifferent to reflection. This difference 
between the two forms of reflection is clearly marked by Hegel when he writes: 
‘Reflection, as absolute reflection is essence that seems within itself and presupposes for 
itself only seeming, only positedness. But external or real reflection presupposes itself as 
sublated, as the negative of itself’ (SL 402-3/LW 17, trans. modified).  
                                                          
42 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 145. 
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The presupposition of external reflection is therefore that which reflection finds 
before itself—that on which it reflects, but which itself is indifferent to reflection. For this 
reason Hegel associates external reflection with Kant’s concept of ‘reflective judgement.’ 
In a manner that will become important for the subsequent course of the logic of 
essence, the externality of the ‘object’ to reflection also means, as Hegel notes, that the 
object is indifferent to the determinations that reflection posits in it (SL /18/253).  
We now need to consider in more detail how this presupposition differs from that 
of positing reflection, and how a complete indifference to reflection can emerge from the 
narrow circle of positing reflection. Henrich explains this in the following way. In the 
sphere of positing reflection, what is posited is pure Schein,43 which cannot persist over 
against reflection. Since it is what it is only in being sublated by reflection, it is 
immediately reabsorbed back into the movement of reflection. In other words, it is a 
moment of reflection, but is not itself reflexive.44 Nevertheless, Henrich states that even 
within his account of positing reflection, Hegel often ‘arrived at the thesis that that which 
is posited in reflection can itself be regarded as reflection.’45 This is for the same reason 
that Schein, in the ‘dialectical reversal’ in 2.2.2, above, proved to be reflexive: because it 
is only as negated, its negation is already internal to it, so it is already itself self-relating 
negation. For Henrich, it is when this reflexivity of posited being becomes explicit that the 
transition to external reflection occurs. Since posited being is thus reflexive, it becomes 
‘self-sufficient’ and so indifferent to the reflection that posited it. In this sense, it has to 
be presupposed by reflection, even if it does not precede this reflection. Thus, Henrich 
                                                          
43 Henrich, p. 278. 
44 Henrich, p. 281. 
45 Henrich, p. 289. 
36 
 
writes that external reflection sets out from ‘posited being which is itself reflection and 
therefore has a stability.’46  
The problem with Henrich’s reading here, however, is that he is again one step 
ahead of Hegel. In a sense, it has been clear since Hegel’s discussion of Schein that that 
which is generated by reflection is itself implicitly reflexive. Nevertheless, it is only at the 
end of Hegel’s account of external reflection that this becomes explicit [gesetzt] or ‘for us’ 
(SL 404/LW 18-19); and this is precisely the point at which the presupposition is 
sublated—at which the transition to a new form of ‘determining’ reflection takes place.47    
Furthermore, Henrich’s account also fails to address Hegel’s statement that the 
presupposition of external reflection is the negative or ‘Nichtsein’ of reflection (SL 
400/LW 17-18). Hegel’s statement indicates that what is in question here is not the 
negative of this particular reflection, and so another form or instance of reflection, but 
                                                          
46 Henrich, p. 298. 
47 Di Giovanni gives a similar explanation to Henrich of how the presupposition of external reflection 
emerges and why it seems to be indifferent to reflection. He argues that, at the end of positing 
reflection, positing and presupposing are so thoroughly mediated by each other that each is in itself the 
entirety of the reflective movement. As he puts it: ‘The same reason that makes it impossible for 
positing reflection to retain (except as a disappearing element) the distinction between its two 
moments equally accounts for their appearance as indifferent elements – for if each moment is already 
the other, each is the whole, and thus an object complete in itself’ (di Giovanni, p. 153). As di Giovanni 
notes, such an explanation would accord with that given by Hegel to account for the later transition 
from the category of absolute difference to that of diversity (Verschiedenheit), which latter is described 
by Hegel as analogous to external reflection (di Giovanni, p.154). Yet in the transition to diversity, the 
reflexivity of that which is posited by reflection has already been established, whereas in the present 
case it is precisely a matter of establishing this reflexivity.   
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the negative of reflection as such.48 Henrich is then right to say that external reflection’s 
presupposition is distinguished from that of positing reflection by its independence from 
reflection; yet he is wrong about the reasons for this: it is not because the presupposition 
is itself reflection, but because it is that simple immediacy that is wholly indifferent to 
reflection.  
Now if Henrich is one step ahead of Hegel, then, as Houlgate does, we can draw 
on his account of positing reflection in order to show how the presupposition of external 
reflection emerges.49 I shall do so in a slightly different way to Houlgate. We can read the 
emergence of external reflection from positing reflection as the unfolding of all that is 
implicit in reflection as the negation of the negative as negative. This description of 
reflection returns in Hegel’s account of external reflection, when he states that it, ‘relates 
to its presupposition such that the latter is the negative of reflection, but so that this 
negative as negative is sublated. Reflection in its positing immediately sublates its 
positing and thus has an immediate presupposition (SL 403/LW 18 trans. modified).50 We 
can then say, as Henrich did of positing reflection, that the sublation of the negative 
cancels the negative character of the latter and thereby also its negative relation to 
reflection. It thus leaves a ‘purely positive’ simple immediacy that is seemingly indifferent 
to reflection.   
 
                                                          
48 Moreover, at a more incidental level, it is difficult to see how Henrich’s account could incorporate 
Hegel’s association of external reflection with Kantian reflective judgement.  
49 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 145. 
50 Significantly, the ‘as’ in ‘sublation of the negative as negative’ is emphasised here, whereas it was not 
in Hegel’s account of the presupposition of positing reflection.    
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3.2.2 The Presupposition of the Presupposition 
 
We can again note the Nachträglichkeit of this presupposition. It is not in itself simply 
immediate, but only seems to be simply immediate within the reflection that reflects ‘on’ 
it. As soon as reflection relates to the presupposition, it has always already cancelled the 
presupposition as negative, such that the latter appears as that which confronts 
reflection as simply and positively immediate. This, however, is also the reason why the 
presupposition of external reflection itself presupposes that reflection. Like the 
presupposition of positing reflection, it is precisely posited as not posited, or ‘pre-posited’ 
(voraus-gesetzt), and thus only seems to fall outside of reflection from within reflection. 
Like Schein, it is generated by reflection. As Hegel puts this, reflection:  
 
presupposes the immediate; in negating, it is the negating of this its negating. But it 
is thereby equally positing, the sublating of the immediate negatively related to it 
[des ihr negativen Unmittelbaren], and this immediate from which it seemed to start 
as from something alien, is only in this its beginning (SL 403-4/LW 18).  
 
Unlike the presupposition of positing reflection, however, the presupposition here is not 
immediately taken back into the movement of reflection as one of the moments of 
reflection. For unlike the presupposition of positing reflection, the presupposition of 
external reflection previously seemed to be wholly indifferent to reflection. It can only 
have seemed so if it was in truth not one moment of reflection, but the whole of 
reflection. Contra Henrich, it is then only here that it becomes explicit that that which 
seemed to be the immediate presupposition of external reflection is itself reflexive. But 
this does not mean that immediacy has been reduced to reflection. It rather indicates the 
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vanishing of the residual difference between reflection and immediacy, which are now in 
complete unity.51 As Hegel puts this:  
 
the externality of reflection over against the immediate is sublated; its positing in 
which it negates itself is the coinciding [Zusammengehen] of itself with its negative, 
with the immediate, and this coinciding is the immediacy of essence itself [die 
wesentliche Unmittelbarkeit selbst] (SL 404/LW 19).  
 
It is at this point that essence proves to be ‘the truth of being,’ not merely insofar as it is 
that which being has become, but insofar as it has reconstituted, in the form of reflected 
immediacy, the immediacy that previously seemed to pertain to being. Indeed, it has now 
become clear that immediacy, in truth, can only be reflected immediacy. As Houlgate 
writes, ‘Being reflexively posited or constituted does not […] prevent such immediacy 
from being genuinely immediate, but is precisely what establishes it as genuine, free-
standing immediacy.’52  
 
3.3. Determining Reflection 
 
The unity of reflection and immediacy, Hegel notes, is at the same time the unity of 
positing and external reflection. This is because that which is posited by reflection has 
proved to be itself reflexive, or ‘essence in and for itself’ (SL 404/LW 19). We might think 
of positing and external reflection, then, as two moments of or stages within a wider and 
more comprehensive circle of reflection. This wider circle is called by Hegel ‘determining 
                                                          
51 Cf. Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 147.  
52 Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, p. 147. 
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reflection,’ and is analysed with regard to the ‘determinations’ [Reflexionsbestimmungen] 
that it posits, which we shall treat in the next chapter.     
Insofar as determining reflection is positing reflection, it first of all produces a 
moment of posited being which is negative. As Hegel states, ‘as positedness it is negation 
as such, a non-being over against an other’ (SL 408/LW 23). In that this determination is 
wholly negative, it is sublated in itself, such that, as Hegel remarks, the equality of 
reflection with itself is not disturbed by it. What is posited here is thus only a moment of, 
and so immediately reincorporated by, the reflection that posits it. In the next chapter we 
shall see that this is true of the first form of ‘absolute difference’ that is posited by 
identity.  
On the other hand, insofar as determining reflection is also external reflection, its 
determination proves to be not mere posited being, but also to be ‘reflected into itself.’ 
As Hegel writes: ‘Firstly, the determination is positedness, negation as such; secondly, it is 
reflection into self. As positedness, it is negation as negation; this accordingly is already 
its unity with itself’ (SL 407/LW 23). Every moment of determinacy is thus always already 
a moment of self-equality, because its negation is internal to it and is thus self-relating 
negation. It is in this way that the determination that has been posited by reflection can 
detach itself from that reflection and persist in a certain independence from it. It can do 
so because it itself is a different form of reflection. In the following chapter we shall this 
process occur at the end of Hegel’s account of absolute difference.   
As we shall see in the next chapter, essence henceforth ‘loses itself’ in its 
determinations, or its ‘essential seeming’: ‘determining reflection is reflection that has 
come forth from itself; the equality of essence with itself loses itself in negation, which is 
the dominant factor’ (SL 407/LW 23).   
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Conclusion 
 
In following Hegel’s account of essence, we first saw essence emerge from the self-
sublation of the immediacy of being. Essence is thus what being proves to be, or ‘the 
truth of being’; yet because the truth of being is non-immediacy, essence initially seemed 
to be distinct from, and the simple negation of, being. Though this distinction was 
sublated, a more subtle distinction nonetheless still seemed to remain between essence 
on the one hand and being as Schein on the other. This distinction, in turn, was shown to 
be merely apparent insofar as Schein and essence are in truth the very same process of 
self-relating negation, or negativity: a circular process which consists in the continual 
alternation of self-division and self-coincidence.  
The second part of the opening chapter of the Doctrine of Essence, dealing with 
reflection, is the mirror image of the first. Here the movement of the Logic doubled back 
on itself, such that it was no longer a question of showing how essence emerged from 
being, but of how being is, ‘in truth,’ an effect of essence as reflection.   
Nevertheless, as we saw, essence is not an unadulterated process of self-
determination. For in its positing it turned out to be presupposing. By the stage of 
determining reflection, this presupposition seems to have been ‘overcome,’ for all 
immediacy has proved to be only reflected immediacy. The emergence of the unity 
between immediacy and reflection is thus one of those moments in the logic of essence 
when positing comes to be simultaneous with presupposing. Yet this does not mean that 
reflection will henceforth be a pure process of self-determination which encounters no 
presupposition. As we shall see in the following chapter, the presupposition of reflection 
will return, yet what will be presupposed here will not be the negative of reflection as 
such, but another form of reflection. Here reflection will be doubled, such that one form 
42 
 
of reflection (difference) will gain an independence from the movement of reflection 
through which it is posited (identity). At this point, the remainder will manifest itself not 
as that which disturbs the closure of one process of reflection, but as that which prevents 
these different forms of reflection from forming one whole—i.e. as the difference of 
identity and difference. This difference will then be ‘overcome’ by the logic of opposition 
which drives the sphere of essence forward.  
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Chapter 2: Hegel’s Logic of Identity and Difference 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we considered the transition from the sphere of being to that of 
essence. We saw that, on the one hand, essence is not the immediacy of being, but, on 
the other hand, is also not other than this immediacy. Indeed, as reflection, essence 
proved to be the truth of the seeming immediacy of being. In this way, Hegel’s conception 
of essence was seen to be a continuation of the broadly Platonic-Aristotelian 
understanding of essence as that which is self-sufficient or ‘in virtue of itself.’ Yet it was 
also seen that for something to be truly self-sufficient is not for it to be detached from its 
relations to other things, but rather for these relations to be taken account of and 
included within itself, such that they are intrinsic aspects of what that thing is. Essence as 
reflection is therefore described by Hegel as ‘the relation to its otherness within itself’ (SL 
408/LW 23); but since this is a relation to its otherness within itself, it is a relation to its 
otherness as to itself. As purely self-relating, essence continually ‘goes together with 
itself’ and is therefore reflexively immediate. 
It is thus not difficult to see why the first ‘determination of reflection’ that results 
from this unity of reflection and immediacy should be ‘identity.’ Reflection has proved to 
be a process of self-determination which gives itself its own ‘posited being.’ Nevertheless, 
reflection as the relation to its otherness within itself is also the relation to its otherness 
within itself. The movement of positing will therefore again come up against a 
presupposition, which in the present context means that identity will prove to be always 
already shot through with difference.  
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In the following, I will be particularly concerned to consider the status of 
difference within Hegel’s analysis of the determinations of reflection. I shall first show 
that identity, for Hegel, does not prescind from difference, but is only a form of 
indifference in difference. As soon as it unfolds itself, identity always already contains 
difference within itself. Nevertheless, since difference ‘emerges,’ as it were, in and 
through the movement of identity, it might be thought that it remains subordinate to 
identity, as merely identity’s ‘posited’ moment—i.e. the product of identity’s self-division 
which is then simply reabsorbed back into identity. In the following I shall argue that, in 
Hegel’s dialectic of identity and difference, identity is not privileged in this simple 
manner. In doing so, I shall claim that this dialectic does not correspond to Karin de Boer’s 
recent reading of the general dialectical movement of the Logic.    
In de Boer’s view, Hegel’s methodology undergoes a significant change between 
his early and his mature works. In the early Essay on Natural Law, for example, de Boer 
claims that Hegel conceives the contrary moments of ethical life as finite moments which 
possess a relative independence, but which are also initially entangled with each other. In 
the Essay, Hegel first saw a need to disentangle these determinations before arriving at 
their synthetic unity. By the time of the Logic, however, this initial entanglement is 
bypassed; it is rather the case that, in truth, one of the contrary terms already contains 
the other, such that its ultimate reconciliation with it is never in any real doubt.  
For de Boer, this reconciliation is guaranteed because the Logic presupposes that 
the conflicts between the fundamental concepts in the history of philosophy have been 
resolved. Hegel’s concept represents the culmination of this history, and its abstraction 
from itself to its barest form constitutes the beginning of the Logic with pure being. Yet 
the concept remains, as it were, in the background, as the ‘ground’ into which the Logic 
progresses. As de Boer writes, 
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As soon as the Logic begins, it is not the entanglement of contrary conceptual 
determinations, but rather the abstract identity of a concept that constitutes the 
beginning of its attempt at self-actualization. Since, moreover, this abstract identity 
from the outset contains its contrary determinations, it is in fact their synthetic unity 
– albeit merely such as it is ‘in itself’ – that replaces the initial entanglement of 
contrary conceptual determinations. Hegel, in other words, could not have 
developed the Logic without presupposing that the concept as such has once and for 
all resolved the initial entanglement of its contrary determinations so as to establish 
itself as the absolute principle of thought.
1
 
 
It is on the basis of this general presupposition that the two contrary determinations 
within any given stage of the Logic will, on de Boer’s reading, always be asymmetrically 
related. One determination will ‘actualise’ itself by opposing itself to and reducing its 
other to a moment of itself. It will be able to do so because, in truth, that other is always 
already contained within it as a moment posited by it.2 It is the asymmetrical reduction of 
one moment to the self-actualisation of the other that de Boer calls ‘absolute negativity.’3 
A key example of such absolute negativity, for de Boer, is the dialectic of the finite and 
the infinite in the Doctrine of Being. On de Boer’s reading, the infinite ‘reduces itself’ to a 
finite term in the moment of its opposition to the finite, but is itself the whole which 
contains this opposition as a moment—and in a way in which the finite cannot. As she 
writes,  
                                                          
1 Karin de Boer, On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), pp. 87–8. 
2 de Boer, pp. 99–100. 
3 de Boer, p. 179. We shall consider de Boer’s reading of absolute negativity in the following chapter. 
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Whereas the infinite reduces the finite to a subordinate moment by means of which 
it can actualise itself, the finite reduces itself to precisely this subordinate moment. 
Only the infinite, in other words, contains its contrary in such a way that it can both 
posit the latter over against itself and reduce it to a subordinate moment of itself.
4
  
 
For de Boer, absolute negativity reflects the mature Hegel’s excessive optimism and 
inability to think persistent conflicts.5 To this negativity she opposes the entanglement of 
relatively independent determinations found in his early works, which she calls ‘tragic 
negativity.’ This form of negativity expresses the symmetrical relation of finite terms. As 
they are always entangled, however, the attempt of one term to actualise itself will 
always be threatened, as it were, ‘from the inside,’ by the contrary attempt of the other.6 
It is by returning to the earlier Hegel, then, that de Boer attempts to depart from the 
mature Hegel; more importantly, as we shall see in the next chapter, she also interprets 
Derridean differance along the lines of ‘tragic negativity.’     
Now de Boer’s reading of absolute negativity, I would suggest, misrepresents the 
methodology of the Logic as a whole. But my concern here is only to show that it does 
not correspond to the dialectic of identity and difference. It is true that the first form of 
difference that emerges in this dialectic, which Hegel calls ‘absolute difference,’ is to a 
great extent only a ‘moment’ of the  self-unfolding of identity. It resembles the 
presupposition of positing reflection, which does not truly disturb the unity of reflection 
with itself. If the dialectic of identity and difference did not proceed beyond this point, it 
would indeed correspond to de Boer’s reading of absolute negativity.  Nevertheless, just 
                                                          
4 de Boer, p. 92. 
5 de Boer, p. 2-9. 
6 de Boer, p. 178. 
47 
 
as a more radical presupposition emerged from that of positing reflection, here too, a 
more radical form of difference is seen to emerge from ‘absolute difference.’ This is a 
form of difference which, in being ‘reflected into itself,’ does not immediately collapse 
back into identity, but is able to persist as difference while containing a ‘moment’ of 
identity within itself. At this point, difference proves to be not merely a moment of the 
whole, but to be, like identity, both a moment and the whole. It detaches itself from and 
thereby proves not to have been posterior to, the movement of identity that ‘posited’ it. 
Hegel draws attention to the importance of this form of difference in the following 
passage from the Encyclopaedia:   
 
essence is being-within-self, it is essential only insofar as it has the negative of itself, 
[i.e.,] the relation-to-another, or mediation, within itself. It has the inessential, 
therefore, as its own seeming [Schein] within itself. But there is a distinguishing 
[Unterscheiden] contained in the seeming or mediation, and what is distinct itself 
acquires the form of identity, in its distinction from the identity from which it 
emerges, and in which it is not or is [only] seeming. Hence, what is distinct is itself in 
the mode of self-relating immediacy or of being (Enc § 114).   
 
I shall claim, therefore, that from this point in the Logic on, identity and difference are, as 
William Maker puts it, ‘equiprimordial.’7 They are also symmetrical, so that while one can 
say that difference is still only the ‘mirror image’ of identity, what is mirrored (identity) 
does not precede its ‘image.’ As we shall see in chapter 3, Hegel’s dialectic of identity and 
difference is then extremely close to, and indeed, ultimately also incorporates, the tragic 
                                                          
7 William Maker, ‘Identity, Difference, and the Logic of Otherness’, in Identity and Difference: Studies in 
Hegel’s Logic, Philosophy of Spirit, and Politics, ed. by Philip T. Grier (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2007), p. 21. 
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negativity that de Boer would oppose to it. The equiprimordiality and symmetry of 
identity and difference is maintained, I shall claim, in all of the forms of difference that 
follow from absolute difference: diversity, opposition, and contradiction. 
 
Difference is thus not subordinated to identity in any straightforward sense. That is to 
say, difference is not subordinated to identity as to its contrary determination: it is 
neither simply posited by identity nor, as we shall see, does it become a ‘subordinate 
moment’ of identity. The majority of the following chapter will be devoted to showing 
this. Nevertheless, at the end of the chapter, I shall claim that identity is privileged over 
difference at a ‘meta-level’: that of the identity of identity and difference. This claim 
constitutes the beginning of an interpretation of Derrida’s remark on Hegel in Positions, 
which will be addressed in more detail in chapter 3:   
 
I have attempted to distinguish différance […] from Hegelian difference, and have 
done so precisely at the point at which Hegel, in the greater Logic, determines 
difference as contradiction only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, to lift it up […] 
into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis (P 44/59-
60).    
 
Identity comes to be privileged as the identity of identity and difference not despite, but 
precisely because of the equality and symmetry of identity and difference. As John Protevi 
notes, it is on this basis that the two determinations come into absolute contradiction; 
they thereby pass into each other initially without leaving a remainder and form a ground 
which encompasses both within a single reflection.8 It is crucial to note, however, that 
                                                          
8 John Protevi, ‘Derrida and Hegel: Différance and Unterschied’, in Jacques Derrida, Vol. 1, ed. by 
Christopher Norris and David Roden (London: Sage, 2003), 331–46 (p. 335/7). 
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ground itself is not simply the identity of identity and difference. It is also, as Hegel notes 
in the Encyclopaedia, the difference of identity and difference (Enc § 121, Add.). Because 
the latter difference remains, ground amounts to the more thorough interpenetration of 
identity and difference, but not their absolute unity. Yet each time a new contradiction 
arises in the logic of essence, this interpenetration becomes ever more thorough, until, in 
the transition to the concept, the remainder of the difference between identity and 
difference vanishes. Contradiction, then, ultimately leads to the oneness of identity and 
difference.  Furthermore, in the following I shall also indicate the ‘all-or-nothing’ 
character of the dialectical movement in this stage of the logic of essence, which provides 
the basis for its subsequent stages. As we shall see, the dialectic moves from the simple 
coincidence of identity and difference to their complete separation, and from there 
directly to their opposition and subsequent sublation into a new unity. As will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4, this all-or-nothing movement preserves the 
symmetry of identity and difference by preventing a certain contamination of ‘internal 
difference’ by ‘external’ difference, a contamination which would ultimately lead to the 
excess of difference over identity.  
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Part 1. Identity9 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the transition to determining reflection marks the 
sublation of the difference between immediacy and reflection. Immediacy has proved to 
be in truth only the ‘going together with itself’ of negation, or negativity. In short, this 
means that there can no longer ‘be’ anything outside the movement of reflection, such 
that reflection now has its outside within itself, as an internal limit. As Hegel writes at the 
end of his discussion of determining reflection: ‘In so far, therefore, as it is the 
positedness that is at the same time reflection-into-self, the determinateness of 
reflection is the relation to its otherness within itself [an ihr selbst]’ (SL 408/LW 23). As we 
noted above, because reflection is only a relation to its otherness within itself, it is first of 
all a relation to this otherness as to itself. As such, it is called by Hegel, ‘identity.’    
Now it may initially seem that Hegel treats identity as he treats the categories 
which begin each new dialectical stage in the Doctrine of Being. There, the new category 
is first taken up in its positive (seiende) immediacy, without reference to its other. In 
Hegel’s introductory comments on the determinations of reflection, for example, he 
writes that identity, as simple relation to itself, is ‘the lack of any determination 
                                                          
9 In the following, the determinations of reflection shall be considered almost exclusively as they are 
treated in Hegel’s Greater Logic. As was noted in the previous chapter, Hegel’s analysis of all logical 
categories, at least until the Doctrine of the Concept, is partly a critical analysis. Nevertheless, this 
critical dimension is far more prominent in the Encyclopaedia’s treatment of the determinations of 
reflection, as the latter also acts as the transitional stage between being and essence which in the 
Greater Logic is fulfilled by a separate discussion of reflection. In order, then, to understand what Hegel 
takes to be the truth of the categories of identity and difference, it is necessary to attend to the latter 
work. 
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[Bestimmungslosigkeit]’ (SL 409/LW 24, trans. modified, my emphasis). This impression 
might be reinforced when, a little later, Hegel states that ‘Essence is simple immediacy as 
sublated immediacy. Its negativity is its being; it is self-equal [sich selbst gleich] in its 
absolute negativity, through which otherness and relation-to-other has vanished in its 
own self into pure equality-with-self. Essence is therefore simple identity-with-self.’ (SL 
411/LW 27). This might suggest that identity is conceived as the collapse of reflection into 
the simple immediacy of and indifference of the sphere of being.  
  Yet not only does the phrase ‘its negativity is its being’ indicate that Hegel’s 
conception of identity will be far more complex than this; but in the sphere of essence no 
category, even in its most immediate form, can any be longer be one-sided in the manner 
of the categories of being. Essence is the sphere of mediation, wherein each category is 
always already permeated by its ‘other.’ Indeed, in the remark following the introductory 
statements on identity, Hegel is highly critical of those conceptions of identity that either 
begin with identity and difference as already self-subsistent terms and then weave these 
together,10 or that abstract identity and difference from their entanglement with one 
                                                          
10 Hegel appears to be making an indirect reference here to the notion of the symploke—the weaving 
together of ‘nouns’ and ‘verbs’—in Plato’s Sophist. In a manner that sheds an important light on the 
difference between Hegel and Derrida, the latter seems to  indicate his own displacement of this notion 
when he reflects on how he might discuss ‘differance’:  ‘I would like to attempt, to a certain extent, and 
even though in principle and in the last analysis this is impossible, and impossible for essential reasons, 
to reassemble in a sheaf the different directions in which I have been able to utilize what I would call 
provisionally the word or concept of différance, or rather to let it impose itself upon me in its 
neographism, although as we shall see, différance is literally neither a word nor a concept.’ This figure is 
invoked partly because, ‘the word sheaf seems to mark more appropriately that the assemblage to be 
proposed has the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing which permits the different threads 
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another. It is in the context of this remark that Hegel makes the following statement, 
which foreshadows the dialectic to come: 
 
A consideration of everything that is shows that in its own self everything is in its 
self-sameness [Gleichheit] different from itself [sich ungleich] and self-contradictory; 
and in its difference [Verschiedenheit], in its contradiction, is identical with itself, and 
is in itself this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other, 
because each is in itself the opposite of itself. (SL 412/LW 28, trans. modified).
11
 
 
Identity, then, is not the result of reflection or the collapse into simple immediacy, but is, 
as Hegel states, ‘reflection in its entirety, not a distinct [unterschiedenes] moment of it’ 
(SL 412/LW 27, trans. modified). Yet while identity is the whole of reflection, it is still 
reflection that is accented in a certain manner.  
We saw in the previous chapter that reflection has two fundamental ‘moments’: 
one in which negation is separated from itself; the other in which negation coincides with 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and different lines of meaning—or of force—to go off again in different directions, just as it is always 
ready to tie itself up with others’ (M 3/3).   
11 In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel is even more forthright: ‘It is of great importance to reach an adequate 
understanding of the true significance of identity, and this means above all that it must not be 
interpreted merely as abstract identity, i.e. as identity that excludes distinction [Unterschied]. This is the 
point that distinguishes all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of philosophy (§ 115). 
Later he adds, ‘although recent philosophy has frequently been nicknamed ‘Philosophy of Identity’, it is 
precisely philosophy, and above all speculative logic, which exhibits the nullity of the mere identity that 
belongs to understanding, the identity that abstracts from distinction. This philosophy then also insists, 
to be sure, that we should not rest content with mere diversity but become cognizant of the inner unity 
of everything there is.’ (§118 Add.).  
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itself. As Miguel de Beistegui notes,12 identity is that form of reflection which emphasises 
the latter moment of coincidence. It is the movement of seeming or shining within itself 
in such a way that this seeming is already reflected into itself as its own seeming: the self-
division that, because it is only self-division, is immediately a self-coincidence. As Hegel 
puts this: ‘As absolute negation it is the negation that immediately negates itself, a non-
being [Nichtsein] and difference [Unterschied] that vanishes in its arising, or a 
differentiating by which nothing is differentiated, but which immediately collapses within 
itself’ (SL 413/LW 29). This is why identity initially seemed to be the lack of any 
determination, for it posits its determinations as already sublated.  
As we can see, identity is then a form of positing reflection or an active process of 
self-determination. For insofar as its otherness is already internal to it, in negating that 
otherness it only negates itself and so immediately coincides with itself. Hegel states that 
identity is thus, ‘the equality-with-self as the bringing of itself to unity [sich zur Einheit 
herstellende], not a restoration of itself from an other, but this pure production 
[Herstellen] from and within itself’ (SL 411/LW 27, trans. modified). This movement can 
perhaps best be illustrated if we think of the identity of a particular being. Identity would 
be the manner in which the determinations of that being which arise through its relations 
to other beings are taken account of and determined as having been always already 
included within itself, in the ‘timeless past’ of essence. For insofar as these 
determinations are integral to what that being is, they represent relations not to an 
other, but only to itself. Here, again, we can note the Nachträglichkeit of identity, for it is 
not simply prior to difference, but only ‘will have been’ prior.  
                                                          
12 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), p. 89. 
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Identity is, then, as John Burbidge puts it, ‘an equivalence to itself that is 
maintained through a process of change,’ because, ‘as a difference begins to appear, it 
disappears. In the concept of identity the moment of change is introduced only to be 
dismissed as creating no essential difference.’13 It is important to be clear however, that a 
change makes no difference to identity because it is precisely determined as not a 
change: it is determined as always already having been posited by identity itself.14 
Nevertheless, to the extent that identity is not simply ‘there’ from the outset, but only 
comes to be posited as having been there from the outset through this movement, 
Hegel’s conception of identity can be expressed as indifference in difference.   
  
Part 2. Difference 
 
2.1 Absolute Difference (Absoluter Unterschied) 
 
Identity, however, now proves to be difference. Difference therefore does not emerge, as 
both Burbidge and Protevi contend,15 through its exclusion by identity. Identity, as 
Houlgate notes, is not yet ‘in relation’ to difference, but is purely self-relating.16 At this 
point, identity has no immediacy that could be placed over against difference, for it 
consists only in the relation of negation to itself, and at this point identity is all that 
                                                          
13 John W. Burbidge, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), 
p. 73.  
14 This is precisely why the concept of ‘change’ does not apply in the logic of essence as it did in the logic 
of being.  
15 Burbidge, p. 74; Protevi, pp. 333–4. 
16 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, in A Companion To 
Hegel (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), pp. 139–58 (p. 148). 
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essence has proved to be. Yet within this process of self-relation a separation of negation 
from itself is necessary in order for negation not simply to collapse into simple immediacy 
in its self-coincidence. Difference thus initially ‘emerges’ because it is found to be 
constitutive of identity as identity. As Houlgate writes, identity ‘is nothing but difference 
because within itself it is nothing but reflexion and self-negating negation.’17   
Difference, then, is always already internal to the unfolding of identity. This is made 
clear in Hegel’s remark on the principle of identity: A = A. Throughout this chapter of the 
Logic Hegel is highly critical of the basic (onto)logical principles on which he remarks, but 
here this criticism only extends to the particular way in which he takes the principle of 
identity usually to be understood. Indeed, in the Encyclopaedia he calls this principle  
‘true enough’ (Enc § 115), but objects to its usual interpretation which, in taking it to 
express simple, abstract identity with self, ignores its very structure. He contrasts this 
interpretation with the speculative understanding of the principle:   
 
In the form of the proposition, therefore, in which identity is expressed, there lies 
more than simple, abstract identity; in it, there lies this pure movement of reflection 
in which the other appears only as seeming, as an immediate vanishing; A is, is a 
beginning that hints at something different [Verschiedenes] to which an advance is 
to be made; but this different something is not reached; A is – A; the difference is 
only a vanishing; the movement returns into itself’ (SL 415-6/LW 32).  
 
As the self-relation of negation, identity requires negation to differ from itself—to 
continually delay its coincidence with itself even, one might say, in the very process of 
coinciding. In this respect, then, identity turns out to be nothing other than difference. Its 
self-coincidence is equally a self-differing.  
                                                          
17 Houlgate, p. 148. 
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Here it is important to stress that the difference that identity has proved to be is 
pure self-difference. Although in the process of reflection a relation to an other appears 
to arise, this is a mere appearance because negation differs only from itself. Indeed, it is 
from the notion of identity as a ‘differentiating by which nothing is differentiated,’ that 
Hegel directly arrives at absolute difference: ‘Here […] distinguishing is present as self-
related negativity, as a non-being which is the non-being of itself, a non-being which has 
its non-being not in another but in its own self. What is present, therefore, is self-related, 
reflected difference, or pure absolute difference’  (SL 413/LW 28).   
 
2.1.1 Absolute Difference = Absolute Identity  
 
Hegel now claims that absolute difference, in turn, proves to be nothing other than 
identity. For Protevi, this movement of the dialectic responds to the exigency of rational 
thought. As he puts it, ‘To think difference as difference some identity must be implicated 
in difference, so that difference stands still long enough to be thought as difference.’18 On 
Protevi’s reading, this is a crucial dimension of the difference between Hegel and Derrida: 
‘This giving of a meaningful identity to difference, this rendering difference meaningful 
via the implication of an identity is the first stage in which, in Derrida’s words, Hegel 
“determines difference as contradiction.”’19 Protevi’s claim, however, is problematic if it 
is to be taken as a reading of this particular section of the Logic. Even if one rejects the 
premise of the Logic that we noted in the previous chapter—namely the identity of 
thought and being—here would not be the point at which to show that a form of 
difference has emerged which might escape rational thought. Absolute difference in truth 
                                                          
18 Protevi, p. 334. 
19 Protevi, p. 334. 
57 
 
proves to be identity for a simple reason—one with which, as we shall see, Derrida largely 
concurs.  
Absolute difference proves to be identity because it is only self-related difference. 
While it is self-relating negation, it is nonetheless the negation that relates only to itself, 
and so continually ‘goes together with itself.’ Like identity, then, it is a movement in 
which a difference appears, but since the latter is only a self-difference, it makes no 
difference and so is immediately annulled.  
Difference, in its initial ‘absolute’ form, can then be seen as a rather ‘minimal’ 
form of difference. It is immediately ‘reabsorbed’ back into the movement of identity, 
because in truth it never really left this movement. In this way, it resembles the 
presupposition of positing reflection which does not trouble the self-determining capacity 
of reflection, for it is a ‘presupposition’ that immediately sublates itself and proves to 
have been ‘pre-posited.’ To this extent, we might say, with Miguel de Beistegui, that 
absolute difference is ‘nothing more than the unfolding of itself of the negativity within 
identity.’20  
It is important to note that this does not mean that there is now, in truth, only identity. 
Difference remains necessary to the unfolding of identity, but the crucial point is that it 
does not disturb this process of self-determination. Difference is a moment in a process of 
self-relation, as the difference between A as subject and A as predicate—a difference 
which vanishes in its very appearing. As Hegel writes, ‘Difference is the negativity which 
reflection has in it, the nothing which is said in enunciating identity, the essential moment 
of identity itself which, as the negativity of itself, determines itself and is distinguished 
from difference’ (SL 417/LW 33).  
                                                          
20 Beistegui, p. 91. 
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At this point, Hegel is only unfolding what difference initially proves to be, and 
thereby showing that when difference takes the form of ‘absolute difference,’ it 
immediately collapses back into identity. This is a point to which Derrida acknowledges an 
ambiguous debt in an important footnote to his ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ which I shall 
come back to in the following chapter: ‘Pure difference is not absolutely different (from 
nondifference). Hegel’s critique of the concept of pure difference is for us here, the most 
uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought absolute difference, and showed that it can be 
pure only by being impure’ (WD 411, n. 91/227, n.1).21  
Now if Hegel’s dialectic of identity and difference were to stop here, then it 
would indeed correspond to the manner in which de Boer reads the relationship between 
contrary categories within the Logic as a whole. As we shall see, however, difference now 
comes to take on a more radical form. This is noted by de Beistegui, who states that, in 
the next category to be examined—diversity—‘essence provide[s] itself with a 
determination that remain[s] indifferent to the process that generated it’22 Nevertheless, 
although de Beistegui gives a nuanced reading of this chapter of the Logic,23 he conceives 
                                                          
21 I am indebted to Johannes-Georg Schülein for drawing attention to this footnote in his paper at the 
2012 Hegel-Kongress in Istanbul. The paper, ‘Hegel und die Stimme der Metaphysik. Zu Derridas Hegel-
Lektüre in Der Schacht und die Pyramide’ is forthcoming in the Hegel Jahrbuch, Hegel gegen Hegel, ed. 
By A. Arndt, M. Gerhard, and J.Zovko (Akademie-Verlag: Berlin).  
22 Beistegui, p. 93. 
23 More than many post-Derridean commentators on Hegel, de Beistegui acknowledges and emphasises 
that, for Hegel, difference lies at the heart of identity. Indeed, he sees the fundamental shift that takes 
place with German Idealism, and that is exemplified by Hegel, to be the freeing of difference from its 
determination as contrariety in Aristotelian metaphysics. As he writes, the Logic ‘enacts a transgression 
in relation to the classical concept of difference […] to the extent that, refusing to subordinate 
difference to the prior identity of a substance or of a genus, it takes it into the hitherto forbidden 
59 
 
its subsequent development in terms that are sometimes reminiscent of de Boer’s. For he 
also states that difference 
 
comprises various strata, various dialectically generated phases, which all stem from 
the self-repelling of identity. The various determinations of this process of 
differentiation are diversity (die Verschiedenheit), opposition (der Gegensatz), and 
contradiction (der Widerspruch). From the outset, then, not only opposition […] but 
also contradiction itself is included within the process of differentiation, and so [is] 
internal—and indeed essential—to the constitution of identity.
24
   
 
In the following, however, I shall claim that difference as it now emerges, and in the 
forms it subsequently takes, cannot be thought as simply internal to the constitution of 
identity; it is rather that which disrupts, and cannot be contained by, identity as a process 
of self-determination.   
 
2.1.2 From Absolute Difference to Diversity 
 
This new form of difference emerges in a similar way to the presupposition of external 
reflection that we considered in the previous chapter. It too is reached through the 
unfolding of all that is implicit in the concept of difference as self-relating negativity. This 
unfolding goes as follows. On the one hand, as we have seen, difference is the self-
                                                                                                                                                                 
territory of contradiction’ (Beistegui, p. 80). For de Beistegui, the logic of identity and difference is 
pivotal in that it expresses in undeveloped form the truth of the concept, which ‘is self-identical only to 
the extent that it opens itself to that which is wholly other than it. Its capacity to be is only a function of 
its capacity to be other, its capacity to open itself to contradiction’ (Beistegui, p. 89).  
24 Beistegui, p. 90. 
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relation of the negative. Yet because this relation is only a self-relation, the negative 
continually ‘goes together with itself’ and collapses back into identity. It thereby proves 
to be a ‘moment’ that is in truth contained within identity; identity is thereby the whole 
of the reflective movement in which both identity and difference are moments. On the 
other hand, however, the very fact that the negative only goes together with itself also 
gives it a certain self-sufficiency as the negative or as different that precisely allows it to 
resist its collapse into identity. It is, as Hegel puts it, ‘reflected into itself’ as difference by 
containing within itself a moment of identity. From this perspective, then, difference is 
also the whole of the reflective movement in which both difference and identity are 
moments.  
At this point, we can see that identity has come up against a presupposition that 
is not simply its own position and that it does not simply precede. For identity now proves 
to be as much a posited moment of difference as difference is a posited moment of 
identity. In truth, then, neither identity nor difference is logically prior to the other, but 
each only will have been prior to the other, after the fact. To this extent, the two 
determinations can be described as ‘equiprimordial.’  
The transition to diversity can now be understood on the basis of this equality or 
equiprimordiality of identity and difference. Each, as a different ‘side’ of reflection or with 
a different emphasis, is determinately different to the other. Yet because each contains 
the other, each is also the whole of reflection. As Hegel writes, difference, ‘possesses 
both moments, identity and difference; both are thus a positedness, a determinacy. But in 
this positedness each is relation to itself. One of the two, identity, is itself immediately 
the moment of reflection-into-self; but equally, the other, difference, is difference in 
itself, reflected difference’ (SL 418/LW 35). Each then contains within itself both its 
‘other’ and its difference from that other, or, as Houlgate writes, difference ‘includes 
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identity as that which it is not,’ as does identity difference.25 This, as we shall see a little 
later, will ultimately drive difference to take the form of contradiction, but it initially has a 
very different result.   
  
2.2 Diversity (Die Verschiedenheit) 
 
2.2.1 The Diverse 
 
Since both identity and difference now contain both their other and their difference from 
their other within themselves, they both take on a seeming self-sufficiency. Though each 
is one side of reflection, each is also the whole of reflection, and for this reason they now 
fall apart from, and become indifferent to, one another. As Hegel writes, ‘Identity falls 
apart within itself into diversity because as absolute difference it posits itself as its own 
negative within itself, and these its moments, namely itself and its negative, are 
reflections in themselves [Reflexionen in sich], are self-identical‘ (SL 418/LW 35). As cut 
off from and indifferent to one another, identity and difference now come to appear as 
two distinct beings; as such, they are called by Hegel ‘the diverse.’ 
Furthermore, the diverse are not indifferent to one another simply because they 
are what we might call two separate ‘spheres’ of reflection, but rather because these two 
spheres have themselves undergone an internal collapse. Let us consider why this should 
be. Each determination contains its difference from the other within itself. Yet because 
this difference is wholly internal, it has always already been cancelled as a difference—
once again, we could say that it ‘makes no difference.’ As Lakebrink observes, it is then 
                                                          
25 Houlgate, p. 149. 
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because the diverse are indifferent to their own ‘interior difference’26 that they are 
wholly indifferent to each other. Since the diverse are thus no longer differentiated 
within themselves, they collapse, as Houlgate emphasises, into the simple immediacy 
encountered in the logic of being,27 such that their difference falls outside them (SL 418-
9/LW 36).   
Now here of course we might question quite why the diverse should collapse into 
such wholly simple self-identity. We might question, in other words, why the fact that the 
difference of each term from the other is internal to each should mean that this internal 
difference now makes no difference. Why should it not persist as a ‘contaminating’ 
difference? It is not clear, then, that the transition from a state in which identity and 
difference only coincide with each other to one in which they fall wholly outside each 
other can be justified on a purely immanent basis. Yet it is this either-or movement that, 
in Hegel’s analysis of identity and difference, serves to prevent any prolonged 
contamination between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ difference.     
The diverse, then, are simply self-identical and indifferent to their difference. We 
might then say that the foundation of diversity is identity in a dual sense: firstly, diversity 
rests on the simply immediate identity of the diverse terms themselves. As Hegel puts 
this, ‘They are diverse when they are reflected into themselves, that is, when they relate 
to themselves; as such, they are in the determination of identity’ (SL 418/LW 35), trans. 
modified). Secondly, the simple self-identity of the diverse is itself a result of the 
interpenetration, or the identity, of identity and difference. Only because both 
                                                          
26 Bernhard Lakebrink, Kommentar zu Hegels Logik in seiner Enzyklopädie von 1830, Bd. 1, Sein und 
Wesen (Freiburg: Alber, 1979), pp. 224–5; cf. also J. Biard et al., Introduction à la lecture de la ‘Science 
de la logique’ de Hegel, vol. 2, La doctrine de l’essence (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983), p. 70. 
27 As Houlgate writes, ‘reflexion produces simple, non-reflexive immediacy by becoming wholly external 
to itself’ (Houlgate, p. 149).  
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determinations contain their other within themselves do they both collapse, as we saw, 
into simple immediacy. This point, it is worth noting, is clearly acknowledged by Derrida 
in Glas:   
 
Diversity is a moment of difference, an indifferent difference, an external difference, 
without opposition. As long as the two moments of difference (identity and 
difference since identity differs, as identity) are in relationship to themselves and not 
to the other, as long as identity does not oppose itself to difference or difference to 
identity, there is diversity. So diversity is a moment both of difference and identity, it 
being understood, very expressly, that difference is the whole and its own proper 
moment. (Gl 168/189).  
  
Nevertheless, though the basis of diversity is identity, this does not mean that diversity 
constitutes a reduction of difference. Within the sphere of diversity, difference remains 
equal to identity, but is now, as we shall see, wholly external to ‘the diverse’ or to the 
self-identical terms.    
 
2.2.2 Likeness and Unlikeness: External Difference 
 
The falling apart of identity and difference into the diverse itself implies the falling apart 
of reflection and immediacy. Though the diverse terms are implicitly reflexive, they are 
now wholly indifferent to their mutual mediation. This does not mean that reflection 
disappears, but it does mean that reflection can only relate the diverse beings to one 
another in an external manner, or from the perspective of a ‘third’ (SL 420/LW 37).  
In its external form, reflection too is divided into distinct moments. The latter are 
no longer identity and difference; since these have become external to themselves, they 
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are replaced by ‘likeness’ [Gleichheit] and ‘unlikeness’ [Ungleichheit]. Furthermore, in the 
comparison of external reflection, likeness is posited without reference to unlikeness and 
vice versa; though external reflection continually switches from the one to the other, they 
are never brought together in the same moment of reflection. The diverse are, as Hegel 
writes, ‘in one respect [Seite] like one another [einander gleich], but in another respect 
are unlike, and in so far as they are like, they are also unlike. Likeness relates only to itself, 
and likewise unlikeness is only unlikeness’ (SL 420/LW 37).  
In the Encyclopaedia Hegel notes that comparison based on isolated respects of 
likeness and unlikeness can yield valuable results in the experimental sciences, but that it 
is not sufficient for truly scientific [wissenschaftlich]—that is, philosophical—
comprehension (Enc § 117). The problem with such comparison is that it sets out from 
the assumption that things in themselves are simply immediate and indifferent to one 
another; it thereby fails to see that the seeming immediacy of these things is constituted 
through their relations to other things, and, above all, through their relations to their 
polar opposites. For example, it determines red as not yellow, not green, not blue, etc., 
but does not identify red in and through its opposition to green. As we shall see at the 
end of this chapter, it thereby fails to ground its comparative activity, and so fails to bring 
the various ‘respects’ and ‘points of view’ into one unified totality. In chapter 4, we shall 
see how a more developed form of the structure of diversity gives rise to the problem of 
relativity, such that things are intrinsically susceptible to being determined in different 
ways.   
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2.2.3 From Diversity to Opposition 
 
Although Hegel takes the complete separation of likeness and unlikeness to emerge 
through the Logic’s immanent development, he writes that it can also be thought as the 
motivated attempt of the understanding to avoid contradiction, an attempt that is 
doomed to failure: ‘The very thing that was supposed to hold off contradiction and 
dissolution from them, namely, that something is like something else in one respect, but is 
unlike it in another—this holding apart of likeness and unlikeness is their destruction 
[Zerstörung]’ (SL 420/LW 38). We can now turn to the manner in which Hegel shows that 
likeness and unlikeness, as well as the diverse themselves, presuppose one other.  
We already know of course that likeness and unlikeness and the two diverse 
terms are abstractions from, and moments within, a wider process of reflection. Yet 
Hegel does not draw on their genesis in order to show that, in truth, they are mediated by 
one another. With respect to unlikeness, he first states that, insofar as it is distinct from 
likeness, it is ‘like itself [sich selbst gleich] and ‘a reflection for itself’ (SL 420/LW 38, trans. 
modified). But this means it is not simply unlikeness but rather contains likeness within 
itself. Furthermore, both likeness and unlikeness are the likeness and unlikeness of a 
‘third,’ namely, of the diverse. This first of all means that likeness is the likeness of what is 
other than likeness itself, and so is not ‘the likeness of itself,’ or is not simply ‘self-
referred.’ Unlikeness, on the other hand, as the unlikeness of what is unlike unlikeness is 
thereby not unlike itself, or, as we might put it, ‘itself unlike,’ but rather like itself and 
only unlike something else (SL 421/LW 38).  
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Now on Houlgate’s reading, these arguments also serve to show why likeness and 
unlikeness are determinations of the diverse themselves, and so why the diverse are not 
in truth indifferent to one another, but rather within themselves like and unlike one 
another. As Houlgate writes, ‘the diverse, as diverse, are both unlike and like likeness and 
unlikeness.’28 In my view, however, this cannot serve as an explanation here since, 
whereas likeness and unlikeness are themselves essentially referred to the diverse, the 
diverse themselves are simply indifferent to likeness and unlikeness. Hegel, as I 
understand him, thus takes the following approach to explaining why the diverse must be 
in themselves like and unlike (one another): As reflected into themselves, the diverse are 
characterised simply by self-likeness. But this self-likeness, since it results from the 
annulment of their internal difference, is the abstract identity of simple immediacy. From 
the transition to essence, we know, however, that this immediacy is not truly self-
sufficient, but immediately sublates itself. In Hegel’s words, ‘the implicit [an sich seiende] 
reflection is self-relation without negation, abstract identity with itself, and so is 
positedness itself’ (SL 421/LW 39). The consequence of this is that in order to be and to 
maintain themselves as themselves, the diverse, just like likeness and unlikeness, must 
include within themselves their relation to each other.   
 
2.3 Opposition (Der Gegensatz) 
 
Now that likeness and unlikeness explicitly include their relation to each other within 
themselves,  they are determined as the positive and the negative. The positive is the 
‘self-likeness reflected into itself that contains within itself the relation to unlikeness’; the 
negative is the ‘unlikeness that contains within itself the reference to its non-being, to 
                                                          
28 Houlgate, p. 152. 
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likeness’ (SL 424/LW 43). In that each determination contains its relation to its other 
within itself, the transition to the positive and the negative signals the return of a form of 
reflection that is no longer external. This is why there is no longer a distinction between 
reflection and the terms that are related. Nevertheless, the positive and negative are not 
united within a single process of reflection, for insofar as each contains the other, each is 
again the whole of which it is also a part. We are thus once again confronted with two 
forms of reflection which both seem to be self-sufficient:    
 
The positive and the negative are thus the sides of the opposition that have become 
self-sufficient [selbständig]. They are self-sufficient in that they are the reflection of 
the whole in themselves, and they belong to opposition, insofar as it is the 
determinateness which, as the whole, is reflected into itself’ (SL 425/LW 43, trans. 
modified).   
 
The structure that has now emerged does not constitute simply a return to identity and 
difference as we encountered them just prior to the collapse into diversity. This might 
appear to be the case when Hegel writes that ‘each is itself and its other’ (SL 425/LW 43). 
Yet here the structure is different because each includes its other in a particular way. The 
two moments are only just returning from the illusory self-sufficiency that they seemed 
to possess in the state of diversity, so although each has to include its other in itself in 
order to be what it is, each includes the other as excluded. For this reason, Biard et al. 
describe opposition in a formula similar to that with which Hegel describes essence as 
such, namely as the ‘simple, or non-mediated, unity of immediacy and mediation.’29 Here 
again we can witness the all-or-nothing character of the dialectical movement. It is 
                                                          
29 Biard et al., p. 77. 
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because likeness and likeness first became completely indifferent to each other that, on 
rebounding out of this indifference, they set themselves up in a polemical relation to each 
other wherein each, in itself, explicitly and actively excludes the other. It is because this 
direct opposition ensues that, as we shall see, each term ultimately proves to be as much 
the other as it is itself, which means that they form a single whole.   
The process of exclusion takes place differently in the positive and the negative. 
Where the positive is concerned, while the moment of exclusion is necessary to its self-
identity, it does not constitute the major part of it—or as the Encyclopaedia succinctly 
puts it: ‘the positive is the identical relation to self in such a way that it is not the 
negative.’ The negative, on the other hand, has a certain positive being of its own, but is 
constituted almost entirely by its not being the positive: ‘the negative is what is distinct 
on its own account in such a way that it is not the positive’ (Enc § 119). Let us now 
consider the defining characteristics of the opposition that has developed between these 
two determinations.  
The opposition that has arisen is a genuine or absolute opposition because it is 
based on the equality of identity and difference, in three crucial and related respects. 
Firstly, it is reciprocal: while one term constitutes itself through its exclusion of the other, 
this other also constitutes itself via the exclusion of the first. Secondly, as we have seen, 
the terms of the opposition are equiprimordial. André Doz, I would suggest, is therefore 
mistaken in claiming that the positive must logically precede the negative in order that 
the latter can exist as negative,30 for the positive is in itself already related to the negative 
and, furthermore, is itself contained within the negative. One could therefore say of 
opposition that which de Beistegui writes of the contradiction that it will become, that it 
                                                          
30 André Doz, La Logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l’ontologie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), p. 
74. 
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‘disavows any problematic of the origin, as well as any attempt to elevate a given 
moment to a position of absolute superiority.’31 Thirdly, the relation between the positive 
and the negative is symmetrical: each is the mirror image of the other. Opposition as a 
whole is thus, like diversity, based on the equality of identity and difference in these 
three senses; what distinguishes it from diversity, however, is that in opposition identity 
and difference are more thoroughly intertwined.  
Hegel calls opposition the Vollendung of difference and it is clearly one of the 
most radical forms of difference we have seen in the Logic. De Beistegui characterises it in 
the following way: ‘In opposition […] the positive and the negative find themselves united 
from the start within a relation which, far from cancelling out their difference, allows 
them to be thought on the basis of difference alone.’32 This does not capture the whole 
truth of this relation, however, for it is based not just on the determinations’ negative 
relation to each other, but also on their reflection into self, or their identity. Yet this 
identity, in each case, is of course disrupted by a difference that it cannot contain, for the 
other that each contains is ‘the non-being of that in which it is supposed to be contained 
as only a moment’ (SL 425/LW 43). We might then say that each is both the condition of 
possibility and impossibility of the other, which would seem to indicate a point of great 
proximity to Derridean deconstruction. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, this 
resemblance only extends so far, since this Hegelian enabling-undermining relationship is 
based upon the relation of symmetrically determined, ‘own others,’ which undermine 
and enable each other equally.  
 
                                                          
31 Beistegui, p. 100. 
32 Beistegui, p. 94. 
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2.3.1 The Relation to an Own Other 
 
The transition from diversity to opposition is particularly significant for Hegel because it 
demonstrates that beings are not essentially diverse—i.e. simply external to one 
another—but are what they are not only through their relations to other things, but more 
specifically, through processes of reciprocal exclusion. Opposition in a general sense is 
thus the state in which the difference of something from other things has become 
internal to it. But since opposition is not solely based on the negative relation to other 
things, it also has the consequence that something comes to be opposed not just to all 
other things, but above all, to its polar opposite. It is due to the equality of the positive 
and the negative in opposition that, for example, red is not simply not a whole range of 
other colours, but that it has its own other in green. Red, in being positively red, 
specifically excludes green more than it excludes other colours. And vice versa for green. 
It is then through the equality of the positive and the negative that beings come to have 
their ‘own,’ necessary others. As Hegel writes in the following, crucial passage of the 
Encyclopaedia:   
 
Ordinary consciousness treats the distinct terms as indifferent to one another. Thus 
we say, “I am a human being, and I am surrounded by air, water, animals, and 
everything else.” In this ordinary consciousness everything falls outside everything 
else. The purpose of philosophy is, in contrast, to banish indifference and to become 
cognizant of the necessity of things, so that the other is seen to confront its other. 
And so, for instance, inorganic nature must be considered not merely as something 
other than organic nature, but as its necessary other. The two are in essential 
relation to one another, and each of them is [what it is], only insofar as it excludes 
the other from itself, and is related to it precisely by that exclusion […] In any case, it 
71 
 
is an important step in thinking, when we cease to say, “Well, something else is 
possible, too.” When we say that, we are burdened with the contingent, whereas, as 
we remarked earlier, true thinking is the thinking of necessity (Enc § 119, Add. 1).
33
  
  
We can already see then, that the importance of opposition is not limited to its status as 
one category among others in Hegel’s Logic. Indeed, its central importance within Hegel’s 
ontology was emphasised by Jean Hyppolite in his Logic and Existence.34 As we shall see in 
chapter 4, opposition—at a ‘methodological,’ rather than a ‘categorial’ level—might be 
considered the motor of the logic of essence, since it is because the contrary logical 
categories at any given stage come into opposition with one another that they come to 
be sublated into the unity of the same ‘ground.’ It is therefore through opposition that we 
pass from one dialectical stage to the next. Throughout the logic of essence, opposition 
usually enters at the end of the second moment of any dialectical stage. In the first 
moment, the two contrary terms are given their initial minimal definitions. But because 
these are so minimal, the terms pass into each other quite trivially (in the manner of 
identity and absolute difference). Because each contrary thus already contains the other 
in itself, in the second moment they take on a seeming self-sufficiency, falling into 
                                                          
33 Hegel also states that ‘the distinction of essence is opposition through which what is distinct does not 
have an other in general, but its own other facing it; that is to say, each has its own determination only 
in its relation to the other: it is only inwardly reflected insofar as it is reflected into the other, and the 
other likewise; thus each is the other’s own other’ (§ 119).  
34 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1997), pp. 115–22. Nevertheless, insofar as Hyppolite emphasises the priority of the 
negative in the transition from diversity to opposition, rather than the equality of the positive and the 
negative, it remains unclear, on his account, exactly how a given being comes to be opposed to its own 
other rather than to be equally opposed to all other others.     
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absolute indifference to each other (as in the case of diversity). This leaves the terms 
open to being determined in different ways. Opposition ensues when the indifference of 
diversity is seen to be only an abstraction from the essential mediation of the terms by 
each other, at which point the indifference swings to the other extreme and becomes the 
exclusion in which each ‘recognises’ the other as its own other. This exclusion, as we shall 
see, leads to contradiction, and to the sublation of the distinction between the contrary 
terms. In the following chapter I shall consider Derrida’s departure from this Hegelian 
logic of opposition and contradiction. His response to the above statement from the 
Encyclopaedia will of course be: “Doch! ‘Something else’ always remains possible, and the 
‘contingent’ need not be a ‘burden.’”  
 
2.4. Contradiction 
 
The positive and the negative now prove to be not just opposed but, as such, to be 
contradictory. The contradiction is not that there are two equally valid determinations of 
being which mutually exclude one another. It is rather, as Biard et al. note,35 internal to 
both the positive and the negative. It has been seen that each term must include its other 
within itself in order to be what it is. This other, however, is included as excluded. But 
insofar as the other is partly constitutive of each term’s very being, in excluding it each 
excludes itself from itself. One could also approach this contradiction from the other 
direction, as does Houlgate, and state that each term is contradictory because, in order to 
be what it is, it must include in itself that which it is not, and which it must therefore 
exclude.36 Hegel himself describes the general structure of contradiction as follows:  
                                                          
35 Biard et al., p. 87. 
36 Houlgate, p. 152. 
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In that the self-sufficient determination of reflection excludes the other in the same 
respect [Rücksicht] in which it includes it and is thereby self-sufficient, it excludes its 
own self-sufficiency in its self-sufficiency; for this consists in containing within itself 
its other determination—through which alone it is not a relation to something 
external—but no less immediately in being itself and excluding its negative 
determination from itself (SL 431/LW 50-1, trans. modified).   
 
This is the basic structure of contradiction as it holds for both the positive and the 
negative. Hegel’s analysis of these determinations individually, however, shows how each 
proves not only to undermine itself, but also to be the other, in its exclusion of that other. 
On the one hand, the positive is, as Hegel writes, ‘positedness [where positedness here 
means a negative relation to the other] as reflected into likeness to itself, positedness 
that is not a relation to an other, a subsistence [Bestehen], therefore, that is insofar as 
positedness is sublated and excluded’ (SL 432/LW 51). The inclusion of the negative 
moment of positedness in the positive allows the latter to reflect back into itself. But in 
that the positive must also exclude this moment of negation, it proves to be the very 
negative that it excludes.  
The negative is similar in structure, although not the same; indeed, in contrast to 
the positive, Hegel calls it posited—which in this case means explicit—contradiction. In its 
opposition to  the positive, it is ‘positedness as reflected into unlikeness to itself, the 
negative as negative’ (SL 432/LW 51). Yet as has been clear since the transition to the 
sphere of essence, the negative cannot be simply negative, for otherwise it could not 
maintain its opposition to the positive; it is rather self-relating negation, which secures it 
a positive being and so a stability as negative. In its very capacity to consistently exclude 
the positive, then, it must itself be positive. The negative is therefore explicit 
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contradiction because it is in itself determined as the ‘non-identical’, or the ‘exclusion of 
identity,’ which in this exclusion has its identity.   
 
Part 3. The Transition to Ground: The Status of Difference 
 
In considering the result of this contradiction, we can now turn back to the overall 
question of this chapter: the status of difference in the dialectic of the determinations of 
reflection. What remains of difference, then, now that it has passed through 
contradiction?   
Since the self-sufficiency of both the positive and the negative has been radically 
undermined, each determination now passes into the other in what Hegel terms a 
‘restless vanishing.’ The first result of the self-sublation of the two terms is an 
indeterminacy expressed by Hegel as the ‘null.’ At its most extreme, this is the collapse of 
all distinction and difference into the simple immediacy of being, or a wholly abstract 
identity. The two determinations gehen zugrunde, which at this point means that they 
destroy themselves or perish.  
Yet this ‘null’ is not the only result of the sublation of contradiction. In another 
respect, all that has been sublated is the relation of otherness between the positive and 
negative, or as Hegel puts it, their ‘posited’ difference. Because each term is now in itself 
the other, the sharp distinction  between them vanishes. In this sense, it is then only their 
self-sufficiency over against one another that ‘perishes’ in the sublation of the 
contradiction. As Hegel puts it, ‘their self-negation sublates the positedness of self-
sufficiency’ (SL 433/LW 53). Through this perishing, what had previously been two self-
reflecting ‘spheres’ now come to be united in a single reflection, which Hegel terms 
‘ground.’  
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Now in regard to the question of difference, we can first of all note that this 
sublation of the ‘posited’ difference between the positive and the negative does not 
constitute a reduction of difference per se. Nor does it mean that difference has 
ultimately proved to be only a moment of the identity from which it initially emerged. For 
what has been lost here in terms of immediate difference has also been lost in terms of 
immediate identity. The passage through contradiction has resulted then in a more 
thorough interpenetration of identity and difference, such that there no longer is any 
immediate identity in which difference could be ‘internalised.’ It would thus be 
misleading to say, as do Biard et al., that in ground, ‘all alterity is absorbed [résorbée].’37  
Just as difference has not been absorbed back into identity, it is also the case that 
identity and difference have not collapsed into a simple ‘oneness.’ For this reason, 
contradiction can be said to persist in ground, even if, as we shall see, it initially goes 
underground. The contradiction consists precisely in that both the positive and the 
negative, as moments of ground, are in themselves the other and are in themselves the 
other. To this extent, then, far from disappearing, the contradiction has become all the 
more pervasive—and so Hegel states that it is ‘as much negated as preserved’ (SL 435/LW 
55). In the Encyclopaedia Hegel therefore observes that ground is not only the unity of 
identity and difference, but also the difference of identity and difference (Enc § 121, 
Add.).   
Nevertheless, Hegel’s exposition first takes up ground only as the identity of 
identity and difference, and furthermore, as a rather simple form of self-determination, 
and it is only later that the other side of ground will come to manifest itself. Since the 
difference between the positive and the negative—i.e. the difference between identity 
and difference—is now a moment internal to ground, it is a difference that is immediately 
                                                          
37 Biard et al., p. 92. 
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sublated as such, or a difference which once again makes no difference. The movement 
that is ground therefore remains, as it were, ‘present to itself’ throughout its course, or 
continually goes together with itself. In this respect, then, as the sublating of the 
difference between identity and difference, ground ‘is not again a positedness as the 
negative of an other, but a uniting [Zusammengehen] with itself, positive unity with itself’ 
(SL 434/LW 54).  The movement of grounding thus becomes a movement of self-
determination which is seemingly self-sufficient. It constitutes the return of the positing 
reflection which seems to know no presupposition other than that which it itself has 
posited. As Hegel writes, ‘Self-sufficiency is thus through its own negation a unity 
returning into itself, since it returns [zurückkehrt] into itself through the negation of its 
posited being’ (SL 434/LW 54, trans. modified, Hegel’s emphasis).  
     On the basis of Hegel’s opening statements on ground, one might then 
question whether contradiction really is preserved within it, or whether contradiction 
here is a mere Schein. This is the view taken by de Boer. As she writes,  
 
Qua finite concept, the concept of contradiction meets its fate by being reduced to a 
determination of the concept of ground. The latter is distinguished from the concept 
of contradiction in that it no longer lets the opposition of its contrary moments 
prevail. The ontological perspective opened up by the concept of ground regards the 
contrary moments of the concept no longer as positing one another, but as being 
posited by their common ground.
38
 
  
Nevertheless, to interpret the transition to ground in this way would be, as we noted in 
the introduction, to distort the methodology of the Logic. For throughout this work, Hegel 
always begins with the ‘positive’ result of a prior sublation, and then proceeds to unfold 
                                                          
38 de Boer, p. 96. 
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the negative result. Likewise, here Hegel first takes up only one aspect of ground, namely, 
that in which each of ground’s moments is in itself the other. Later in the analysis of 
ground, however, we will see what follows from the fact that each of these moments is 
also in itself the other. In other words, we will witness the return of the remainder, such 
that ground will prove to be, in truth, not simply self-determining or pure positing 
reflection, but will come up against a genuine presupposition. As Hegel himself writes in 
the Lectures on Logic, ‘this ground is no dry essence, nor is it essence as identity. Rather, 
the essence of matters is a self-identity that at once includes something still different 
from this very self-identity’ (LL 140). What de Boer’s remark does serve to highlight, 
however, is that the transition to the next stage of the logic of essence—that of ground—
only takes place when the loss of the immediate or ‘posited’ difference between the 
positive and negative is first taken up as their identity, that is, as the single process of 
reflection in which they are only moments.   
 
We have seen, then, that the determination of difference as contradiction does not serve 
to ‘reduce’ difference or privilege identity in any simple sense. That is, difference is not 
absorbed into identity. Nevertheless, contradiction as methodological contradiction 
rather than the particular category of contradiction does contribute to the privileging of 
identity at a ‘meta-level’: that of the identity of identity and difference. We noted above 
that because this latter identity is not absolute in ground, the difference of identity and 
difference—or the ‘remainder’—will return. Ground, in its positing, is not at the same 
time presupposing, so within the grounding relation the diachrony and Nachträglichkeit 
of essence persists. Yet over the subsequent course of the logic of essence, each new 
state of contradiction that is reached will serve to increase the interpenetration of 
identity and difference. The difference between identity and difference, or the 
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remainder, will therefore be gradually reduced, until in the transition to the concept it 
vanishes entirely.    
The concept, as we shall see, is then the absolute identity of identity and 
difference. This does not mean that the concept is not internally differentiated. But it 
does mean that the division of the concept is simultaneous with its unity; thus, every 
‘finite’ moment of the concept is at once the whole of the concept, since it is immediately 
one with all of the other moments. As such a totality, the concept is completely 
transparent to itself and even in its division immediately goes together with itself or 
‘continues’ itself within itself. Since the remainder vanishes in the concept, so too does 
the Nachträglichkeit that characterises essence. As there is no longer any ‘recoil’ between 
positing and presupposing, the continuation of the concept through its moments 
constitutes the eternal logical present which fully comprehends both past and future.  
The logic of opposition and contradiction that recurs throughout the logic of 
essence thus ultimately comes to privilege identity, not in the form of identity over 
difference, but as the identity of identity and difference. In chapter 6 we shall consider 
the structure of the concept in general, as well as the movement through which the 
‘absolute method’ reached at the end of the Logic attempts to overcome the 
Nachträglichkeit of the Logic as a whole through the complete comprehension of its 
beginning.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we first saw that identity, for Hegel, is not static, but rather a dynamic 
process in which reflection relates to its otherness within itself. Identity was thus seen to 
be a form of positing reflection or self-determination. Difference emerged as the reverse 
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side of this movement, in the form of reflection that relates to the otherness within itself. 
Yet since this otherness is only within itself, difference proved to be pure self-difference 
or ‘absolute difference’ that only goes together with itself and so immediately collapses 
back into identity.   
In another respect, however, we saw that it is just because difference is self-
relating that it acquires the self-sufficiency that allows it to persist as difference. In this 
form, it is still the ‘mirror image’ of identity, and yet it is the mirror image of that which 
does not precede its being mirrored. At this point, difference is seen to be equiprimordial 
with identity, in that while difference is contained as a moment within identity, identity is 
also contained as a moment within difference.   
This equiprimordiality and symmetry of identity and difference was seen to lead 
to their seeming self-sufficiency and indifference toward each other in the state of 
diversity. This self-sufficiency proved to be unsustainable, yet since the two 
determinations had become so divided from each other, they then rebounded out of this 
separation with such force that their relation became a ‘polemical’ opposition. Their 
mutual mediation took the form of each term’s inclusion of the other as excluded. Since 
in excluding the other, each determination not only excluded itself, but thereby became 
the other, opposition passed over into explicit contradiction. Contradiction was then seen 
to resolve itself into, but also to persist within, the category of ground.   
 
We can now begin to outline an interpretation of Derrida’s statement in Positions that 
Hegel, ‘determines difference as contradiction only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, 
to lift it up […] into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis’ 
(P 44/59-60). This interpretation, and Derrida’s departure from Hegelian contradiction, 
will be taken up in detail in chapters 3 and 6. In these chapters I shall suggest that 
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Derrida’s concern with the role of contradiction is, in part, that which I have outlined 
above. The concern is therefore not that one term of an opposition simply comes to 
incorporate the other, but that contradiction ultimately leads to a state in which identity 
and difference are in complete harmony with one another and only go together with each 
other. This is why he speaks of difference being aufgehoben and interiorised not into a 
form of ‘presence’ but into ‘self-presence’—for difference here cannot be thought as 
being interiorised into that which would precede the very process of interiorisation itself.   
But does this mean that, for Derrida, the Hegelian dialectic of identity and 
difference only becomes problematic when difference is explicitly determined as 
opposition or contradiction? Should we then look for the point of almost absolute 
proximity between Hegel and Derrida within Hegelian diversity, and see Derrida as 
‘opposing’ Hegelian diversity to Hegelian opposition, or claiming that the former exceeds 
the latter? Things are of course not quite this simple. For diversity, like opposition, is still 
based on the equality of identity and difference; as we saw above, it is distinguished from 
opposition only by the fact that identity and difference are external to one another. 
Diversity is therefore itself the symmetrical ‘own other’ of opposition: it is absolutely 
external difference as opposed to intrinsic difference. This is what allows Derrida to 
observe in Glas that ‘The opposition between difference and qualitative diversity is a 
hinge of the greater Logic’ (Gl 168/189).  
 As I shall show in the next chapter, for Derrida it cannot then be a matter of 
emphasising Hegelian diversity over contradiction or—as I shall show in chapter 6—of 
contingency over necessity, for this would already be to accept the very basis of the 
Hegelian distinction. For Derrida, it will rather be a question of deconstructing these 
distinctions, which means: firstly, showing ‘diversity’ to be not simply the symmetrical 
other of opposition, and secondly, showing opposition to be a restriction of the wider 
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field that is constituted by ‘diversity.’ In short, Derrida will suggest that the ‘own other’ of 
opposition is reached through the exclusion of ‘other others,’ and that the harmony 
ultimately achieved in the concept is thus predicated on a form of ‘repression.’  
 With some caution, we might then say that for Derrida it will be a question of 
indicating a certain contamination between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ difference, which 
means that, in Hegelian terms, Derridean ‘differance’ would be located at a point 
between diversity and opposition. It would be a form of difference that, while not being 
simply ‘external,’ would still be permeated by a remainder which would prevent 
opposition from becoming absolute. As we shall see in the following chapter, this would 
mean that no term could have a necessary, ‘own other.’ The attempt to posit the latter 
for any term would constitute a more or less violent restriction of a wider field of 
potential ‘other others.’  
 Nevertheless, we do indeed need to proceed with some caution here. For as I 
shall claim in the following chapter, it would be misleading to claim that Derrida has a 
‘theory’ or ‘philosophy’ of ‘differance,’ one which would either constitute a displacement 
of the Hegelian logic of opposition or an alternative theory which might directly 
‘compete’ with the latter. For to have such an account would already be to presuppose 
that ‘differance’ could present itself as such—that it could ‘come on the scene’ in full 
illumination, rather than being that which precisely resists and escapes the ‘as such.’ Part 
of Derrida’s ‘objection’ to Hegel is then that the very attempt to grasp difference in pure 
onto-logical terms is already to determine it from the outset on the basis of identity at 
the meta-level of the ‘as such.’39   
                                                          
39 Note that this is not de Boer’s point: it is neither the claim that difference is determined merely on 
the basis of its contrary category, nor that the concept is already present, and seeking to ‘actualise’ 
itself, from the outset of the Logic. It is the much more minimal claim that, insofar as this logic is the 
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 As I shall discuss in the following chapter, two consequences follow from this 
point. Firstly, if it cannot be a question, for Derrida, of presenting ‘differance’ on its ‘own’ 
terms, it will rather be necessary to indicate the displacement of oppositional 
structures—by that which we cannot name once-and-for-all ‘differance’—in numerous 
contexts. To this extent, Derrida’s response to Hegel is interminable. Secondly, in 
Derrida’s analyses of such oppositional structures, it will not be a question of arguing that 
a displacement of these oppositions must occur, or that this could be decided on a 
‘neutral’ basis, but rather of showing the possibility of this displacement and above all, 
that the opposition has first of all been constituted as a repression of this possibility. In 
other words, it will not be a question of considering whether opposition is necessary or 
not, but of highlighting the forces which serve to institute supposedly necessary 
oppositions.    
Now some of these contexts are of course the texts of Hegel. In chapter 6 I shall 
outline Derrida’s contention that the standpoint from which the Logic is written is itself 
only reached by means of a restriction of ‘external’ difference. In chapter 4, however, I 
shall also suggest that such an exclusion of the possibility of a diversity that is not simply 
Hegelian diversity also takes place within the text of the Logic itself. In the respective 
dialectics of ground and the modal categories, I shall claim that the ‘all-or-nothing’ 
character of the dialectical movement noted above serves to prevent a contamination of 
‘internal’ difference by ‘external’ difference. I shall suggest that this all-or-nothing 
movement is made seemingly plausible through an appeal to ‘common sense.’  
                                                                                                                                                                 
science of the basic categories or ‘ways’ of being as such, all of these categories are already determined 
within the element of identity. One of the two contrary categories is not privileged explicitly within the 
dialectic, then, but the dialectic itself is already skewed towards one of those terms. This also does not 
mean that identity is not genuinely disturbed by its other, but only that identity will ultimately be able 
to take account of this disturbance.      
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Chapter 3: A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity 
 
Part 1. Methodological Reflections  
 
In the previous chapter we considered Hegel’s logic of identity and difference in the 
Doctrine of Essence. The aim of the present chapter is to consider Derrida’s relation to 
this Hegelian logic and to pursue Derrida’s statement in Positions that differance is ‘at a 
point of almost absolute proximity to Hegel’ and that Derrida had ‘attempted to 
distinguish [differance] […] from Hegelian difference […] precisely at the point at which 
Hegel, in the greater Logic, determines difference as contradiction only in order to resolve 
it, to interiorize it, to lift it up […] into the self-presence of an onto-theological or onto-
teleological synthesis’ (P 44/59-60).  
In the scholarship on the relation between Hegel and Derrida, the relation of 
differance to this point of Hegel’s Wesenslogik has not been treated in detail. This has 
prevented an adequate dialogue from being established between those who have 
charged Hegel with suppressing difference and those who have defended Hegel from 
such critiques. While the former have often contended that difference is for Hegel only 
ever a moment of a self-identity that is privileged from the outset, the latter have often 
felt it sufficient to recall the equality of identity and difference in Hegel and to suggest 
that postmodern philosophies of difference serve to fetishise difference and elevate it to 
the level of a ‘metaphysical’ principle.1 Each ‘side’ thereby sets up a ‘straw man’ version 
                                                          
1 William Maker, ‘Identity, Difference, and the Logic of Otherness’, in Identity and Difference: Studies in 
Hegel’s Logic, Philosophy of Spirit, and Politics, ed. by Philip T. Grier (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2007), p. 29, n. 14. 
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of the other and fails to grasp why Hegel is so important for Derrida—why he is, as 
Derrida puts it in Grammatology, ‘the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of 
writing’ (G 26/41).  
  In the following, I shall suggest that we can gain a more subtle idea of the 
difference between Derrida and Hegel if we set out from the proximity noted by Derrida. 
In doing so, I shall not at this point concentrate on Derrida’s texts on Hegel, but on certain 
rather ‘programmatic’ early writings, including the first part of Grammatology, the lecture 
‘Differance,’ Positions, and above all, Limited Inc. I shall suggest that in the latter we can 
initially observe a point of proximity to Hegel insofar as both thinkers offer a critique of 
‘immediacy’ or ‘presence.’ Yet I shall also claim that Derrida takes this critique further in 
that he departs from the Hegelian logic of opposition through which Hegel ultimately 
comes to reconstitute presence as the self-presence of the concept.   
I shall contrast my reading with that of Karin de Boer, not just in regard to the 
‘structural’ relation of Derridean differance to Hegelian difference, but also in regard to 
the nature of the Derridean project.2 Indeed, before we consider the structural proximity 
and difference between Derrida and Hegel, we need to ask about the basis of this 
proximity and thus the possibility of a direct comparison between the two figures. The 
question arises here of whether Derrida’s ‘project’ could be said to operate at a similar 
level of generality to Hegel’s Logic, which treats the fundamental forms of being.    
 
                                                          
2 Karin de Boer, ‘Différance as Negativity: The Hegelian Remains of Derrida’s Philosophy’, in A 
Companion to Hegel, ed. by Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
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1.1 Language and Ontology 
 
I shall address this question principally through certain passages of Grammatology. The 
first part of this text allows us to see how Derrida conceives his early engagements with 
language and linguistics not to be restricted to these domains, narrowly conceived, but 
also to intervene on the ‘ontological’ plane, or at least its historical determination as the 
‘metaphysics of presence.’ Indeed, as de Boer writes, ‘Derrida uses the context of 
Saussure’s linguistics—then at its height—for a purpose by no means limited to the 
element of language alone.’3 In the following I shall outline why I take de Boer’s claim to 
be partially true.  
The significance of Derrida’s engagements with language and linguistics can only 
be appreciated in the context of his questioning of the division between the ontological 
and the ontic. In Grammatology, Derrida indicates that the ‘historical’ context from which 
he is writing is one in which language and writing can no longer be considered merely 
‘examples’ or instances of a metaphysical superstructure. This is a period in which the 
question of language has come to dominate the philosophical and broader theoretical 
field. As Derrida writes, the ‘inflation of the sign’ is both a crisis and a symptom: ‘It 
indicates, as though in spite of itself, that a historico-metaphysical epoch must finally 
determine as language the totality of its problematic horizon’ (G 6/15). Furthermore, this 
historical determination also has a retroactive effect: it opens the space of a ‘reflection’ 
through which it can be seen that the problem of language always will have been ‘central’ 
to philosophy. Indeed, the first chapter of Grammatology opens with the words: 
                                                          
3 de Boer, p. 596. 
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‘However the topic is considered, the problem of language has never been simply one 
problem among others’ (G 6/15).4  
Two principal sources of this elevation of language are indicated in 
Grammatology: Heidegger’s philosophy and structural linguistics. Heidegger’s 
determination of being as sense, and sense as indissociable from language, has given 
language a privileged status in the enquiry into being. The sense of being is henceforth, in 
Derrida’s words, ‘tied, if not to a particular word or to a particular system of language 
(concesso non dato), at least to the possibility of the word in general’ (G 21/34). This 
means that language can no longer be conceived merely as a means of access to being, or 
an ontic representation of that which would ‘exist’ outside it. From this, Derrida draws 
the further conclusion that linguistics can no longer be considered a merely ‘ontic science 
or regional ontology’ (G 21/35).   
Nevertheless, Derrida observes that Heidegger’s thinking and modern linguistics 
are not in a simply mutually complementary relationship. On the one hand, the 
Heideggerian development lends philosophical weight to the rise of structural linguistics 
and underlines its wider significance. On the other hand, however, it is in traversing the 
field of structural linguistics with an attentiveness to Heidegger’s questioning of being 
that Derrida takes a difference to emerge that is more ‘originary’ than the Heideggerian 
ontico-ontological difference, and from which the latter is said to be  ‘derivative’ 
                                                          
4 Here Derrida seems to follow Jean Hyppolite, who in a paper entitled ‘Language and Being; Language 
and Thought,’ writes: ‘Language has become the centre of all philosophical problems today. 
Undoubtedly it was always thus, but it is only today that we can become truly aware of it’ (Jean 
Hyppolite, ‘Language and Being; Language and Thought’, trans. by Emilio Comay del Junco, Pli, The 
Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 24 (2013), 10–17). 
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(G23/38)5 This is made possible through modern linguistics’ shifting of the focus of 
attention from the primacy of the spoken word to the relationships between signs at the 
level of syntagmatic and paradigmatic chains.6     
Modern linguistics does not simply shift the focus of attention from the isolated 
word to the relationships between signs; in doing so, it also serves to shift the focus from 
speech to writing. In Derrida’s words, ‘By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly 
perceptible, everything that for at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally 
succeeded in being gathered under the name of language is beginning to let itself be 
transferred to, or at least summarized under, the name of writing’ (G 6/16). It is then 
partially on this historical basis that Derrida conceives his questioning of the relation 
between speech and writing (which we shall consider a little later) to be at the same time 
a deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.7   
                                                          
5 As Derrida is careful to note here, and as we shall see in the following, this ‘originary’ quality is not to 
be confused with a more profound ‘ground’ or ‘origin’ (G 23/38).  
6 It should be noted that Derrida’s discussion of what we might call Heidegger’s linguistics and its 
relation to modern linguistics is extremely subtle and cannot be addressed adequately here. On the one 
hand, Derrida notes that the early Heidegger’s privileging of the word that is ‘spoken’ in the ‘ideal’ 
communion of the self with itself (experienced as the call of the conscience) serves to ‘efface’ the 
signifier. It also serves to make the word ‘being, an ‘Urwort,’ or ‘the transcendental word assuring the 
possibility of being-word to all other words’ (G 20/33-4).  On the other hand, the later Heidegger’s 
emphasis on the ‘necessary, irreducible, and originary dissimulation of the meaning of being’ as and 
only as the history of the logos means that, in the final event, ‘nothing escapes the movement of the 
signifier’ (G 22/36). Nevertheless, it is of course not a question, for Derrida, of separating an ‘early’ 
Heidegger from a ‘later Heidegger,’ but rather of attending to the emphasis given to these different 
accents that are never simply ‘absent’ from Heidegger’s thinking at any given period.   
7 As Derrida writes of Saussure in Grammatology: ‘this and some other indices (in a general way the 
treatment of the concept of writing) already give us the assured means of broaching the de-
88 
 
But does this mean, then, that Derrida, by a sleight of hand, is in fact operating at 
the same level of generality as Hegel in his Logic? If linguistics no longer has merely 
regional or ontic significance, then is not Derrida’s appropriation of linguistics just 
ontology by any other name? This conclusion, however, would be too rash. It would 
ignore the fact that Derrida is not attempting to indicate a reversal of the relation 
between the ontic and the ontological here, but its complication. Linguistics has not 
simply supplanted ontology. On the one hand it does not possess merely regional 
significance; yet on the other hand,  it remains a ‘particular’ domain because though it 
may constitute a royal road to the deconstruction of metaphysics, it is still one domain 
among others. What may appear a casual remark in Grammatology makes this crucial 
point. Derrida writes of linguistics that:    
 
Not only is its field no longer simply ontic, but the limits of ontology that correspond 
to it no longer have anything regional about them. And can what I say here of 
linguistics, or at least of a certain work that may be undertaken within it and thanks 
to it, not be said of all research in as much as and to the strict extent that it would 
finally deconstitute the founding concept-words of ontology, of being in its privilege? 
(G 21/35).
8
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
construction of the greatest totality—the concept of the episteme and logocentric metaphysics—within 
which are produced, without ever posing the radical question of writing, all the Western methods of 
analysis, explication, reading, or interpretation’ (G 46/68). 
8 This complication of the ontic and the ontological or the particular and the general, is not the only 
reason why Derrida cannot be conceived to be providing an ‘ontology.’ Ontology for Derrida is also 
characterised by the thinking of presence as that which serves to give a fundamental ‘order’ to the ontic 
field. Derridean ‘differance,’ as we shall see, cannot be thought in such terms.  
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While some domains may be more (historically) significant than others, there is no 
absolutely privileged domain of the deconstruction of metaphysics. Derrida himself 
undertakes this deconstruction in numerous domains, including the political, the 
anthropological, the poetic, the artistic, the psychoanalytic, and the theological. Derrida’s 
engagement with linguistics should then be seen as part of a wider (and interminable) 
project of questioning whether supposedly ‘ontic’ domains function according to a 
supposedly self-present ontological truth that ‘underlies’ them—whether they 
correspond, for example, to the structure of Hegel’s concept. The more they are shown 
not to, the more such an onto-logic of self-presence is put into question.9 Yet such an 
onto-logic cannot be definitively ‘refuted.’ Derrida’s remark on the attempt to reconceive 
the notion of the trace in a manner that departs from the ‘classical discourse’ might 
equally be applied here: ‘the effort will be laborious and we know a priori that its 
effectiveness will never be pure and absolute’ (G 46/68).   
 
1.2. A Derridean ‘Philosophy’?  
 
Since no one domain is absolutely privileged, the work of deconstruction is never 
‘finished.’ Deconstruction cannot then simply take a shortcut through linguistics, but 
must necessarily intervene in a plurality of domains. Now one might of course argue that 
what Derrida ‘does’ in these various domains is ‘essentially’ the same thing, and that their 
plurality only dissembles an underlying set of principles according to which 
deconstruction operates. In short, one can attribute to Derrida a ‘philosophy.’ This is 
                                                          
9 In that it is rooted in this wider project, in this respect the ‘general’ significance of Derrida’s 
engagement with language and linguistics does not presuppose the Heideggerian determination of 
being as sense and thus as language.  
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always possible, and on some occasions more than others Derrida seems to license such a 
reading, particularly in his earlier texts.10 It is on the basis of such an assumption that de 
Boer writes that Derrida ‘uses’ the Saussurean context. The principle of Derrida’s 
philosophy, she states, is ‘differance’:  
 
It might be objected that différance cannot possibly be called a principle, since 
philosophical principles have traditionally been used to develop comprehensive 
systems. I hold, however, that any philosophy presupposes a basic guiding thread 
that functions as a principle, if only to expose the purported one-sidedness of the 
principles that had been put forward until then. In what follows I will conceive of 
différance as such a critical principle, and treat it on a par with the Hegelian principle 
of absolute negativity.
 11
   
 
The problem with de Boer’s reading here is not, however, the one that she indicates—
namely that it risks suggesting that Derrida’s philosophy is systematic—but rather that it 
implies that Derrida has a ‘philosophy’ at all. The approach taken by de Boer presupposes 
both that a Derridean ‘philosophy’ could be abstracted from the contexts in which it is 
elaborated, and concomitantly, that there could be a ‘master word’ or concept which 
captures the essence of that philosophy. Accordingly, de Boer writes that the ‘concept of 
différance can be elucidated against the backdrop of the Doctrine of Essence.’12 This 
                                                          
10 This might seem to be the case, for instance, in the ‘Differance’ lecture, in the first part of 
Grammatology, and in parts of Limited Inc. It is important to note, however, that all of these texts are 
based around engagements with other texts.  
11 de Boer, p. 595. 
12 de Boer, p. 595 (my emphasis). Here de Boer does not address Derrida’s statement in the ‘Differance’ 
lecture that ‘différance is literally [à la lettre] neither a word nor a concept’ (M 3/3).  
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implies that any other terms used in a similar way to ‘differance’ in other contexts—terms 
such as ‘pharmakon,’ ‘spacing,’ ‘dissemination,’ ‘writing,’ ‘tracing,’ ‘iterability,’ ‘chora,’ 
‘hymen,’ ‘supplement,’ etc.—are merely other names for differance. The problem with 
this approach is ultimately that it would be in contradiction (and contradiction in a 
‘classical,’ uninteresting sense) with any philosophy one might draw out of Derrida’s 
multiple textual interventions. For any such philosophy would have to contend that the 
context in which a ‘concept’ is elaborated transforms its sense. This approach would 
therefore leave Derrida open to—and supposes that he did not consider—the charge 
classically levelled against the ‘relativist,’ namely, that of basing the affirmation of 
‘relativity’ on one universal, unchanging principle. By contrast, Derrida himself states that 
the term ‘differance’ must let itself be substituted for by other terms:  ‘I wish to underline 
that the efficacity of the thematic of différance may very well, indeed must, one day be 
superseded, lending itself if not to its own replacement, at least to enmeshing itself in a 
chain that in truth it never will have governed.’ This is ‘the chain in which différance lends 
itself to a certain number of nonsynonymous substitutions, according to the necessity of 
the context’ (M 12/13).  
For Derrida, then, ‘re-naming’ is not simply re-naming, and, as we shall see in 
chapter 6, if something is essentially many-named, then it is not ‘one,’ since its various 
names will serve to transform its sense. As Derrida writes in Grammatology: ‘If words and 
concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can justify one’s 
language, and one’s choice of terms, only within a topic [an orientation in space] and an 
historical strategy. The justification can therefore never be absolute and definitive’ (G 
70/102)?13 Now this does not mean that Derrida’s interventions in various contexts have 
                                                          
13 And as Derrida notes in the ‘Differance’ lecture: ‘there is nowhere to begin to trace the sheaf or the 
graphics of différance. For what is put into question is precisely the quest for a rightful beginning 
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to be very different from one another, but it does mean that their description cannot 
simply import terms from elsewhere and must remain sensitive to the specificity of the 
context. Derrida’s interventions are, indeed, often formally very similar, and there is a 
sense in which we might say they are ‘systematic’; but they are so insofar as they respond 
to what Derrida takes to be a systematic gesture of repression in the Western tradition of 
philosophy.14   
Differance cannot then be considered the general principle of a Derridean 
‘philosophy.’ Nevertheless, we still need to consider a more subtle manner in which 
Derrida might be said to make claims of a very general ‘ontological’ nature. It may be that 
Derrida does not approach the various contexts with which he engages with a pregiven 
‘philosophy,’ but that in traversing these contexts he arrives at conclusions whose 
generality exceeds their apparent particularity. As we shall see below, in ‘Signature Event 
Context’ (hereafter SEC), this might seem to be the case when Derrida begins to speak of 
the general conditions of the functioning of any ‘mark’ whatsoever. The generality of the 
term ‘mark’ brings it into proximity with the Hegelian term ‘determinacy’ and might be 
thought to operate at the same basic ontological level. Nevertheless, the same point can 
be made here as we made above: ‘mark’ may be the most ‘appropriate’ term in one 
context but will need to be replaced by other terms in other contexts. In comparing the 
‘logic’—or rather the ‘graphics’—of identity and difference outlined in SEC to Hegel’s logic 
of identity and difference, I will therefore suggest not that it directly ‘competes’ with 
Hegel’s logic, but that it is at first formally analogous to it, and on this basis can indicate a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
[commencement du droit], an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility. The problematic of 
writing is opened by putting into question the value arkhe’ (M 6/6). 
14 Although there is not space to do so here, this systematicity would therefore have to be distinguished 
from the systematicity that Rodolphe Gasché attributes to deconstruction itself (Cf. in particular chapter 
9 of The Tain of the Mirror, ‘A System Beyond Being,’ pp. 177-255).  
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displacement of it within a context whose significance is not merely ontic, in the manner 
discussed above. Before doing so, however, I shall consider de Boer’s reading of Derrida’s 
relation to Hegel.    
 
Part 2. Tragedy and Displacement 
 
De Boer locates the proximity between Derrida and Hegel in the ‘unmistakeable 
resemblance’ between two forms of Hegelian negativity and two forms of Derridean 
differance.15 The first form of Hegelian negativity is abstract negativity, which produces 
differences that  are ‘arbitrary,’ ‘external,’ or ‘inessential’ because they do not serve to 
oppose a term to its ‘own other.’ As de Boer notes, they thus do not provide a basis for 
the eventual identification of one term with its contrary.16 The second form is absolute 
negativity, which de Boer describes here as she did in On Hegel, i.e. as ‘the movement 
wherein something opposes its contrary so as to actualize itself through the latter.’17 For 
de Boer, absolute negativity is a one-sided form of negativity insofar as it reduces its 
contrary to a moment of itself, and can do so because this contrary always was in truth 
only its own moment: ‘In each case the moment that constitutes a determination of pure 
thought, to use a Hegelian term, is defined as the principle of both itself and its contrary. 
Such oppositions thus affirm the power of pure thought to actualize itself by means of its 
contrary.’18 This is true both of those terms governed by absolute negativity, but also of 
absolute negativity itself in its relation to abstract negativity: the exteriority of the latter 
                                                          
15 de Boer, p. 599. 
16 de Boer, p. 601. 
17 de Boer, pp. 599–600. 
18 de Boer, p. 599. As we shall see, this conception of absolute negativity significantly determines the 
manner in which de Boer conceives Derrida’s departure from Hegel.   
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is reduced in that it is determined as the contrary of absolute negativity, in which it has its 
truth and essence.19 Abstract negativity is therefore determined as ‘a subordinate 
moment’ of absolute negativity.20   
Where the ‘two forms’ of differance are concerned, de Boer distinguishes these 
not only according to their effects, but also according to the domains in which they 
operate. The first form operates, de Boer writes, ‘within the element of linguistic 
exteriority’ and there produces differences similar to those of Hegelian abstract 
negativity.21 These are differences between terms which ‘cannot be traced back to a 
positive, self-identical element,’ and which Derrida explicates by drawing on Saussurian 
linguistics. De Boer refers to such differences as ‘arbitrary,’ though we should note that in 
Grammatology, Derrida explicitly criticises Saussure’s use of this term for reasons we 
shall consider in chapter 6 (G 44/65). On de Boer’s reading, though Hegel acknowledged 
this form of differance under the heading of abstract negativity, in Derrida’s view he 
‘failed to take [it] seriously’ by denying it a place within ontological thought.  
Furthermore, Hegel ‘ignored altogether’ another form of negativity or differance 
which, ‘within the element of pure thought,’ generates ‘irresolvable differences’ between 
‘seemingly opposed determinations such as essence and appearance, inside and 
outside….’22 This second form of differance resembles Hegel’s absolute negativity in that 
it provides an account of how seemingly fixed conceptual oppositions arise, but departs 
                                                          
19 de Boer, p. 599/604. 
20 de Boer, p. 600. 
21 de Boer, p. 599. 
22 de Boer, p. 599. 
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from Hegel in that it does not ‘resolve’ these oppositions through the subjugation of one 
term by the other. 23  
De Boer states that it is not clear how Derrida understands the relation between 
these two forms of differance. She seems to suggest that the second form of differance 
represents a symptom of the contamination of the purity of ontological thought by the 
first form of differance, or the contamination of absolute negativity by abstract 
negativity.24 Nevertheless, within the ‘element of pure thought,’ this contamination does 
not manifest itself as abstract negativity but as ‘irresolvable difference,’ which closely 
resembles the ‘tragic negativity’ of de Boer’s On Hegel.  
 Now de Boer’s reading is helpful insofar as it broaches the question of how, for 
Derrida, a form of ‘external difference’ might come to contaminate and problematise 
seemingly fixed oppositions. But her reading is problematic insofar as it ends up 
separating differance as ‘external difference’ from differance as ‘irreducible difference.’ 
Insofar as it maintains a distinction (though one that is to a certain extent problematised) 
between ‘linguistic exteriority’ and ‘the element of pure thought,’ it also preserves a 
distinction between the particular and the general which, as I argued above, Derrida 
would not accept. In her subsequent elaboration of differance, de Boer focusses almost 
exclusively on the second form of ‘irreducible difference’ between contrary terms within 
                                                          
23 Interestingly, de Boer does not mention a passage of the ‘Differance’ lecture where Derrida indicates 
an even greater proximity to Hegel: ‘How are we to think simultaneously, on the one hand, différance as 
the economic detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or 
the presence that has been deferred by (conscious or unconscious) calculation, and, on the other hand, 
différance as the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable 
loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other 
relationship that apparently interrupts every economy?’ (M 19/20). 
24 de Boer, p. 601. 
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the ‘element of pure thought.’ She elaborates this form of differance, and thereby 
pinpoints Derrida’s break with Hegel, in the following way:  
 
Derrida turns against Hegel […] by arguing that the difference between contrary 
determinations is such that it does not necessarily develop into their opposition, nor, 
consequently, into their resolvable contradiction. Whereas Hegel holds, in sum, that 
ontological oppositions result from the negation of their implicit unity, Derrida 
contends that apparent oppositions result from the negation of their irresolvable 
difference.
25
  
 
De Boer illustrates her thesis with reference to Derrida’s discussion of nature and spirit in 
Grammatology. She claims that while Hegel determines nature in terms of spirit, Derrida 
suggests that ‘nature and spirit can come into their own only by means of a detour (un 
passage détourné) that leads from one to the other.’26 Because Derrida sees ‘neither 
moment as more primordial than the other’ or ‘the ultimate principle of its contrary,’ 
neither one is absorbed by the other: there results a ‘primordial, nondialectical struggle 
between contrary conceptual determinations,’ in which each tries to ‘actualise’ itself 
through the other.27 On this account, Derrida’s departure from Hegel would then consist 
in acknowledging a certain symmetry between the two terms, or in attributing to each an 
equal power of self-actualisation.  
Now one might easily find evidence for such a reading in Derrida’s texts. Here I 
shall focus on two such instances, but shall also indicate why I take them to be of limited 
relevance. Firstly, de Boer herself draws attention to a passage in the ‘Differance’ lecture 
                                                          
25 de Boer, p. 602.  
26 de Boer, p. 598. 
27 de Boer, p. 598. 
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where Derrida, in the context of a discussion of Nietzsche, describes differance by way of 
the Heideggerian concept of ‘the same.’ This passage might seem to support de Boer’s 
reading of differance as the active, conflictual difference between contrary terms. Derrida 
writes that differance as the same is 
 
the displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to the other. Thus one 
could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed […] 
not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the 
terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and deferred 
in the economy of the same [...] Thus, différance is the name we might give to the 
“active,” moving discord of different forces.    
 
Furthermore, we might note that in the lecture Derrida also refers to a polemical form of 
differance in which the differentiated terms have an ‘allergic’ relation to one another (M 
8/8). Nevertheless, Derrida’s lecture needs to be treated with some caution. Firstly, the 
passage quoted by de Boer is one of a number of passages in which Derrida does not 
present differance ‘in and for itself,’ but indicates how differance can be seen to be at 
work within the texts of various thinkers. Derrida therefore ‘borrows’ the terminology of 
these thinkers but cannot be assumed to adopt it unreservedly (which is why he puts 
scare quotes around the term ‘active’). Secondly, as Robert Bernasconi stresses,28 the 
‘Differance’ lecture is an early text of Derrida’s, and one which betrays the strong 
influence of Heidegger even while Derrida tries to distinguish differance from 
Heideggerian ontological difference at the end of the lecture. Derrida’s reference to a 
                                                          
28 Derrida & Differance, ed. by David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1985). In a 
footnote to his translation of Derrida’s lecture, Alan Bass also notes that the polemical difference of 
which Derrida speaks cannot correctly be described as ‘active’ (M 8, n.9).  
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polemical form of differance might be seen as a reference to the Heideggerian concept of 
strife, such as occurs between world and earth in Heidegger’s essay on ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art.’ Yet Derrida is absolutely clear that differance, even in this ‘polemical’ form, 
should not be described as an active principle, but rather in the middle voice (M 9/9). 
Finally, differance as such ‘active’ discord is not the only form of differance that Derrida 
refers to in the lecture, and, as I shall suggest, is not the form that plays the most 
significant role in his actual deconstructive ‘practice.’ In this connection we might note 
that, at an earlier point in the lecture, Derrida notes that differance ‘resists’ the 
opposition between the sensible and the intelligible because it ‘transports’ (porte) this 
opposition (M 5/5), which indicates that it not only prevents its resolution but also both 
‘underlies’ or ‘generates’ it and displaces it or carries it off. This indicates—and this is the 
thesis I shall come to develop—that the difference between such terms is ‘irreducible’ 
because their relationship can always come to be determined otherwise.  
Another passage that might seem to support de Boer’s reading of differance—
this time in regard to the symmetry of contrary terms—appears in Positions. There 
Derrida explicitly states that ‘in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing 
with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the 
terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand’ (P 41/56-7, 
cf. also LI 21/50). In other words, in such ‘oppositions’ we are not dealing with an 
opposition at all, but an asymmetrical subordination of one term by the other. It might 
then seem sensible to think of Derrida as attempting to rectify such an asymmetry by 
conceiving differance in terms of the symmetrical relation between contrary terms. 
Nevertheless, (and leaving to one side for the moment Derrida’s general suspicion of 
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symmetry),29 this would only support de Boer’s reading of differance via Derrida’s 
departure from Hegel if we were to suppose that in the latter we are also dealing with 
‘classical’ oppositions, i.e. relatively simple hierarchies. In the previous chapter I 
attempted to show that this is not the case—that we are rather dealing with a ‘real’ 
opposition between ‘equals.’ At least in his subtlest criticism of Hegel, I believe this is also 
Derrida’s view. Moreover, it is only on this basis that we can comprehend why Hegel is so 
important a figure for Derrida and why he is ‘also the thinker of irreducible difference’ (G 
26/41). 
  Derrida’s critique of the Hegelian logic of identity and difference is aimed, as I 
indicated in the previous chapter and as I shall discuss in chapter 6, at the very ‘equality’ 
and symmetry of the related terms, and not the simple subordination of one to the other. 
It is precisely because identity and difference are ‘on the same level,’ in Protevi’s words, 
that they can come into direct contradiction and thereby pass into each other initially 
without remainder, forming a unity which fully encompasses them both.30 Derrida’s 
‘objection’ to this logic is that this unity serves to privilege identity in a more subtle 
manner than in ‘classical’ philosophical oppositions, i.e. not identity in its initial 
opposition to difference, but the peaceful and harmonious identity of identity and 
difference, or ‘self-presence.’ As Protevi notes, ‘it is precisely in the reciprocal implication 
of identity into difference that we find the point of Derrida’s difference from Hegel.’31 
Derrida’s essential point is then, as I shall also discuss in chapter 6, that neutrality is not 
                                                          
29 Cf., in the ‘Differance’ lecture, M 7/7, 10/10.  Cf. also Derrida’s remark in Writing and Difference that 
‘In doubling lordship, sovereignty does not escape dialectics’ (WD 329/382).  
30 J. Protevi, ‘Derrida and Hegel: Différance and Unterschied’, in Jacques Derrida, Vol. 1, ed. by 
Christopher Norris and David Roden (London: Sage, 2003) , 331–46 (pp. 335–7). 
31 Protevi, p. 333. 
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neutral,32 and furthermore, that it is constituted through a repression of a more radical 
difference.   
As we saw in the previous chapter, in the Encyclopaedia Hegel notes that the 
identity of identity and difference as ground can also be called the difference of identity 
and difference (Enc § 121, Add.); and, as we shall see, a certain remainder returns to 
haunt every new unity that is formed throughout the logic of essence. Nevertheless, the 
recurrence of methodological opposition and contradiction throughout the logic of 
essence serves gradually to reduce this remainder, such that in the transition to the 
concept it ultimately disappears. The concept then is no longer disturbed by even a 
remainder of exteriority; the difference within it is its self-differentiation. And because 
nothing has been lost or left behind on the path to the concept—because it thus fully 
accounts for its own ‘history’—the latter too can retrospectively be posited as having 
been in truth only the concept’s self-difference. But this is not to say that the concept was 
there, as de Boer supposes, driving the dialectical progression from the outset. It rather 
will have been there, once it has been reached, according to the ‘soothing’ (apaisant) 
logic of the Hegelian future perfect that Derrida refers to in Dissemination and that I shall 
discuss in chapter 5 (D 21/30). Derrida does not then assume, as does de Boer, that 
                                                          
32 On the question of neutrality, cf. also Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, pp. 136-142). Derrida’s reading 
of Hegel’s concept is in this respect close to de Beistegui’s, when the latter writes: ‘it is precisely in 
integrating contradiction itself within the unity of substance that Hegel is eventually in a position to 
posit the real or being as the One substance, and no longer to set the identity, or the being kath auto, of 
the substance against any residual difference. Contradiction, as absolute contradiction, is only a 
symptom of a speculative shortsightedness. Identity alone is absolute, and absolute only to the extent 
that nothing remains outside of it, as something absolutely other. Yes, Hegel pushes difference all the 
way (in)to contradiction. As a result, however, the ultimate form of absolute alterity, what Aristotle 
recognized as pure heterogeneity, becomes a pure illusion’  (Beistegui, p. 106).  
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‘Hegel comprehends the concept of difference as a particular form of the concept as 
such, that is, as an as yet abstract form of the absolute negativity that impels concepts to 
establish the unity of their contrary determinations.’33 
If we now return to de Boer’s reading of differance, we can see that, far from 
departing from the Hegelian logic of opposition, it in fact reinstates it, precisely because it 
sets out from a misidentification of Hegelian opposition with ‘classical’ ‘opposition.’ As 
the struggle between contrary terms, differance interpreted as tragic negativity would 
not be the absence of opposition but rather an unresolved and supposedly irresolvable, 
genuine opposition. And yet, it is difficult to see why this opposition should be 
irresolvable, since it is characterised by the same three features which in the previous 
chapter we saw as defining Hegelian opposition: the terms are equiprimordial, they 
reciprocally exclude each other, and they do so symmetrically—insofar as each is 
accorded an equal power of self-actualisation (or insofar as each is equally positive and 
negative). As they are formally identical there is then no essential barrier to their 
eventual unity.  
This is not to say that tragic negativity might not be elaborated in such a way that 
it does not collapse into Hegelian opposition; but it is to say both that de Boer does not 
provide this elaboration and, more importantly, that however it might be elaborated it 
would not be Derrida’s way out of Hegel’s logic. This is because such negativity is 
predicated on the concept of contrary terms—terms which are essentially each other’s 
own other. For Derrida, this would already bring tragic negativity into the vicinity of 
Hegelian opposition: as he writes in Glas, ‘The “its other” is the very syntagm of the 
Hegelian proper; it constitutes negativity in the service of the proper, literal sense’ (Gl 
83/96). To accept such essential contrariety from the outset would leave little room for 
                                                          
33 de Boer, p. 601. 
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challenging the manner in which the contrary terms, in any given case, have traditionally 
been conceived (cf. P 41/57).  
Derrida, I would like to suggest, is not a tragic thinker, but a thinker of 
displacement. While he begins with opposed terms, classical or otherwise, he does not 
remain there. As he remarks in SEC, deconstruction operates according to a ‘double 
gesture’ (LI 21/50). The first gesture is that of reversal, where the privileged term in an 
opposition is shown to be in fact ‘derivative’ from or supplementary to the 
underprivileged term which had been considered to supplement it. The second is one of 
displacement, which moves beyond a simple inversion of the power imbalance between 
the two terms. This second gesture shows not that the previously ‘weaker’ term now 
comes to dominate, but that the seemingly ‘stronger’ term in fact resulted from a more 
or less violent attempt to restrict and exclude from itself the wider field constituted by 
the ‘weaker’ term. It therefore shows that the sense of the latter must be both 
generalised and therefore reconceived.  As Derrida notes in Grammatology with regard to 
the opposition of speech and writing: ‘It is not a matter of rehabilitating writing in the 
narrow sense, nor of reversing the order of dependence when it is evident’ (G 56/82). The 
second gesture thus allows a ‘new “concept”’ to emerge, ‘a concept that can no longer 
be, and never could be, included in the previous regime’ (P42/57).  
If this is the case, then we can only locate Derrida’s proximity to and departure 
from Hegel if we expand our perspective beyond the opposition of contrary terms, and 
consider how such opposition constitutes a restriction of a wider field of ‘external’ 
difference. It will then be a question of showing that, for Derrida, opposition is a moment 
of a structure that produces effects similar to those encountered in the state of Hegelian 
diversity. The latter category, as we indicated in the previous chapter and as we shall see 
in the following chapter, gives rise to ‘external comparison’ between terms, such that 
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these terms can be said to have a variety of others rather than their own others. But as 
we noted in the conclusion of the previous chapter, it cannot be a question, for Derrida, 
simply of affirming Hegelian diversity over Hegelian opposition, and particularly not of 
affirming pure diversity over pure opposition, for pure diversity collapses into opposition. 
For this reason I would have to disagree with Kevin Thompson’s identification of 
differance with Hegelian diversity. He writes:  
 
Diversity—marked within the logic of Aufhebung between abstract and determinate 
negation—uncovers the enigma of simultaneity, the quasi-transcendental remains, 
at the closure of the history of metaphysics. An infinitesimal and radical 
displacement of Hegelian speculation indeed appears to be carried out in this 
disclosure and it would seem possible then to isolate the precise point of rupture 
between the Derridean chain of infrastructures and Hegelian speculative logic. It is 
the category of diversity.
34
  
     
As is evident here, Thompson takes the category of diversity to be the point of 
contamination between merely external difference and internal difference, yet as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, for Hegel it is the paradigmatic structure of external 
difference. Thompson’s affirmation is thus too simple for two principal reasons. Firstly, 
Hegelian diversity, at least in its pure form, is, as we saw, predicated on the equality of 
identity and difference, whereas, as I shall suggest in the following, ‘differance’ implies 
the excess of difference over identity. Secondly, and at a more basic level, diversity has its 
foundation in the indifferent self-identity of the diverse terms (whose difference lies 
wholly outside them). Thompson himself acknowledges that diversity is a structure based 
                                                          
34 Kevin Thompson, ‘Hegelian Dialectic and the Quasi-Transcendental in Glas’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. 
by Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 258. 
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on ‘a manifold of self-contained and solely self-related objects, monads, that are wholly 
indifferent to one another.’35 But it would surely be to turn things on their head to claim 
that Derrida attempts to depart from Hegel by affirming that things are simply self-
identical. As I will claim in the following section, for Derrida as much as for Hegel, things 
are what they are only through processes of mutual mediation or ‘seeming’ in one 
another. Derrida departs from Hegel, however, by affirming the excess of this 
mediation—affirming that a certain ‘remainder’ that is not identity prevents the various 
processes of mediation between terms from being brought into one whole or totality.   
In the next section, I shall first show how Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
speech/writing opposition in SEC initially exhibits a proximity to Hegel’s logic of identity 
and difference, insofar as Derrida, like Hegel, gives a critique of ‘immediacy’ or ‘presence.’ 
I shall then show how this deconstruction comes to displace this Hegelian logic by 
indicating the excess of difference over identity, rather than their equality. Here it will not 
be a question of showing a radical break with Hegel, but a small displacement of the 
Hegelian logic which may have significant consequences. As Derrida himself noted in this 
regard, ‘everything, what is most decisive, is played out, here, in what Husserl called 
“subtle nuances,” or Marx “micrology”’ (P 44/60).  
 
Part 3. Almost Absolute Proximity, and a Remaining Difference 
 
3.1 Proximities 
 
In the first part of SEC, Derrida gives an immanent critique of Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac’s conception of writing. Condillac here constitutes one ‘example’ of such a 
                                                          
35 Thompson, p. 253. 
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conception, yet at the same time Derrida indicates Condillac’s exemplarity when he 
states: ‘I do not believe that a single counterexample could be found in the entire history 
of philosophy as such’ (LI 3/21). Derrida’s critique focusses on the notion that writing, as 
one species of communication among others, serves to represent ‘thoughts’ or ‘ideas.’ 
Functioning as it does by means of signs, writing is thus marked by a form of absence 
proper to all communication: that of the ‘thing itself’ that is communicated. Indeed, as 
Derrida puts it, for Condillac the sign ‘comes into being at the same time as imagination 
and memory, the moment it is necessitated by the absence of the object from present 
perception’ (LI 6/25). The absence in question here is therefore the absence of an original 
presence; the sign, as a form of representation, transports an original presence that in 
itself has no need of such mediation in order to be what it is.36  
As a particular form of communication, writing is further distinguished by its own 
form of absence: it can be used to communicate between those who either are not or 
cannot be physically present to one another. It serves both to ‘perpetuate’ thoughts over 
time and thereby to ‘mak[e] them known to persons who are absent.’37 This absence 
makes writing differ in degree but not in kind from other forms of communication: 
though the receiver may be absent, the written message still transports the thought 
intended by the sender, but over greater spatio-temporal distances than would be 
possible by means of oral communication. Writing constitutes a ‘continuous modification 
and progressive extenuation of presence’ across a ‘homogeneous field,’ without altering 
the ‘ideal content’ of this presence (LI 5/24). As Derrida states, ‘writing will never have 
                                                          
36 In Grammatology, Derrida writes that the ‘very idea of the sign […] implies a distinction between a 
signifier on the one hand, and a signified on the other that is able to ‘”take place” in its intelligibility, 
before its “fall,” before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below’ (G 13/25).  
37 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, quoted by Derrida in LI 4/22.  
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the slightest effect on either the structure or the contents of the meaning (the ideas) that 
it is supposed to transmit [véhiculer]’ (LI 4/22). It is thus conceived as a merely ‘technical’ 
supplement to speech. In this way, Derrida shows that for Condillac there is a continuous 
path from ‘simple sensation and present perception to the complex edifice of 
representation’ (LI 6/25).  
Derrida undermines Condillac’s account solely by putting pressure on its internal 
assumptions. He thus considers the ramifications of the absence ‘proper’ to writing, 
namely, that the written mark can continue to function beyond the presence of the 
‘sender’ to the mark and the presence of the sender and receiver to one another. What 
has traditionally made it possible to distinguish written from oral communication, he 
notes, is that a written sign is ‘a mark that subsists, one which does not exhaust itself in 
the moment of its inscription and which can give rise to an iteration in the absence and 
beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject who, in a given context, has 
emitted or produced it’ (LI 9/30). Derrida thus notes that the written mark must then still 
be capable of ‘functioning’ when this absence is pushed to an ‘absolute’ degree, that is, in 
the case of the disappearance or demise of both the sender and ‘any receiver, 
determined in general’ (LI 7/27).  
If this is the case, however, then writing can no longer be conceived as a simple 
extension of the bounds of (oral) communication or as ‘an (ontological) modification of 
presence’ (LI 7/27). For it shows that the written ‘message’ is not essentially and wholly 
governed by the sender’s intention (vouloir-dire) and the hermeneutic context which links 
him or her to the receiver. Writing can therefore no longer be thought as simply one form 
of the transportation or ‘communication of consciousnesses or of presences’ (LI 8/29). 
Furthermore, the possibility of the sign’s being repeated in contexts other than those in 
which the sender intended it to function opens it to an essential ‘drift’ [dérive] in 
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meaning, such that its alteration would not be a mere accident but a necessary 
possibility.  
Now Derrida explains the iterability of the written mark through a ‘graphics,’ of 
identity and difference which closely resembles Hegel’s logic of identity and difference. 
On the one hand, the continued functioning of the mark beyond the sender’s or (any 
particular) receiver’s intentions implies that it is constituted according to a certain ‘code’ 
(LI 7/28) or, as Derrida slightly later puts it, must have ‘a certain self-identity’ (LI 10/31). 
This allows the mark to break from a given context and maintain itself in another. On the 
other hand, this identity does not precede difference. Firstly any sign or mark only 
emerges as a distinct element—only acquires what we might call a ‘minimal 
determinacy’—through the difference or spacing [espacement] which separates it from 
other marks in the syntagmatic chain (LI 10/31). Its capacity to break from any context is 
co-dependent on this spacing. Secondly, this identity or ‘unity,’ Derrida writes, ‘only 
constitutes itself by virtue of its iterability’ (LI 10/32). We might then say that this 
identity, like Hegelian identity, is nothing other than the mark’s capacity to include within 
itself or to ‘take account of’ its differences from other marks across various contexts. But 
this means that this identity is from the outset permeated by difference, since the sense 
of the mark, not simply preceding other marks, will depend on which marks it comes to 
be distinguished from in these different contexts. It will depend, in other words, on which 
others it includes as excluded. As we shall see, this opens up the possibility of a 
potentially radical drift in its meaning and a potential rupture of its identity.  
 
Now the significance of Derrida’s analysis would be limited if it were only valid for writing 
in the narrow sense—that is, if it did not indicate that the difference by which writing is 
permeated is generalisable. If Derrida’s conclusions were only applicable to writing, then 
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writing might be unsuited to ‘representing’ the presence or immediacy that it transports, 
or would be an imperfect means of ‘accessing’ it, but the possibility of such an immediacy 
would itself remain unchallenged. Derrida claims, however, that the traits by which 
writing are characterised ‘are valid not only for all orders of “signs” and for all languages 
in general but moreover, beyond semio-linguistic communication, for the entire field of 
what philosophy would call experience, even the experience of being: the above-
mentioned “presence”’ (LI 9/29-30).  
  In order to demonstrate this in the case of oral communication, Derrida does not 
present a new ‘argument,’ but rather sets out the ‘essential predicates in a minimal 
determination of the classical concept of writing’ (LI 9/30) and (rhetorically) asks: why 
should these not also be applicable to oral communication? Insofar as any ‘element’ of 
spoken language both possesses a ‘certain self-identity’ that permits it to break from any 
given context and to be recognised in others,38 and is distinguished from other elements 
through spacing, it too will be iterable and thus susceptible to the same drift as written 
communication.39 As Derrida states, ‘This structural possibility of being weaned from the 
referent or from the signified […] seems to me to make every mark, including those which 
are oral, a grapheme in general; which is to say […] the nonpresent remainder [restance] 
of a differential mark cut off from its putative “production” or origin’ (LI 10/32). The mark 
cannot then be conceived as the ‘representation’ of this ‘origin,’ but at most, as its 
                                                          
38 Indeed, it is at this point that Derrida substitutes the notion of ‘identity’ for that of ‘code’ (LI 10/31).  
39 This does not mean that it is thereby equally susceptible to such drift. Here Derrida is only concerned 
to show that the structural conditions of speech do not differ in kind from those of writing (though they 
do differ in kind from the conditions of speech as it has historically been opposed to writing). Here 
Derrida’s later remark that the ‘relative purity’ of performatives does not ‘emerge in opposition to 
citationality or iterability, but in opposition to other kinds of iteration within a general iterability’ could 
equally be applied to the ‘purity’ of speech (LI 18/45).  
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trace—a trace which differs from itself as soon as it appears insofar as it is already 
projected toward new contexts. As Derrida remarks in the ‘Differance’ lecture: ‘Always 
differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases 
itself in presenting itself’ (M 23/24).   
Furthermore, Derrida proposes extending this ‘law’ to ‘all “experience” in general 
if it is conceded [s’il est acquis] that there is no experience consisting of pure presence 
but only of chains of differential marks’ (LI 10/32). This is clearly an extension of Derrida’s 
central point in SEC and might be parsed as follows: insofar as any experience ‘of’ 
something must first of all isolate that ‘object’ of experience from the other elements in 
the context in which it appears, this object too will be constituted in its ‘identity’ through 
spacing and will therefore also be iterable. The mark is therefore not, in truth, a trace of 
an original presence, but rather the trace of that which is itself a trace.  
It is at this point that Derrida’s analysis arrives at its point of greatest proximity 
with Hegel’s conception of essence as reflection. As we have seen, Derrida, like Hegel, 
calls into question the notion of simple immediacy or ‘presence.’ For Derrida, as for 
Hegel, the ‘essence’ that the mark ‘represents’ and seems to refer back to is itself always 
already a process of seeming, insofar as it too does not precede its mediation by the 
other terms from it is differentiated. To this extent it therefore does not precede its 
‘representation.’ For Derrida, as for Hegel, this implies the Nachträglichkeit of that which 
the mark or the trace seems to refer back to, in that the latter is, to borrow a phrase from 
Derrida’s discussion of Freud and Levinas in the ‘Differance’ lecture, a ‘past that has never 
been present.’ (M 21/22). The trace is therefore a 'remainder’ of this ‘past,’ but like the 
remainder of Hegelian essence, it is the remainder of that which never was simply 
present. In the following section we shall explore this proximity between Derrida and 
Hegel further with regard to the concepts of identity and difference. Nevertheless, we 
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shall also see that what we might call ‘Derridean seeming’ is not a seeming of ‘essence’ 
within itself, but rather a seeming that prevents the closure of reflection on itself.   
 
3.2 Differences 
 
One might then think that Derrida is elaborating a logic that is identical to that of Hegel’s 
dialectic of identity and difference. Like Hegel, Derrida offers a critique of immediacy 
which leads to a seeming ‘equiprimordiality’ of identity and difference. As in Hegel’s 
account, neither identity nor difference precedes the other, yet each, paradoxically, will 
have preceded the other. The mark does not precede the spacing that makes it possible, 
and the spacing does not precede the marks which it divides. Likewise, the mark 
possesses a capacity to break with a given context, but this capacity does not precede the 
spacing which permits such a break.   
Is Derrida not then at a point of absolute proximity to Hegel? That his use of the 
term ‘identity’ in SEC is not accidental is confirmed by its repetition in his response to 
John Searle’s misreading of that paper: ‘Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well 
as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and 
identifiable in, through, and even in view of its alteration. For the structure of iteration—
and this is another of its decisive traits—implies both identity and difference’ (LI 53/105) 
Yet how, on the other hand, would we reconcile this statement with Derrida’s approving 
quotation, in the ‘Differance’ lecture, of Saussure’s claim that ‘in language there are only 
differences without positive terms’? (M 10-11/11). In order to see how these statements 
might be reconciled, we will need to consider more closely the role that ‘identity’ plays 
here.  
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We can initially note that, as we saw in the previous chapter, Derrida accepts 
Hegel’s demonstration that ‘pure difference’ without any element of ‘identity’ would, 
paradoxical though it may seem, not be ‘pure,’ or would not be pure difference. This is 
the root of Derrida’s objection, in ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ to Levinas’ attempt to 
‘leap’ out of the Hegelian logic of identity and difference through a relation to an other 
who is wholly other. This was the context of the remark of Derrida’s that we quoted in 
the previous chapter: ‘Pure difference is not absolutely different (from nondifference). 
Hegel’s critique of the concept of pure difference is for us here, the most 
uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought absolute difference, and showed that it can be 
pure only by being impure’ (WD 411, n. 91/227, n.1)40 As I read this footnote and 
Derrida’s accompanying quotation from Hegel’s Logic, Derrida is both acknowledging a 
debt to Hegel while also signalling a potential departure from him—he is noting that 
‘pure’ difference must contain an element of identity, yet without wishing to follow Hegel 
in taking this element to be equal to that of difference.   
For Derrida, differance is then not to be thought without an element of identity. 
Nevertheless, Derrida’s use of the term ‘identity’ in Limited. Inc. might be thought to be 
misleading, insofar as it has little in common with what has traditionally been designated 
by ‘identity.’ If we look again at Derrida’s response to Searle, we can see that the 
‘identity’ in question is first designated as a ‘minimal remainder [restance].’ We can shed 
some light on the nature of this remainder if we now turn to the manner in which SEC 
comes to displace the Hegelian logic of opposition.   
                                                          
40 Cf. note 21 to chapter 2. This crucial remark is also noted by Leonard Lawlor, in his discussion of Jean 
Hyppolite’s influence on Derrida. After quoting it, Lawlor writes that ‘The very root of Derrida’s law of 
contamination can be found here, in Hyppolite’s Hegel. It is the source of the concept of différance’  
(Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002), p. 103. 
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In SEC Derrida writes that the ‘identity’ of the mark is ‘paradoxically the division 
or dissociation of itself’ (LI 10/31-32). This is because the mark’s very capacity to enter 
other contexts opens the possibility of the ‘drift’ in its sense, or of its radical 
transformation. This may mean, first of all, that the mark comes to take on ‘conflicting’ 
meanings which undermine its unity, and even meanings which ‘contradict’ one another 
in various ways. Furthermore, the necessary possibility of the mark’s extraction from any 
given context means that no definitive set of ‘relevant contexts’ for the mark can in 
principle be circumscribed. No such delimitation of ‘relevant’ contexts is possible, since in 
each one, the spacing that separates the mark from other marks will always leave it open 
to being displaced into yet further contexts—to being infinitely re-marked.41 It is this 
which prevents a balance or equality from being established between identity and 
difference. Derrida indicates rather that identity is exceeded in advance and throughout 
by a difference that is inscribed within it but which it cannot contain—by what we might 
provisionally call the ‘virtual’ possibility of its endless transformation and internal division 
and disintegration. In other words, it is already carried away from itself as soon as it 
‘enters the game’ (Cf. G 7/16).    
It is this excess of difference which reduces identity to the status of a 
remainder—to that which, at the limit, no longer has the power to positively assert itself 
as a self-consistent unity, but only to negatively assert itself as not being reducible to any 
particular determination while nevertheless still being susceptible to further 
determination. The remainder is then the ‘identity’ that manifests itself only as difference 
and deferral. Thus in Limited Inc. Derrida writes that ‘the remainder, although 
indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is a differential structure 
                                                          
41 Cf. Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Nontotalization without Spuriousness: Hegel and Derrida on the Infinite’, The 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 17 (1986), 289–307 (p. 300). 
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escaping the logic of presence and absence […] This is why the mark qua “non-present 
remainder” is not the contrary of the mark as effacement (LI 53/105). The Derridean 
remainder, I would like to suggest, is in this sense at a point of extreme proximity to the 
remainder that runs through Hegel’s logic of essence, and which, as we saw, manifests 
itself as the difference of identity and difference which prevents reflection from 
becoming unified into one whole. Yet Derrida, unlike Hegel, does not see this remainder 
as being gradually reduced, but rather focusses on the manner in which it provides both 
the condition of possibility of a form of ‘diversity’ that is not the diversity of Hegel’s Logic 
and the condition of impossibility of the necessary opposition between ‘own others.’  
 
3.3. ‘Accounting for’ Opposition 
 
We can now see, on the basis of the ‘impure’ form of ‘diversity’ that we have reached, 
how opposition should constitute a restriction of this field. In order to do so, let us return 
to the movement of the mark through this field. In certain of the contexts into which it 
might enter, the mark will be opposed to another mark and will include this other mark 
within itself as excluded; in other contexts, it will be opposed to different marks. 
Alternatively, across a range of contexts, the mark may develop within itself opposed 
meanings (such as the term Aufhebung). But since the range of contexts into which it 
might enter is structurally limitless, the mark has no necessary or essential other. There is 
no ‘own’ other, but only a series of, as it were, ‘provisional’ others, or a multiplicity of 
provisional ‘contradictions,’ and there will always be ‘other others’ that have not yet been 
‘taken into account.’ As Protevi writes, ‘Derrida here shows that marks can be opposed to 
one another, but only on the basis of their inscription in the forceful and meaningful field 
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he names the “general text.”’42 In order to illustrate this notion of the general text, 
Protevi refers to the following section of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy,’ where Derrida writes,  
 
[The pharmakon] is the différance of difference. It holds in reserve, in its undecided 
shadow and vigil the opposites and the differends that the process of discrimination 
will come to carve out. Contradictions and pairs of opposites are lifted from the 
bottom of this diacritical, differing, deferring, reserve. Already inhabited by 
différance, this reserve, even though it “precedes” the opposition between different 
effects, even though it preexists differences as effects, does not have the simplicity 
of coincidentia oppositorum. It is from this field that dialectics draws its 
philosophemes (D 127/158).  
 
It is therefore only when this wider field of the ‘general text’ is restricted that terms seem 
to have their own essential others.43 We can now see why Derrida is far from affirming 
the persistent conflict between supposedly ‘contrary’ terms, but rather affirms the 
displacement of such conflict. As Derrida writes in an important footnote in 
Dissemination: 
 
Differance—which is thus by no means dialectical contradiction in this Hegelian 
sense—marks the critical limit of the idealizing powers of relief [la relève] wherever 
they are able, directly or indirectly, to operate. Differance inscribes contradiction, or 
                                                          
42 Protevi, p. 341. 
43 As Derrida’s scare quotes indicate, the ‘general text’ neither logically nor temporally precedes its 
repression. As we shall see in chapter 6, such repression has, for Derrida, always already occurred, and 
the wider field is only glimpsed through an analysis of repression and a displacement of its effects. This 
is another reason why ‘differance’ is not more ‘originary’ than difference as opposition and why it is not 
a ‘determining principle.’  
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rather, since it remains irreducibly differentiating and disseminating, contradictions. 
In marking the “productive” (in the sense of general economy and in accordance 
with the loss of presence) and differentiating movement, the economic “concept” of 
differance does not reduce all contradictions to the homogeneity of a single model. 
It is the opposite that is likely to happen when Hegel makes difference into a 
moment within general contradiction. (Belated residual note for a postface) (D 6, 
n.8/12-13, n.5).  
 
The ‘general text’ to which Protevi refers, or the ‘wider field’ of writing, is a fractured 
space in which marks can take on irreconcilable senses that cannot be brought together 
into the harmonious unity of a single ‘ground.’ Moreover, this is essentially so insofar as, 
for structural reasons, this field remains open to further determination, such that what 
each mark will have been remains still to come.44 The fractured nature and structural 
openness of the field thus prevents the difference within it from being thought, as is the 
case with Hegel’s concept, as self-difference. This is why, insofar as he might have Derrida 
in mind, William Maker would be very far from the ‘mark’ when he claims that the 
postmodernist fetishising of difference turns it into a ‘metaphysical, authoritarian 
determining ground in its own right.’45 Derridean ‘differance’ or ‘spacing,’ as we saw 
above, neither underlies nor governs the displacements that take place in this field.    
 
                                                          
44 In the following chapter, we shall consider the ramifications of Derrida’s insight for Hegel’s logic of 
‘ground.’  
45 Maker, p. 29, n. 14. 
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Part 4. Concluding Methodological Reflections  
 
Whether or not one is convinced by Derrida’s claims in SEC, one might still wonder how 
much he has ‘shown.’ One might ‘object,’ for instance, that he has only shown the 
possibility of the radical displacement of any mark, not its necessity. One might claim that 
though this displacement is possible, it usually does not ‘in fact’ occur, and that there is 
usually a reasonably clearly delimitable range of contexts in which a mark can be 
observed to function, such that the opposition to an ‘own other’ rather ‘naturally’ occurs 
and does not have to be conceived as a form of ‘repression.’ Such a common sense claim 
would, however, miss Derrida’s point on both a superficial and a more profound level.  
At the superficial level, Derrida’s reply to Searle makes clear that it was never 
SEC’s aim to show that any mark necessarily becomes detached from the speaker’s 
intention. Its aim was only to show that this is a necessary possibility, which must 
therefore ‘be taken into account in any attempt to analyse or to describe, in terms of 
necessary laws, such a structure’ (LI 47-48/96). Derrida then develops this point a little 
further, suggesting that even in the case in which a mark has not ‘in fact’ been repeated 
(supposing that in such a case the mark could even have a sense) and is proffered by the 
sender in the presence of the receiver, this presence is still ‘complicated, divided, 
contaminated, parasited by the possibility of an absence inasmuch as this possibility is 
necessarily inscribed in the functioning of the mark’ (LI 48/96).   
A little later Derrida elaborates on this point in order to show that, at a deeper 
level, the above objection rests on a questionable distinction between actuality and 
possibility, and therefore on a problematic conception of the event. To this end, Derrida 
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initially distinguishes two forms of possibility: possibility as éventualité (as that which 
happens to befall an entity) and structural (or necessary) possibility. Yet he suggests that 
at a certain level it is not possible to separate these two forms of possibility:    
 
It might, however, also be said: in fact that doesn’t always happen like that. But at 
this point, we must pass to possibility qua necessity […], and moreover, we must 
recognize an irreducible contamination or parasitism between the two possibilities 
and say: “to one degree or another that always happens, necessarily, like that”: by 
virtue of the iterability which, in every case, forms the structure of the mark… What 
makes the (eventual) possibility possible is what makes it happen even before it 
happens as an actual event (in the standard sense) or what prevents such an event 
from ever entirely, fully taking place (in the standard sense) (LI 57/113).   
 
Of course, in order to assess their ‘cogency,’ Derrida’s claims here would need to be 
significantly elaborated. One way of doing so would be to extract from Derrida’s texts a 
philosophy of ‘structural possibility,’ alongside a supposedly Derridean philosophy of 
‘originary diversity.’ Derrida’s ‘position’ on possibility could then be directly compared 
with Hegel’s account of the modal categories in the Wesenslogik. Building on the 
reflections in the introduction to this chapter, however, in these closing remarks I shall 
indicate certain problems with this approach, in order to explain why I shall not adopt it 
in the subsequent chapters of this study.  
Firstly, ignoring the context of Derrida’s engagements in this way would not only 
imply that there is a ‘neutral’ way of presenting Derrida’s ‘philosophy’; it would also risk 
suggesting that there simply ‘is’ an original diversity or general text that pre-exists, and 
then comes to be restricted by, the isolation of necessary oppositions. In this way it 
would also collapse éventualité into structural possibility, rather than indicating the 
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complication of the former by the latter. The form of the approach would thus again 
contradict, in a simple manner, the content of the ‘ideas’ it would present.  
In the present chapter, I have attempted to avoid this approach by showing how 
Derrida elaborates a ‘graphics’ of identity and difference in and through his reading of 
Condillac. For Derrida, as we shall see in chapter 6, the ‘general text’ or ‘writing’ does not 
temporally or logically precede its restriction; since a certain restriction has always 
already occurred and, moreover, could not but occur, the general text only ‘exceeds’ its 
restriction at the same time as it is restricted by it. Or, in other words: the sense of the 
mark is displaced at the same time as it is inscribed. The excess, then, cannot be thought 
without relation to that which it exceeds.   
This leads us to a further reason not to elaborate a general Derridean theory of 
structural possibility: cut off from the contexts with which Derrida engages, it would 
invite inane ‘counter-examples’ of the form: ‘just because there is a structural possibility 
of my becoming a murderer, in Derrida’s view I might as well already be a murderer.’ 
Beyond collapsing éventualité into structural possibility, such ‘objections’ would ignore 
the fact that deconstruction does not set out from nowhere. It is rather elaborated 
against particular, historically dominant forms of ‘repression’;  the excesses it points out 
are excesses over these repressive gestures. Furthermore, for Derrida it is a question of 
showing the complicity of such repressive gestures with a certain value system. 
Metaphysics, as Derrida reminds us in Grammatology, does not just mean the thinking of 
presence, but the desire for presence (G 49/71-2). Even where such ‘abstract’ concepts as 
‘possibility,’ ‘actuality,’ and ‘necessity’ are concerned, it is still a question, as Derrida puts 
it in Grammatology, of ‘demonstrating the systematic and historical solidarity of the 
concepts and gestures of thought that one often believes can be innocently separated’ (G 
13-14/25).  
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For these reasons, in considering Derrida’s relation to Hegel, rather than 
elaborating a Derridean theory of difference or of possibility which might ‘compete’ with 
Hegel’s, it is more important to consider Derrida’s analysis of what he takes to be the 
mechanism of repression in Hegel and the value system which is immanent to it. Through 
a reading of Glas in chapter 6 I shall consider how for Derrida the Hegelian attempt to 
overcome the remainder is concomitant with a desire for mastery that constitutes itself 
through an exclusion of the feminine. I shall suggest that for Derrida this desire is 
concomitant with an ingratitude toward that which ‘gives to thinking.’ This constitutes 
another reason why the question of whether ‘things really do happen like that’ cannot be 
resolved in a supposedly neutral theory, for our response to it is not independent of our 
response to this gift and its animation of our attention.    
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Chapter 4: Hegel’s Logic of Ground and Modality: The Problem of 
Relativity 
 
Introduction 
 
Building particularly on chapters 2 and 3, the following chapter considers the further 
development of Hegel’s logic of essence. It first considers the dialectic of ‘ground,’ which 
immediately follows that of identity and difference, and then turns to the dialectic of the 
modal categories near the end of the sphere of essence.  
I shall first show that it is in the dialectic of ground, when essence is no longer 
merely ‘formal’ but now has a content, that the moment of diversity within the dialectical 
movement gives rise to a state of relativity. This relativity, I shall suggest, becomes the 
central problem of essence. I shall then examine the manner in which Hegel takes this 
state of diversity to sublate itself into a state of opposition. The sublation of diversity into 
opposition is, as I indicated in chapter 2, the process through which we move from one 
stage of essence to the next, and through which the ‘remainder’ that haunts essence is 
gradually reduced. Here I shall be concerned to show how, in the dialectic of ground, this 
sublation is an instance of what in chapter 2 I called the ‘all-or-nothing’ movement of the 
dialectic in the sphere of essence. Let us briefly run through the stages of that movement 
as they appeared in Hegel’s logic of identity and difference, since they form a general 
pattern according to which the subsequent stages of the logic of essence progress.1  
                                                          
1 It should be noted, of course, that this is not a pattern that is simply repeated throughout the logic of 
essence. Variations upon, additions to, and complications of, this pattern can be observed in the various 
stages of essence, yet the pattern presented here is a ‘necessary simplification’ if we are to bring into 
121 
 
 
1. The stage of ‘going-together.’ The difference between the two terms is initially so slight 
that they immediately collapse into each other.  
2. The stage of division or diversity. Since each term has proved to contain within itself 
both the other and its difference from that other, each term seems to be self-sufficient. 
Moreover, since the difference that each contains has become only its self-difference, 
and is thereby taken to make no difference, each term collapses within itself into simple 
self-identity. The two terms thus become absolutely indifferent to one another.   
3. The stage of opposition and contradiction. Diversity proves to sublate itself and the 
dialectical movement now swings back to the other extreme. Yet it does not simply fall 
back into the peaceful identity of the two terms. Because they had become utterly 
indifferent to each other, they rebound out of this separation with such force that they 
come into a relation of mutual exclusion. They oppose themselves to each other, but in 
doing so each proves to be as much the other as it is itself.   
4. The stage of resolution or interpenetration. Here it is because the clash is so violently 
polemical that the two terms come into an ecstatic union. The remaining difference of 
identity and difference is overcome and the two terms come to be moments of a single 
reflection which fully encompasses them both. Derrida captures this point clearly in his 
discussion of the opposition between the divine and the human law in Glas, which we 
shall consider in chapter 6: ‘As if two motives [mobiles], disposing each of their self-
moving principle [principe automoteur], starting from their opposite places, crossed or 
met each other in the course of a circular path, stopped short {tombaient en arrêt}, and 
from the collision formed one single vehicle on an infinite circle’ (Gl 170/192). It is only 
                                                                                                                                                                 
view the mechanism through which Hegel ultimately takes the sphere of essence to sublate itself into 
that of the concept.  
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because the terms come into the unity of a single reflection (the identity of identity and 
difference) that we move to the next stage of essence, within which the difference of 
identity and difference will subsequently emerge again.     
 
In the dialectic of ground, it is of course in the second of these stages that the state of 
relativity arises. Because at this point the ground and that which it grounds (the 
‘grounded’) fall into the indifference of diversity, each term becomes susceptible to being 
determined in multiple ways, without any of these determinations being able to claim any 
ultimate authority. The grounding relation thus proves to be an insufficient way of 
accounting for something, and this failure indicates that something can be accounted for 
fully only if the conditions of grounding (or what we might call the surrounding context) 
are also taken into consideration. This wider context initially seems also to be another 
form of diversity, insofar as it is constituted by a multiplicity of determinations that are 
indifferent to one another. To this extent it only constitutes an extension of the problem 
of relativity rather than its resolution, since the conditions are not unified under any one 
ground. Yet Hegel argues that this diversity sublates itself, and here we observe another 
instance of the all-or-nothing character of the dialectical movement. The simply external 
difference between the conditions becomes wholly internal, such that they sublate their 
indifference toward one another and through their mutual opposition come to form one, 
unified whole—they are thereby united under one ‘ground.’ The context, we might say, 
thus becomes saturated and simply reflects back on that which is to be explained by it.  
 In the following, however, I shall claim that this transition cannot be immanently 
justified, i.e. that it cannot be shown to be necessary on its own terms. I shall suggest 
instead that its apparent plausibility is achieved in two ways. Firstly, it relies on the all-or-
nothing character of the dialectical movement. It is because the conditions are first 
123 
 
presented as simply external to one another that the sublation of this externality might 
seem naturally to lead to their complete unity. Secondly, and in a manner that 
foreshadows the Derrida’ critique of Hegel that will be discussed in chapter 6, I shall claim 
that this all-or-nothing movement constitutes a leap from the ‘givenness’ of the 
conditions as indeterminate to their ‘givenness’ as ‘self-evident.’ I shall therefore suggest 
that the sublation of the state of relativity implicitly relies on an appeal to ‘common 
sense’ regarding the authority of the context.2 It is then in these two ways that the 
remainder that haunts the logic of ground comes to be conjured away.   
 I shall also consider what it is that the all-or-nothing movement serves  to exclude 
here, namely, a certain contamination of ‘internal’ difference by ‘external difference.’ 
Indeed, I shall suggest that were this leap from the former to the latter not to be made, 
we would arrive rather at a structure similar to that of the Derridean ‘general text’ that 
we considered in the previous chapter. For Derrida, as we saw, the context proves in itself 
to open out on to other contexts, and thereby leaves the sense of the terms ‘contained’ 
within it open to continual displacement.3      
The second part of the chapter will then turn to Hegel’s analysis of the modal 
categories of possibility, actuality, contingency, and necessity near the close of the logic 
of essence. Although by this point in the sphere of essence the remainder has been 
greatly reduced, the modal dialectic is seen to exhibit a similar character to the dialectic 
of ground. I shall therefore claim that the key transition within this dialectic cannot be 
immanently justified for the same reasons that are applicable to the dialectic of ground.   
                                                          
2 To this extent, Derrida’s critique of Hegel’s appeal to what ‘everybody knows’ is extremely close to 
that of Deleuze in the 'Image of Thought' chapter of Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 
2004), cf. p. 214.  
3 This does not mean that a multiplicity of different contexts is presupposed from the outset. The point 
is rather that if a given context is ‘unsaturated’ then other contexts are necessarily possible.  
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Contingency, just like opposition, can be seen as both a particular and a general 
category of essence, as is noted by Giacomo Rinaldi: ‘The contradiction typical of all the 
categories of Essence so far examined was, as we have seen, that they involve a relation 
that ‘in itself’ should be ‘internal’, necessary, but de facto remains merely ‘external’—i.e., 
conditioned by contingent presuppositions extraneous to its concept.’4 Insofar as this 
contingency or this presupposed ‘remainder’ cannot be shown to be immanently 
overcome at the key stages of essence that the present study considers, this also means 
that Hegel cannot demonstrate the necessity of the sublation of the sphere of essence as 
a whole into that of the concept.    
 
Part 1: Ground  
 
I shall now turn to the text of the Logic in order to develop these claims, beginning with 
Hegel’s dialectic of ground. The category, ‘ground,’ as we saw in chapter 2, results from 
the self-sublation of the positive and the negative. The collapse of the ‘posited’ 
distinction between these determinations means that their difference is in truth only a 
moment within a reflexive movement which encompasses them both. As this reflexive 
movement, ground thus first of all takes the form of a self-relation. It repels itself from 
itself and then takes back into itself what it has repelled. As Hegel puts it, it is the 
‘absolute recoil [Gegenstoß] upon itself’ (SL 444/LW 65).  
Hegel’s usage of the German term ‘Grund’ here brings together two of its senses: 
the Grund is both the ‘basis’ or ‘foundation’ of things and the ‘reason’ of things—i.e. their 
logos or that which accounts for what they are. Ground is therefore at first a new 
                                                          
4 Giacomo Rinaldi, A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel (Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1992), p. 213. 
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manifestation of the self-determining side of essence: it relates to its determinations as 
moments that it itself has posited through its own movement. It will come to be seen, 
however, that ground is too minimal an ontological category to fully account for things. It 
will therefore have to presuppose the wider state of affairs or the ‘conditions’ which allow 
it, in any given case, to fulfil its grounding function. It is through this mutual mediation 
between the ground and its conditions that Hegel takes the transition to the next stage of 
essence—that of ‘existence’ to occur.  
Ground is a transitional stage within the logic of essence. It is both the last of the 
‘determinations of reflection’ and also the stage in which reflection begins to lose its 
purity or empty formality and dissolve into immediate existence. Furthermore, it marks 
more broadly the end of the first sphere of essence, which is characterised by what Hegel 
calls essence’s inwardness. The inwardness of essence refers partly to its lack of 
determinate content, which has not yet emerged from the movement of reflection. 
Nevertheless, in the three preliminary stages of ground,5 which I shall not consider here, a 
content begins to emerge through the grounding movement. We shall join Hegel’s 
account of essence at the point at which this content has become indifferent to the form 
which it receives. As the ‘ground of a determinate content,’ ground has now become 
‘determinate ground’ (SL 445/LW 66).   
  
1.1 Formal Ground 
 
The first form of determinate ground, which Hegel calls ‘formal ground,’ is thus the 
ground of a content that is indifferent to its form. For this reason, the content is the same 
whether it is determined as the ground or as that which the ground grounds (the 
                                                          
5 Termed ‘Form and Essence,’ ‘Form and Matter,’ and ‘Form and Content’ (SL 447-455/LW 68-78).  
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‘grounded’). As proved to be the case with absolute identity and absolute difference, the 
ground and the grounded are thus immediately identical to each other. As Hegel puts it, 
'there is nothing in the ground that is not in the grounded, and there is nothing in the 
grounded that is not in the ground' (SL 457/LW 80).   
This means, however, that formal ground does not yet fulfil the function of a 
ground at all: because the ground lacks any distance from the grounded, its ‘explanation’ 
of the latter can only be tautologous. In other words, it cannot go wrong, because it 
involves no risk. In the ‘Remark’ to this section, Hegel associates this principle of formal 
ground with the ‘mere formalism’ that would lead one to define gravity simply as an 
‘attractive force’ (SL 458/LW 81). For Hegel this kind of ‘explanation’ only amounts to a 
doubling of the immediate phenomenon, or its hypostatisation into the form of a 
principle or ‘reflected being’ (SL 459/LW 82).    
On the one hand, then, the ground and the grounded simply collapse into one 
another. On the other hand, however, and in a manner that recalls the transition from 
absolute difference to diversity, each term proves to contain its other and its relation to 
that other within itself. As Hegel puts it, ‘each is in itself this identity of the whole’ (SL 
461/LW 85) As at the end of the analysis of absolute difference, here the two ‘sides’ of 
the relation thus prove to be self-sufficient and so fall apart from each other. Each term 
now comes to be ‘reflected into itself,’ such that we are no longer presented with one 
content which appears in different forms, but with a content that is different in the 
ground and the grounded. Real ground therefore constitutes a developed form of 
diversity, and its moments possess a similar indifference toward one another.    
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1.2 Real/Complete Ground 
 
Since the ground and the grounded have fallen apart, a distance has now opened up 
between them which on the one hand allows the ground to ground the grounded. It is 
now possible for the ground to ‘account for’ the grounded in a manner that is not simply 
tautological. On the other hand, however, this very distance also prevents the ground 
from grounding the grounded. For since the ground and the grounded, like ‘the diverse,’ 
are now indifferent to one another, there is no longer any internal connection between 
them. Insofar as the two terms are now simply given, the connection between them, 
Hegel states, can only be ‘contingent’ (SL 466/LW 89)—i.e. based on an ‘external 
reflection.’ The indifferent diversity of the ground and the grounded here causes the 
spectre of multiplicity to come to the fore. As Hegel writes in the Encyclopaedia, ‘the 
ground is not what is simply identical with itself; it is also distinct [unterschieden], and for 
that reason various grounds can be offered for one and the same content’ (§ 121 Add.).  
The process of grounding is now the attempt to posit the essential determination 
or aspect of something. But in this movement of positing, ground now comes up against a 
presupposition: namely, all of the other determinations of the thing to be grounded. As 
Hegel writes, beyond what the ground posits in the grounded, there is also ‘an 
unessential form, external determinations of the content which, as such, are free from 
the ground and are an immediate manifoldness’ (SL 462/LW86). Now just like the ground 
and the grounded, these various determinations of the grounded are diverse, and so 
indifferent to one another. No single determination can then be the ground of all the 
other determinations. In the ‘Remark’ Hegel illustrates this point with the example of a 
stone, the weight (Schwere) of which might be taken as its essential determination. 
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Nevertheless, as Hegel writes, ‘the stone has a further determination of its content by 
virtue of which it is not merely something heavy but a stone; this is external to heaviness’ 
(SL 464/LW 87, trans. modified). Furthermore, it also remains essentially indeterminate 
which of the various determinations of something should be taken as ‘most essential’ (die 
wesentliche) (SL 463/LW 87).6   
Because the ‘grounded’ might be grounded in diverse ways, the category of ‘real 
ground’ is therefore marked by a state of relativity. It is only through the ‘external’ or, we 
might say, ‘transcendental’ perspective of a ‘third’ that a ground can be posited as the 
ground of something. But this relativity is not ‘epistemological,’ as it were, but 
ontological. The problem is not that there is a multiplicity of different ‘perspectives’ on 
the same content—this is rather the state of affairs we encountered in formal ground. 
Here it is rather that the content itself has broken apart into a diverse multiplicity. For 
Hegel, the problem of relativity is only as disturbing as it is because it is essential, because 
there is no stable ‘content’ upon which the various perspectives are directed.  
  But what, indeed, is the ‘problem’ here, and why should this state of diversity be 
troubling? It is so, for Hegel, insofar as it might be understood not just as one aspect or 
‘side’ of what being proves to be, but as the ultimate truth of being. This, as he notes in 
both the Encyclopaedia and the Logic, would allow for the triumph of sophistry, which 
Hegel, following Plato, conceives as a form of ‘räsonnement’ which proceeds on the basis 
of grounds alone (SL 466/LW 90). The Sophists, as Hegel notes in the Encyclopaedia, came 
on the scene when the Greeks were ‘no longer satisfied with mere tradition and 
authority,’ and ‘taught people how to seek out the various points of view from which 
                                                          
6 Just as that which is to be grounded can have multiple grounds, the same ground can be the ground of 
many diverse things, and of things that are ‘opposed.’ As Hegel notes, gravity [die Schwere] accounts as 
much for why a house remains standing as for why a stone falls (SL 464/LW 87).  
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things can be considered’ (Enc § 121 Add.).7 For Hegel, this was a necessary moment in 
the progression of thinking; nevertheless, since grounds are essentially distinct from that 
which they ground, it is also dangerous insofar as ‘good grounds’ can be given for 
anything, or any course of action, whatsoever. As Hegel states, ‘Everything in the world 
that has been corrupted has been corrupted on good grounds’ (§ 121 Add).   
 Now of course, to speak of corruption and of sophistry in the pejorative sense 
supposes that the truth of things is not simply a diverse collection of equally valid and 
equally invalid grounds. And indeed, Hegel takes the first lesson of ‘real ground’ to be 
that grounds, by themselves, are unable to fully account for things. This is made clear in 
one of Hegel’s examples from the Encyclopaedia. It is perhaps not insignificant that 
amidst the ontological chaos of real ground the examples Hegel reaches for in both the 
Encyclopaedia and the Logic relate to law and order. In the former he proposes to 
consider an action—‘let us say […],a theft.’ As he writes,    
 
This is a content in which a number of aspects [Seiten] can be distinguished. Property 
has been violated by the theft; while the thief, who was in need, has obtained the 
means for the satisfaction of his wants. It may be the case, too, that the person from 
whom the theft was made did not make good use of his property. Well, it is certainly 
correct that the violation of property which has taken place is the decisive point of 
view before which the others must give way; but this decision is not entailed by the 
principle of thought according to which everything must have a ground (§121 Add.).  
 
The essential point for Hegel here is that grounds, in themselves, call for something 
beyond themselves in order to be able to ground. In itself, then, the ground depends on 
an immediacy that lies outside itself and which will come to be thematised as the 
                                                          
7 Hegel, like Plato, is thus concerned to delineate the ontological conditions of possibility of sophistry.    
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condition [Bedingung] of its grounding. We might say, then, that in order to see what is 
the most important perspective from which something is to be viewed, we need to 
consider the wider context in which it is situated. But Hegel’s comments on the Sophists’ 
break with tradition and authority also seem to imply, consciously or not, that this 
consideration of the wider context will also serve to temper such a rebellion against 
authority and tradition.    
 
1.3 The Condition and the Sache selbst 
 
The ground, as we have seen, is not intrinsically connected to that which it grounds. This 
connection only arises when the immediate condition outside the ground connects the 
ground to the grounded. At this point, Hegel is just making the point that if we wish to 
consider the most important perspective from which to regard something, we cannot 
simply reflect on that thing itself. For then we will be confronted with a multiplicity of 
determinations, none of which possesses a claim to being ultimate and authoritative. We 
therefore have to broaden our perspective to the wider state of affairs in which that thing 
is situated, and look not simply at what is posited in the thing, but at what is given in 
relation it, or what just happens to be there. In the case of the act of ‘theft,’ for example, 
the perspective which ‘best accounts’ for what that act is depends on the wider context 
of the given personal, social, economic, and political conditions in play.  
 Let us now turn to this condition. The condition is that which qua condition only 
has its being in relation to the ground, but nevertheless it also has an 'immediacy,' 
described here by Hegel with the concept of Dasein, which refers to the immediacy 
characteristic of the sphere of being (and not to the particular category of Dasein within 
that sphere). It is important to note here that because the condition is immediate being in 
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general, it is multiple in itself. As Hegel writes, it is ‘first an immediate manifold Dasein’ 
(SL 470/LW 94). The condition of ground as such therefore always consists in a number of 
conditions which, as immediate determinations, are indifferent to one another. Thus, 
while at this point Hegel speaks primarily of the condition of ground, he later refers to 
conditions in the plural. In the following, I shall generally refer to the ‘conditions’ of the 
ground.  
 Now if the conditions were only a form of indifferent Dasein then of course the 
relativity that characterised real ground would remain, for the ground would still only be 
contingently connected to that which it grounds. There would then need to be a further 
condition which makes these conditions the condition of this ground, and so on ad 
infinitum. But Hegel attempts to show that the remaining exteriority between the ground 
and its conditions is only a seeming exteriority. Let us now turn to this demonstration.    
We have already seen that the ground presupposes its immediate conditions. But 
if this is the case, then the conditions are not simply external to the ground: there simply 
is no ground as such prior to that which gives it its determinate sense and thus enables it 
to fulfil its grounding function. It is in ground's very nature then to sublate itself as pure 
ground and to become immediate. The conditions, on the other hand, are, as we have 
seen, only conditions in relation to the ground and ‘in themselves’ are only a diverse 
manifold of immediate, indifferent determinations. Nevertheless, Hegel reminds us that, 
as has been clear since the beginning of essence, there can no longer be any simple 
immediacy such as there was in the sphere of being. Dasein as simply immediate being 
must sublate itself into reflection (SL 472/LW 97). This means that the conditions cannot 
in truth be simply a collection of diverse determinations, but are what they are only by 
being mediated by one another—by being always already moments of a grounding 
relation which is constituted by the totality of their relations, or their mutual 
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interpenetration. It is because this diverse multiplicity comes to take on a coherent sense 
that the condition as such loses its exteriority over against the ground.   
The ground, then, does not absorb the condition into itself: condition and ground 
only are what they are when they meet in the middle, so to speak. Hegel's point, as we 
noted, is on the face of it quite simple: in order to give an adequate account of 
something, we have to move from a narrow reflection on the explanandum to a wider 
reflection which encompasses the whole state of affairs in which it stands. This wider 
state of affairs is then of course found to be not simply indifferent to the matter at hand, 
but to bear on it in itself. In this wider reflection the border is then broken down between 
what just happens to be there and what is there ‘for a reason’ (was ein Grund hat).  
 The separation of ground and condition thus proves to be contradictory, and this 
contradiction of course contains within itself a new unity. As Hegel writes, ‘What is 
present […] is simply only one whole of form, but equally only one whole of content’ (SL 
473/LW 98). This unity is termed by Hegel the Sache.8 Near the close of the chapter on 
ground, Hegel describes the emergence of the Sache in the following manner:  'When all 
the conditions of a Sache are present it enters into Existence,' and ‘when the totality of 
the Sache is posited as groundless immediate, this scattered multiplicity inwardizes  
[erinnert] itself in its own self,' (SL 477/LW 102). Indeed, here we should note that this 
‘inwardisation’ or what we might call ‘internal completeness’ is the more important sense 
of ‘totality’ at work here. When Hegel speaks of ‘all the conditions’ being present he does 
not simply mean that all of the conditions are necessary in order for the Sache to be the 
particular Sache it is; more importantly, he means that all of the conditions, through their 
mutual mediation, come to form a single, coherent whole. It is only on this basis that the 
                                                          
8 As Miller’s translation of ‘Sache’ as ‘fact’ does not capture the breadth of the German term, and as 
there is no one English word which would capture this breadth, I shall leave Sache untranslated here.  
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Sache simply emerges into existence and requires no additional conditions in order to be 
what it is.    
   The Sache is then the unity of the ground and the conditions, or, in other words, 
the unity of reflection and immediacy. But because it is precisely the unity of two 
moments that both prove to be in themselves the other, the Sache is itself a wider 
reflection which includes both the ground and the conditions as its own moments. Just as 
ground proved first to be the identity of identity and difference, the Sache proves initially 
to be the ground of ground and condition (SL 474/LW 99). What previously seemed to be 
the ‘external’ relation between ground and condition has now proved to be the 
‘tautological movement of the Sache to itself’ (SL 477/LW 103) which is 'only the 
vanishing of the illusion [des Scheins] of mediation’ (SL 476/LW 102).  
  This movement takes places place in two stages: the first is an outward 
movement in which the Sache repels itself from itself, spreading out into what appears to 
be a ‘multiplicity without unity’ (SL 475/LW 100). In this outward movement, we might 
say that the Sache gives itself its own conditions or posits itself as immediate. The second 
stage is an inward movement in which these seemingly immediate moments are seen to 
be what they are ‘solely through the reflection of the ground-relation which posits itself 
as sublated.’ In other words they are seen to be pre-posited by the ground which ‘relates 
them, so making them moments in the unity of the Sache’ (SL 476/LW 101). The Sache is 
therefore an immediate self-relation which will form the basis of the next stage of the 
logic of essence, ‘existence.’   
  
As we have seen, then, the Sache is the ground of ground and condition. Yet here we 
might still ask: what is the condition of the Sache’s being the ground of ground and 
condition? What enables the Sache first of all to be formed as one single reflection which 
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contains its conditions within itself? The Sache can only be such if the diverse conditions 
sublate themselves as diverse, and in their opposition to one another come to form one, 
unified whole. Because the conditions thoroughly interpenetrate one another, the 
‘context’ that they constitute is thus saturated. And since the context is saturated in this 
way there is no longer any need for a condition of the condition, i.e. for a form of 
‘external’ mediation, or a ‘transcendental’ perspective.  
 But how does Hegel arrive at this saturation of the context? This can again be 
explained by the all-or-nothing character of the dialectic as it manifests itself in the above 
transition. The conditions first appear as simply immediate over against one another; 
Hegel then reminds us that there can no longer be such simple immediacy, so that we 
move from this absolute exteriority straight to the absolute interpenetration of the 
conditions. It is once again because the terms have been held apart in such abstraction 
from each other that, on rebounding out of this separation, they come to oppose 
themselves to one another and thereby come to form one unified whole.  
Now Hegel’s argument here is based on the transition from the sphere of 
immediate being to the sphere of essence that we considered in chapter 1. There we saw 
that being could no longer take the form of simple immediacy, but rather proved to be a 
process of mediation. But this in itself does not take us very far. It only shows that 
formally, being must be reflexive, which means here that the determinations of being 
(the conditions) cannot be simply immediate, but are what they are only through their 
mutual mediation. But this by itself does not solve the problem encountered in real 
ground, namely that a number of grounds could be given to explain the same thing. The 
problem there was not that of the form taken by being, but of a multiplicity of content—
the plurality of different grounds. Now it was after the transition to essence that a 
remainder was seen to be generated by the process of reflection, which prevents 
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reflection from being simply self-determining or from closing on itself, since it is disrupted 
from within by that which it cannot ‘get behind.’ The mode of Hegel’s presentation here 
thus serves to mask the fact that there is no immanent reason why such a remainder 
should not persist between the various conditions such that they do not form a single 
whole. In this case, while the conditions could not simply exist ‘outside’ any ground, they 
could still be unified by a number of different grounds.  
If this were the case, then we would be presented with a structure very close to 
the Derridean ‘general text’ which we considered in the previous chapter.9 If the 
remainder were to persist here, then the Sache could not be the movement out from 
itself and back to itself—the reciprocal movement between the ground and its 
conditions—for the ‘context’ would remain unsaturated and would open out, in itself, on 
to other contexts. Instead of a movement of self-repulsion and return, there would be a 
movement outward that always risks not returning, a movement of dissemination 
whereby the conditions would continually call for further conditions. This would mean 
that the sense of the Sache would remain indeterminate and essentially susceptible to 
redetermination. In this case, we could not say that the Sache ever simply ‘emerges’ into 
the immediacy of existence, for such simple existence presupposes that the ‘external 
mediation’ characteristic of the grounding relation in ‘real ground’ has vanished.   
If the transition to the complete immanence of the Sache cannot itself be justified 
on an immanent basis, how might we explain Hegel’s confidence regarding this 
transition? The Derridean ‘objection’ to Hegel outlined above might be seen as a critique 
                                                          
9 Nevertheless, it is crucial to note here that if the Logic were to open on to such a structure, then this 
would be the point at which it would break down as a pure onto-logic. For it would have opened on to a 
form of difference that, in being essentially multiple, could no longer be presented within such a logic, 
for the reasons we discussed in relation to Derrida in the previous chapter. It is thus only by repressing 
this possibility that the Logic is able to constitute itself as a logic.  
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of ‘common sense,’ of a certain surety concerning the unity and authority of the context. 
This surety seems to be evinced by a rapid slide from one sense of immediate ‘givenness’ 
to another, a slide which shall form one of the central themes of chapter 6. In the present 
case, the conditions which make up the surrounding context are initially immediately 
‘given’ in the sense that they are essentially indeterminate. This indeterminate givenness 
then immediately proves to be a form of givenness as self-evidence. The slide between 
these senses is evident if we return to Hegel’s example of the ‘theft.’ On the one hand, 
the conditions surrounding the act are not directly connected with it, and so are not 
already contained within any particular ‘ground’ of the act. And yet, Hegel assumes that 
these conditions will show that ‘it is certainly correct that the violation of property which 
has taken place is the decisive point of view before which the others must give way’ (Enc 
§ 121 Add.). 
For Derrida, as we shall see in more detail in chapter 6, this appeal to what is 
given in the second sense can be seen as a repression of the very question of ‘diversity’ 
that Hegel’s thought opens on to. Hegel opens this question, and to that extent is ‘also 
the thinker of irreducible difference’ (G 26/41), yet immediately attempts to close down 
this troubling instability by treating it as merely external difference, as opposed to wholly 
internal difference. As Derrida suggests in Writing and Difference, Hegel thereby ‘blinds 
himself’ to what he himself reveals.10 In the Encyclopaedia example, for instance, Hegel 
does not even countenance the possibility that a consideration of the wider context could 
lead to a more radical transformation of how the act is seen, such that, for example, it 
                                                          
10 Cf. Jacques Derrida, WD 327–9/380-2. ‘In naming the without-reserve of absolute expenditure 
“abstract negativity,” Hegel, through precipitation, blinded himself to that which he had laid bare under 
the rubric of negativity. And did so through precipitation toward the seriousness of meaning and the 
security of knowledge’ (WD 328/381).  
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might no longer be conceived as a ‘theft’ at all. Perhaps it would not be going too far to 
suggest that there are traces of a certain repression evident in the closing passages of the 
logic of ground, when Hegel repeats a seemingly straightforward formula three times in 
the space of a paragraph, with slight variations: 'When all the conditions of a Sache are 
present it enters into Existence’; ‘When […] all the conditions of the Sache are present, 
that is, when the totality of the fact is posited as a groundless immediate, this scattered 
multiplicity inwardizes [erinnert] itself’; ‘When […] all the conditions of the Sache are 
present, they sublate themselves as immediate being…’ (SL 477/LW 102-3).  
 
Part 2. Contingency and Necessity  
 
I shall now turn to Hegel’s analysis of the modal categories near the end of the logic of 
essence. This analysis is separated from the dialectic of ground by a number of dialectical 
stages. At each of these stages, the relevant contrary terms ultimately come into 
opposition and contradiction; their sublation produces a new unity which forms the 
starting point of the next stage. These categories include: the thing and its properties; the 
appearing world and the world that is in and for itself; the whole and the parts; force and 
expression; and the inner and the outer. Throughout this progression, the trace or 
remainder has become less and less resistant to reflection, and at the point at which the 
last major section of the logic of essence is reached, which Hegel terms ‘actuality’ 
(Wirklichkeit), it has been reduced to almost nothing. With the sublation of the difference 
between the inner and the outer, essence becomes a process of manifestation which is 
no longer, as Hegel states, a Scheinen in an other, but only within itself. Essence has then 
nearly acquired the complete transparency which characterises the concept. As Hegel 
writes, ‘The actual is […] manifestation; it is not drawn into the sphere of alteration by its 
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externality, nor is it the Scheinen of itself in an other, but it manifests itself, that is, in its 
externality it is itself and is itself in that alone, namely only as a self-distinguishing and 
self-determining movement’ (SL 541-2/LW 175). 
I shall consider the second chapter of Hegel’s account of ‘actuality,’ which deals 
with the categories of possibility, actuality, contingency, and necessity. Even at this stage 
of essence, when the distinction between the inner and the outer has been overcome, 
reflection still has not come to coincide with itself completely and is therefore still 
haunted by an other within itself. Although the modal dialectic is not the last stage of the 
logic of essence, it is nevertheless in the transition from real possibility to real necessity 
that the last really significant presupposition of reflection, which takes the form of 
contingency, is seen by Hegel to be overcome. In the following reading of the modal 
dialectic, I shall claim that in the stages of formal actuality and real actuality, the necessity 
of contingency is maintained, but that in absolute necessity this remaining contingency is 
annulled in all but a negligible sense. As we shall see, the transition to real necessity, 
which forms the basis for the transition to absolute necessity, significantly resembles the 
transition from ‘real ground’ to the Sache, and I shall claim that it too cannot be 
demonstrated to be necessary.       
 
2.1 Formal Actuality 
 
Now that the difference between the inner and the outer has been sublated, the question 
is no longer  whether being manifests itself completely, but how it does so, i.e. how this 
process takes shape as the movement between possibility and actuality. As in the 
dialectic of ground, these two categories are first determined formally—they are only 
modes of presentation of a content that in itself is indifferent to them, just as formal 
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ground only involves a change of ‘perspective’ on the same content. Possibility is this 
content in the form of ‘reflection into self’; actuality in the form of its immediate 
existence (SL 542/LW 176). As George di Giovanni puts this, the former is ‘a mere self-
reference,’ the latter ‘a mere presence.’11  
Hegel initially focusses on possibility, drawing out first its positive and then its 
negative sense. Positively, it is initially characterised according to the traditional schema 
of identity: what is possible is that which is not self-contradictory (SL 543/LW 177). But 
this minimal and purely formal description puts almost no limit on what is in truth 
possible: considered in abstraction, anything is just as possible as its opposite, which 
latter would exclude it. This definition of possibility in terms of non-contradiction 
therefore comes to contradict itself; were it to be used as a criterion, we would have to 
say that anything is as impossible as it is possible. The same result is reached through the 
negative definition of possibility as that which is not what it is by itself: what determines 
whether it is really possible lies entirely outside itself (SL 543-4/LW 177-8).  
In this way, the minimal determination of possibility as a mere self-reference 
proves to be insufficient to distinguish possibility from the ‘mere presence’ or bare 
immediacy of actuality. Hegel thus writes that possibility ‘is therefore also the immediate 
and thus becomes actuality' (SL 544/LW 178). This does not mean there is now only 
actuality, however, because the merely formal actuality into which possibility has 
sublated itself is, in its bare immediacy, itself just as much possible as it is actual. Neither 
possibility nor actuality constitutes the ground of that which is nonetheless actualised; 
what is actualised, then, just happens to be actualised.   
                                                          
11 George Di Giovanni, ‘The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic’, in Art and Logic in Hegel’s 
Philosophy, ed. by Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth L. Schmitz (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), 
p. 185. 
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This is of course where contingency enters. For, as Hegel writes, 'The contingent 
is an actual that at the same time is determined merely as possible' (SL 545/LW 179). We 
might then say that the contingent is that which, in itself, cannot account for itself, or that 
which is marked by a certain givenness. To this extent, Hegel notes, it both has a ‘ground‘ 
and lacks a ground.12 It lacks a ground in itself but it has its ground in an other (SL 545/LW 
179). But this ground is not yet to be thought as the conditions and wider circumstances 
by means of which any possibility comes to be actualised, as these are not yet on hand. 
All that there currently is, then, is the passing over [Umschlagen] of possibility and 
actuality into each other, which Hegel describes as the ‘absolute unrest’ of becoming (SL 
545/LW 180). Each calls upon the other in order to ground it, but each is equally 
incapable of such grounding, due to its empty, immediately self-sublating indeterminacy.  
Just as in the case of becoming in the Doctrine of Being, however, Hegel finds that 
this restless movement comes to a halt, not this time in the category of Dasein, but in 
that of necessity. Hegel states that 'because each immediately turns into its opposite, 
equally in this other it simply unites with itself, and this identity of both, of one in the 
other, is necessity' (SL 545/LW 180). Now here we should note that this formal 
conception of necessity is extremely minimal. The necessity in question clearly cannot be 
that which guides the process of actualisation, as there is nothing on hand that could do 
so. But it is precisely because there is nothing outside of what there happens to be that 
                                                          
12 Ground here is to be understood in a general sense as that  which provides a reason why something is 
actualised. It is not to be identified with the specific category of ground we considered in the first part 
of this chapter.     
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the latter is all that there can be, and so in this sense is necessary. As Stephen Houlgate 
notes, necessity here can then only be the necessity of contingency.13 
 
2.2 Real Actuality 
 
Formal necessity, as the necessity of contingency, is then the necessity that possibilities 
be actualised, but not the necessity that any particular possibilities rather than others be 
actualised. The second stage of the modal dialectic begins from the manifold content that 
is generated according to this necessity. Hegel's attention again turns first to the meaning 
of possibility. Given the existence of such a manifold content, possibility can no longer be 
simply the non-contradiction of something with itself. If something is really possible, as 
Hegel writes, it ‘must also not be self-contradictory with respect to its developed and 
distinct [unterschieden] circumstances and everything with which it stands connected’ (SL 
548/LW 182, trans. modified). Its real possibility is then no longer in itself, as was the case 
with formal possibility, but is rather constituted by ‘the existing [daseiende] multiplicity of 
circumstances [Umstände] which are connected with it' (SL 547/LW 182).    
Like the ground and the grounded in the sphere of real ground, possibility and 
actuality have now fallen apart from one another. Possibility is now the possibility of 
something else being made actual. This is true of every possibility that has been 
actualised, insofar as it is now a moment within a state of affairs which makes other 
terms possible; but it is also true of the totality of the determinations making up this state 
of affairs, insofar as they are in themselves the real possibility of generating a new totality 
of circumstances. As Hegel writes, ‘real possibility constitutes the totality of conditions, a 
                                                          
13 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Necessity and Contingency in Hegel’s Science of Logic’, The Owl of Minerva, 27 
(1995), 37–49 (p. 41). 
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dispersed actuality which is not reflected into itself but is determined as being the in-itself 
of an other’ (SL 547/LW 182, trans. modified). Indeed, here we see how in real possibility 
the sphere of actuality comes to take on its generative aspect; Hans-Peter Falk thus 
suggests that ‘real possibility’ could equally be termed ‘potentiality’14   
We can now turn to the manner in which Hegel conceives this separation of real 
possibility from actuality to undo itself. As we have seen, whether something is really 
possible depends on the state of affairs constituted by the given multiplicity of other 
determinations which make up the surrounding ‘context.’ These conditions are described 
by Hegel as ‘diverse determinations, and […] a manifold content in general’ (SL 546/LW 
181) and, as we saw above, an ‘existing [daseiende] multiplicity’ (SL 547/LW 182). Now to 
the extent that these conditions remain diverse, then precisely what they make possible 
remains external to them: in other words, what will be actualised remains contingent. 
Nevertheless, at this point Hegel refers back to the argument from the dialectic of 
identity and difference that diversity sublates itself into opposition, though without 
demonstrating its validity in the context of modality. ‘Manifold existence, Hegel writes, ‘is 
in its own self, this, to sublate itself and fall to the ground’ (SL 548/LW 183). Yet Hegel 
appears to explain what is meant here also by repeating, almost word for word, the claim 
made at the end of the dialectic of ground: ‘When all the conditions of a Sache are 
completely present [vollständig vorhanden sind], it enters into actuality‘ (SL 548/LW 183). 
Hegel’s claim can therefore be taken to be that the more something comes to be really 
possible rather than possible in only an empty, formal sense, the more it comes to be 
actual, and thus proves to be necessary. As John Burbidge interprets Hegel’s point, 'On 
the one hand, a set of conditions are not the real possibility of a thing unless all the 
                                                          
14 Hans-Peter Falk, Das Wissen in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ (Freiburg: K. Alber Verlag, 1983), p. 
169. 
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conditions are present. On the other hand, when all the conditions are present, the thing 
is no longer simply possible, but actual.’15 Just as in the case of formal necessity, it is then 
through the sublation of the difference between possibility and actuality that real 
necessity arises. Simply put, if whatever is really possible is actual, then what is really 
possible is necessary: it could not be otherwise. ‘Under these conditions and 
circumstances,’ Hegel writes, ‘nothing else can follow’ (SL 549/LW 184, trans. modified).    
For Hegel, this again does not mean there is now only actuality, but rather that 
there is no longer a separation between what is possible and what is actual, no longer a 
leap from the one to the other, for each is in itself the other. The transition from 
possibility to actuality is thus 'not a transition, but a going-together-with-itself' which in 
its self-sublation brings forth 'the same moments which were already there' (SL 548/LW 
183). Likewise, in sublating itself, the immediate existence of actuality makes itself into 
the 'in itself [i.e. the possibility] which it already is' (SL 549/LW 184). As di Giovanni 
writes, then, ‘the one significant reality is the emergence of an event as process.’16 Di 
Giovanni is right to refer to a process here, and thus to a certain development, but we 
also need to note that this development is at the same time always already cancelled as 
such, for it always already will have occurred. Here we can see, then, just how much the 
remainder, or the delay between positing and presupposing, has been reduced at this 
point in the logic of essence.  
  
Though this transition appears to be straightforward, we might raise the same objection 
to it as we did to the transition to the Sache in the sphere of ground, namely that Hegel 
                                                          
15 John W. Burbidge, ‘The Necessity of Contingency’, in Art and Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy, ed. by 
Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth L. Schmitz (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 208. 
16 Di Giovanni, p. 190.  
144 
 
cannot show in an immanent manner that a remainder of exteriority should not persist 
between possibility that actuality, and therefore that a degree of contingency or 
indeterminacy as to what may be actualised does not remain. Now in raising this 
objection, it is important to make clear what does the real work in Hegel’s argument. 
Although aspects of Hegel’s presentation suggest otherwise, the transition to necessity is 
not brought about through the ‘external completeness’ of the conditions. Real necessity 
is the notion that something in particular, i.e. something determinate, is contained within 
and must follow from a given state of affairs. This form of necessity cannot then be 
reached simply through the external coming together of a number of conditions. For if 
these conditions remained merely diverse over against one another, then as was the case 
in ground, they would not be in themselves the conditions of one particular thing rather 
than another. There would then need to be another condition which makes these 
conditions the condition of possibility of something in particular, rather than of anything 
else, and so on ad infinitum.  
In truth, the transition to real necessity takes place, then, not when a new 
condition comes to be added to the existing set of conditions, but rather when the 
conditions that are already there prove not to be simply diverse but rather to relate to 
one another in such a way that they form one coherent whole. Only in this way do they 
contain in themselves, and thus by themselves make necessary, something in particular. 
As we saw di Giovanni note, the actualisation then becomes a wholly immanent process 
of development, a movement, we might say, of the self to itself, rather than a leap from 
one moment to the next. And as Hegel himself states of actuality: ‘when its immediate 
existence, the circle of conditions, sublates itself, it makes itself into that in-itself which it 
already is’ (SL 549/LW 184).  
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Once again, however, this complete coherence of the conditions cannot be 
immanently justified, but is made seemingly plausible through Hegel’s presentation of 
this transition as a moment within an all-or-nothing dialectical movement, as well as his 
appeal to a ‘self-evident’ notion of external completeness (i.e. ‘when all the conditions 
are completely present…’) which does not do the real work of his argument. If a 
remainder were then to persist here between the conditions, their complete unity would 
not be attained and precisely what they give rise to would remain indeterminate. In 
chapter 6, I shall pursue this point through Derrida’s critique of the notion of necessity in 
Hegel’s ‘system’ more generally.  
 
2.3 Absolute Necessity 
 
The transition to real necessity forms the basis of the transition to ‘absolute necessity.’ In 
the final part of this chapter, I shall suggest that it is through this latter transition that 
contingency is ‘overcome’ in an important sense. First, however, we need to consider in 
what sense contingency still remains. Real necessity, as we have seen, expresses the 
complete mediation of possibility and actuality. Yet Hegel notes that such necessity is still 
based on a presupposition that falls outside this mediating movement, namely on a 
moment of contingency which remains unaccounted for. This is because real necessity 
constitutes the mediation of those determinations which in the process of formal 
actuality happened to be actualised. Real necessity, in Hegel's view, can account for the 
unity of these determinations, but not for what was first of all there to be mediated. As 
Hegel puts it, 'it has its starting point in the contingent’ (SL 549/LW 184). As Giacomo 
Rinaldi notes, real necessity is then the kind of relation usually expressed in the form of a 
hypothetical judgement: ‘an existence is ‘really’ necessary in that, once the totality of its 
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conditions is posited, it must necessarily actualize itself. Yet that the totality of its 
conditions be posited is by no means determined by its very essence.’17 The transition to 
absolute necessity thus constitutes another example of the movement by which essence 
attempts to ‘get behind’ the remainder that seems to fall outside of reflection, and so to 
account for its own beginning. For Hegel, it will be a question here of showing that this 
presupposed contingency is in truth a moment of necessity itself, i.e. that necessity is not 
merely the mediation of pre-given determinations, but is also that which first of all 
generates these terms. The presupposition of real necessity will thus prove to be ‘its own 
becoming; - or the presupposition which it had is its own positing’ (SL 551/LW 186, trans. 
modified).   
The passages in which Hegel attempts to demonstrate this overcoming are some 
of the most dense and elliptical in the Logic (SL 550-1/LW 186-7). Nevertheless, Hegel's 
central point does not amount to a new logical development, but can be seen as an 
extension and radicalisation of a consequence implicit in the structure of real necessity. 
This consequence can be put in the following way: the previous dialectic has, in Hegel's 
view, shown that any possibility that is 'really real,' as it were, cannot but be actual. But if 
this is the case, then there is no longer any sense to the notion that things might have 
been otherwise; the notion of possibility that such a thought involves is purely formal, 
and formal possibility has been seen to sublate itself—it has proved to be mere Schein. 
Thus, if in truth there cannot be a genuine possibility that is not already actual, then there 
can no longer be any 'original' contingency. Indeed, with the closure of reflection on itself 
we lose the notion of any origin überhaupt, for such a notion is seen to be an ‘illusion’  
generated by reflection itself, just as it was in the opening chapter of the logic of essence. 
In truth, what seemed to be simple immediacy will have been reflected immediacy. 
                                                          
17 Rinaldi, p. 215. 
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Absolute necessity therefore corresponds to the Sache selbst in the sphere of ground: it is 
that which posits its own conditions.      
Hegel maintains, however, that even absolute necessity remains, in a certain 
sense, the necessity of contingency. This point is taken up by both di Giovanni and Dieter 
Henrich. The former writes that to determine reality absolutely, in the manner of 
absolute necessity, 'does not mean to enumerate exhaustively the ready-made qualities 
which supposedly make up its content, but to define it precisely as generating its own 
problems of determination.’18 Yet insofar as these ‘problems’ are only generated by 
absolute necessity itself, it is difficult here to see why they should be genuine problems. 
Why this is the case emerges more clearly if we consider Henrich's very similar position. 
Henrich writes that it would be legitimate to see contingency as being annulled by 
necessity in Hegel's Jena Logic, but that in the Wesenslogik of 1813 this is no longer the 
case. In the latter, he states, necessity posits its conditions, but it posits them precisely as 
contingent.19 Here Henrich draws on Hegel’s statement that it is 'necessity itself which 
determines itself as contingency – in its being repels itself from itself and in this very 
repulsion has only returned to itself' (SL 551/LW 187). Yet neither Henrich nor Hegel 
elaborates on precisely what it would mean for necessity to posit itself as contingency, 
and it is difficult to see how such an elaboration could be given, for up to this point in the 
Logic contingency has referred to that which precisely is not posited—that which can only 
be presupposed, even if by reflection, as falling outside the circle of reflection.     
Absolute necessity does not come up against such a presupposition since, as a 
pure self-relation, nothing any longer remains opaque to it. As Hegel writes, ‘the form in 
its realisation has penetrated all its differences and made itself transparent and is, as 
                                                          
18 Di Giovanni, p. 193. 
19 Dieter Henrich, Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 164. 
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absolute necessity, only this simple self-identity of being in its negation or in essence’ (SL 
551/LW 187). To the extent that it is a movement that only goes together with itself, 
absolute necessity has thus come to reconstitute the simple immediacy of pure being as 
pure reflected immediacy. It can therefore be thought as the thoroughgoing mediation of 
mediation and immediacy. As Hegel puts this, absolute necessity is, ‘being which in its 
negation, in essence, is self-related and is being. It is as much simple immediacy or pure 
being as simple reflection-into-self or pure essence; it is this, that these two are one and 
the same’ (SL 552/LW 188).  
 Absolute necessity has then almost entirely ‘overcome’ and accounted for 
contingency. Nevertheless, just because it has come to reconstruct the simple immediacy 
of being through its thoroughgoing self-mediation, it remains in a minimal sense still the 
necessity of contingency. It is such because, although the manifold content from which 
real necessity seems to begin is in truth only posited by absolute necessity, there is still no 
reason why what is posited is posited.20 This content simply is necessary, without any 
further explanation; in other words, what must be must be, but it is not yet clear why 
what must be must be. Hegel therefore states that, because it is immediate, ‘that which is 
simply necessary only is because it is; it has neither condition nor ground.’ On the other 
hand, however, since this immediacy is mediated or reflected immediacy, Hegel also 
states that 'it is, because it is. As reflection, it has a ground and condition, but it has only 
itself for ground and condition’ (SL 552/LW 188).  
 
                                                          
20 My thanks to Stephen Houlgate for pointing out this dimension of absolute necessity. Houlgate also 
notes one further sense in which absolute necessity might be considered the necessity of contingency. 
On his view, it ‘determines nothing other than the unavoidable fate of all contingent things, namely that 
they will end’ (Houlgate p. 47).  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I claimed that it is in the sphere of ‘ground’ that difference as diversity 
explicitly gives rise to the central problem of essence: relativity. This state of diversity is 
taken by Hegel to sublate itself in the dialectic of ground and in that of the modal 
categories. I claimed, however, that this sublation could not be justified on an immanent 
basis. I suggested instead that it gains its plausibility through the all-or-nothing 
movement from one moment of the dialectic to the next, and through a more implicit 
appeal to the authority of the context. As I shall suggest in chapter 6, in Derrida’s view 
this surety constitutes itself through the repression of the possibility of reconceiving the 
sense of any ‘given’ context.  
 In the present chapter, very little was said about Derrida’s relation to Hegel’s 
logic of contingency and necessity. Here I would like to reiterate the reasons for this, 
while also foreshadowing the manner in which, in chapter 6, I shall nonetheless consider 
Derrida’s Auseinandersetzung with the role of contingency and necessity in Hegel’s 
‘system’ more broadly.   
  Firstly, just as Derrida cannot simply affirm the excess of Hegelian diversity over 
opposition, he cannot affirm the excess of Hegelian contingency over necessity. To do so 
would already be to accept the basis of Hegel’s distinction between these categories, 
according to which contingency is the symmetrical ‘own other’ of necessity, in the form of 
‘external’ rather than internal difference. Indeed, as I shall discuss in chapter 6, Derrida 
points out that Hegel can only determine contingency as mere contingency to the extent 
that it can meaningfully be contrasted with true necessity. Contingency is therefore only 
determined as such once it has been overcome. If it is not overcome, then of course 
‘contingency’ can no longer be ‘mere’ contingency.  
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 Secondly, Derrida also cannot offer an alternative general theory of contingency 
and necessity. For to give a general theory of contingency would already be to determine 
contingency on the basis of necessity and so to privilege the latter; it would be to 
determine what contingency necessarily is, in all contexts. Furthermore, to state that 
contingency, thus defined, always exceeds necessity would be to make a universal, 
necessary claim. 
Derrida therefore cannot simply argue for the excess of contingency over 
necessity in general, whether in the form of a more radical necessity of contingency or 
the contingency of all necessity. To do so would lead toward the contradiction into which 
Markus Gabriel runs in his Transcendental Ontology. In that work, Gabriel draws on 
Schelling in order to argue, against Hegel, for the contingency of necessity. But Gabriel 
also notes that 'if contingency is to truly have the last word, we cannot even claim that 
this is necessary: this means that there is no theoretical operation that can guarantee 
even that at least contingency is necessary.'21 Now while Gabriel is content merely to 
acknowledge this contradiction, Derrida recognised that it must affect the very bases of 
his methodology: this, as we noted in the previous chapter, is why Derrida always has to 
speak from within, although at the same time always from the edge of, particular 
contexts, such that the universal validity of any statements made within these particular 
contexts is always already problematised and subject to displacement.  
 Furthermore, even ‘within’ these contexts, it is not Derrida’s aim to critique the 
authors he engages with by appealing to that which must be universally acknowledged. 
The same is true, as we shall see in chapter 6, of Derrida’s critique of the shift from 
diverse structures to oppositional structures at various moments in Hegel’s system. 
                                                          
21 Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 
130. 
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Appealing to that which is ‘obvious,’ ‘plain to see,’ or ‘given,’ would already, as we saw 
above, conform to the manner in which Hegel arrives at the notion of necessity or the 
Sache selbst. For Derrida, by contrast, it will always be a question of attempting to remain 
open to the ‘other other’ that does not push itself to the fore, and also to the mechanism 
by which this other other is repressed.   
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Chapter 5: Hegel's Concept 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapter is devoted to the beginning and end of the third and final book of 
Hegel’s Logic: The Doctrine of the Concept. In the first part of the chapter I shall give a 
characterisation of the general structure of the concept, particularly by contrasting it with 
the sphere of essence. On the basis of this characterisation, I shall also consider the status 
of difference in the conceptual sphere. It is particularly important to undertake this 
investigation in relation to the concept because, as Michael Theunissen notes, it is with 
the concept that the Logic ceases to be a critical presentation of prior attempts to grasp 
the truth of being and comes to be the presentation of this very truth, as Hegel conceives 
it.1 Difference as it appears in the concept is then the truest and ‘highest’ form of 
difference for Hegel. Nevertheless, I shall claim that in the conceptual sphere identity 
comes to be privileged over difference in two ways. Firstly, identity comes to be privileged 
at the ‘meta-level’ of the identity of identity and difference, insofar as the different 
moments of the concept form a totality. I shall claim that this form of identity as the self-
relation or self-presence of the concept follows as a direct consequence of the sublation 
of the sphere of essence. Secondly, identity comes to be privileged in a more 
straightforward manner, insofar as the movement of the concept as such is identified with 
the unfolding of one of its determinations: the universal. I shall claim that this form of 
identity as the active self-determination of the concept does not strictly follow from the 
                                                          
1 Michael Theunissen, Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, 2 ed. (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 38. 
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sublation of the sphere of essence, but constitutes Hegel’s interpretation of this sublation.  
In the second part of the chapter, I shall consider how the ‘absolute method’ 
introduced at the very end of the Logic comes to reconceptualise both the beginning of 
the Logic and the process of its subsequent development. As the ‘universal self-
consciousness’ of the Logic,2 the absolute method thus brings a certain closure to the 
logical system, in demonstrating what this system will have been, in truth.  
 
Part 1: The Concept in General 
 
1.1. The Diachrony of Essence 
 
As Hegel makes clear, the sphere of the concept is distinguished from that of essence by 
its transparency (SL 582/LB 11). As we saw in chapters 1, 2, and 4, essence is 
characterised by a certain opacity. This opacity is due to the remainder of being which 
continually eludes the reflexive self-determination of essence. Essence, as a movement of 
positing, continually came up against that which it could not have posited by itself, but 
which it had to presuppose. Now what it presupposes, as we noted in chapter 1, itself 
does not lie outside this movement of positing—this is why it is not a ‘remainder’ in a 
simple sense, i.e. not a ‘leftover’ from the sphere of being that has not completely 
disappeared, but rather a ‘past that has never been present’ and that only will have 
preceded its being posited. Yet it is just because the remainder is ‘generated’ through the 
very movement of reflection on it that this reflection cannot definitively ‘get behind’ it. 
Each time that essence catches up with it, it immediately reappears again. The opacity of 
                                                          
2 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1997), p. 167. 
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essence is thus concomitant with the diachrony of essence.    
   The logical ‘present’ of essence is thus continually disrupted by the spectre of 
the ‘past,’ such that what this past will have been cannot be definitively determined: 
essence as reflection or Erinnerung cannot close upon itself. This disturbance manifests 
itself, on the one hand, as a ‘delay,’ or a jolting movement from one determination to the 
other. Each determination of essence is in itself its other, but is not quite at the same time 
that other; they are still separated by the remaining difference of identity and difference. 
According to the all-or-nothing dialectical movement of essence, they therefore fall apart 
into reflections that are apparently complete in themselves, and so fall into a state of 
diversity.   
 Now as we saw in chapter 4 in particular, it is through the logic of opposition that 
runs through the sphere of essence that the remainder, and thus the diachrony of 
essence, is gradually reduced. Although the diachrony of essence continually returns, 
each instance of opposition serves to further reduce the gap between ‘past’ and ‘present’ 
by further reducing the remainder on which it rests. By the end of the logic of essence, 
the ‘delay’ between positing and presupposing has become so slight that it ultimately 
disappears. This occurs when, at the end of the sphere of ‘actuality,’ the categories of 
activity and passivity sublate themselves into each other in a similar manner to the 
positive and the negative that we observed at the end of the dialectic of identity and 
difference (SL 568-9/LW 207-8). They thereby form one single process—which Hegel 
terms reciprocity—wherein each term only goes together with itself in its other. At this 
point, being comes to take on conceptual, rather than essential, form. As Hegel writes, 
‘The mutual opacity of the substances standing in causal relationship has vanished and 
become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality of their self-subsistence has passed 
into a positedness; the original substance [Sache] is original in that it is only the cause of 
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itself, and this is substance raised to the freedom of the concept’ (SL 582/LB 11). 
 
1.2. The Simultaneity of the Concept 
 
The concept is thus no longer disturbed by the remainder. But this does not mean that it 
falls into a static form of self-identity and that the process of negativity comes to a halt. 
The latter remains integral to the concept, which means that the negation still separates 
from itself and comes to coincide with itself again. Indeed, in the conceptual sphere, 
negativity,  
  
constitutes the turning point of the movement of the concept. It is the simple point 
of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate 
and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and 
through which alone it is true (SL 835/LB 296).  
 
What separates the logic of the concept from that of essence is rather the form that this 
movement takes. In the sphere of the concept, this movement is no longer subject to a 
logical delay; both of its phases rather occur simultaneously, such that  the movement 
‘outward’ is at the same time a movement of return. In other words, the relation to the 
other is at the same time, because equally, a relation to self. The concept, as we shall see 
below, therefore amounts to the complete mediation of mediation and immediacy.   
 Whereas in essence, then, there was a jolting movement from one determination 
to its other, in the concept there is a flowing movement. As Gerard Lebrun puts it, the 
concept is defined by development rather than the appearing (paraître) that characterises 
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essence.3 Thus, whereas in the logic of essence it was possible to speak of the relation 
between, for example, the thing and its properties, here it is initially no longer 
appropriate to speak of things as such, but only of a process: what comes into focus with 
the concept is no longer being as divided into distinct, internally complex terms but the 
formal structure of being as movement.4 This movement does not proceed from one 
distinct point to another, but is the continuous development of the self in the other.5  
To this extent, then, it is difficult to see how Hegel’s concept could so often have 
been regarded as the sphere in which his thought comes to rest—as the moment of its 
simple closure on itself. Recent scholarship has therefore attempted to counter this 
misreading by stressing the dynamism of the concept.6 But in doing so, it is in danger of 
overstating its case and missing what remains valid in this too simplistic criticism of Hegel: 
for that the music has not come to a stop does not yet tell us what we are listening to. As 
we have seen, the transition to the concept is characterised by the overcoming of a 
distinction between identity and difference, or the  self and the other. This means that 
both moments are given simultaneously, as each is immediately the other. Thus, while the 
concept is in one sense only movement, in another sense, this movement has always 
already occurred. It is a movement, in other words, that brings forth only what is already 
there. This is why Jean Hyppolite notes that the concept is marked by the coincidence of 
                                                          
3 Gérard Lebrun, La patience du concept: Essai sur le discours Hégélien (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp. 332–
3. 
4 Nevertheless, later in the logic of the concept this process will come to reconstruct mechanical and 
chemical objects.   
5 This is why the language of positing and presupposing should no longer be appropriate to the sphere 
of the concept. Nevertheless, in the following, we shall see that at certain crucial points Hegel continues 
to speak of positing, though not of presupposing.  
6 In the following, I shall consider an example of such a reading in Lebrun.  
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‘invention’ and ‘comprehension.’7  
Just as essence proved to be the truth of being, the concept has now proved to be 
the truth of both being and essence, or the ‘objective logic.’ As we know from the 
consideration of essence, however, the concept cannot be the truth of the preceding 
spheres if it does not both incorporate and account for their seeming truth through a 
structure which, as Houlgate notes, ‘preserves aspects of both but is reducible to neither.’ 
As he states, ‘the concept has the simple self-relation that characterises immediate being, 
and it also incorporates the sheer negativity or ‘reflexion’ that characterises essence.’8 As I 
shall now discuss, these two dimensions of the concept correspond to two ways in which 
identity comes to be privileged within it.  
 
1.3 Conceptual Difference 
 
1.3.1 The Concept as Self-Relation  
 
The concept results from the sublation of the distinction between the passive and the 
active, or, as we might more broadly put it, between identity and difference or self and 
other. From a Hegelian perspective, difference is then held to reach its apotheosis in the 
concept because there can no longer be any identity that is not always already shot 
through with difference. Hegel writes, for instance, that it is only a superficial conception 
(Vorstellung) that conceives all multiplicity as standing outside of the concept. In truth, 
however, ‘differentiation’ (das Unterscheiden) is an ‘essential moment of the concept’ (SL 
                                                          
7 Hyppolite, p. 182. 
8 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Why Hegel’s Concept Is Not the Essence of Things’, in Hegel’s Theory of the 
Subject, ed. by D. G. Carlson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 20. 
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588-9/LB 19). This is what allows Hegel to say that the concept holds the highest 
contradiction within itself.  
 The concept, as we shall see, is thus nothing other than the differentiating 
process which separates out the moments of the universal, the particular, and the 
singular. Nevertheless, since each of these moments, in relating to the others, only goes 
together with itself, they all form a single whole or totality. As Hegel puts this, ‘The 
concept in its simple self-relation is an absolute determinateness [i.e. is difference] which, 
however, as purely self-related is no less immediately a simple identity’ (SL 582/LB 11). 
Within the concept, difference is then immediately self-difference. Identity is thus 
privileged here at the meta-level of the absolute identity of identity and difference.    
 The ‘self’ in question here cannot be thought as that which mediates these 
moments, but is only the unity that results from their complete interpenetration. While 
the concept can then be said to ‘continue itself’ through these various moments, it does 
not precede and is nothing outside of these moments. Furthermore, this identity of 
identity and difference is based on the equality and equiprimordiality of the different 
moments; no single moment is privileged over the others.  
 This unity has of course been reached through the logic of opposition which ran 
through the sphere of essence, and which gradually reduced the remaining difference of 
identity and difference to nothing. As I shall discuss in more detail later, this reduction 
proves in the sphere of the concept to be the overcoming of each moment’s resistance to 
its inclusion in a univocal totality. As shall also be discussed, the fundamental unity of the 
concept in this sense leads to the inevitable return and meta-level privileging of such 
terms as ‘identity,’ ‘inner,’ and ‘essence.’  
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1.3.2 The Concept as Self-Determining  
 
Identity is also privileged at a more simple level, in a manner that does not strictly follow 
from, but in a certain sense runs counter to, the logic that Hegel has thus far elaborated. 
This takes place insofar as the concept comes to be determined not just as a form of self-
relation or self-presence but also as an active process of self-determination. The result of 
the sublation of the difference between the passive and the active thus comes to be 
thought as the active. This first becomes evident in Hegel’s discussion of the transition 
from essence to the concept, which is reminiscent of his discussion of the transition from 
being to essence. The concept has thus far proved to be the truth of both being and 
essence, but only insofar as it is their result. To this extent, it is only, as Hegel puts it, their 
‘abstract truth’ (SL 591/LB 22). In order to constitute the full truth of being and essence, 
however, the concept must not only incorporate these spheres within itself, but must also 
show how they are in truth generated from out of itself (SL 591/LB 22). 9 In its initial form, 
the concept is incomplete, Hegel writes, because it ‘has not yet given itself a reality of its 
own, a reality produced from its own resources’ (SL 591/LB 22). It is only in doing so that it 
can throw off its status as a result and can become the absolute beginning, or the 
freedom, that it already is: ‘this identity must itself posit that which it is’ (SL 596/LB 28, 
trans. modified).  
                                                          
9 Here we again encounter the paradoxical logic of the future perfect which has its fullest expression in 
essence, and whose status in the Logic as a whole we shall later question in more detail. The concept 
does not precede being and essence, and, on reaching the concept, Hegel describes these spheres as 
the ‘becoming’ of the concept or the 'genetic exposition of the concept’ (SL 578/LB  5). Nevertheless, 
while this ‘becoming’ in one sense precedes the concept and while the concept is nothing in truth prior 
to the unfolding of these spheres, their development is also a form of ‘return’ into what Hegel describes 
as their ‘unconditioned ground’ (SL 591/LB 22).  
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Now of course ‘identity’ and ‘activity’ mean something very different in the logic of 
the concept than they do in the logic of essence, and the two senses should not be 
confused. This is why, as Houlgate notes, Hegel’s description of the concept as ‘ground,’ is 
rather unhelpful here, for it brings to mind the relative mastery of essence. By contrast, 
the activity appropriate to the concept cannot amount to an exertion of force. It cannot 
be an activity that acts on its determinations, as it can no longer take any distance from 
them. Houlgate makes this quite clear when he writes:   
  
When being proves to be concept, the determinations of immediate being and 
essence do, indeed, show themselves retrospectively to have been concepts, rather 
than merely immediate or reflexive determinations. They do not, however, turn out 
to have been under the sway of an all-powerful concept that determined behind 
their backs how they would develop. They turn out, rather, to have been the initial, 
abstract forms of the concept itself, that is, to be the concept itself in an 
undeveloped form. With the move into the sphere of the concept, the transitions of 
being and the reflexive positings of essence are thus revealed to have been the initial 
ways in which the concept freely determined itself and set itself on the path towards 
becoming explicitly self-determining.’
10
 
 
To this extent, then, even this form of identity as self-determination cannot amount to a 
form of identity that is opposed to or distinct from difference. Nevertheless, it still 
remains unclear how we can speak of self-determination here at all. If the concept results 
from the sublation of the active and the passive, then of course, there can now only be 
one process in which these determinations are moments; to that extent, this process can 
be conceived as a form of self-relation, in the manner described in 1.3.1, above. But why 
                                                          
10 Houlgate, p. 26. 
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should this self-relation be thought as self-determination if it is equally active and 
passive?  
 This only becomes clear when we see that Hegel takes the movement of the 
concept as a whole to be a movement that sets out from one of the concept’s 
determinations, namely the universal. The universal, of course, corresponds to the 
moment of identity within the sphere of essence: it is that form of negativity in which the 
self-coincidence of the negative is emphasised, or the moment of unity. As we shall see, 
the universal first determines itself as the particular, and the universal and the particular 
then come to be united with one another as the singular. The movement of the concept 
as a whole is thus thought by Hegel as the self-determination of the universal, which in 
dividing itself from itself, or ‘becoming other,’ only returns  to itself (SL 601/LB  33).   
 Now it is important to emphasise again that the universal cannot be that which 
stands outside this process of differentiation and guides it from behind the scenes. As we 
shall see, the universal is always already particularised, or as Hegel puts it, ‘concrete.’ 
Nevertheless, the fact that—without apparent justification—Hegel associates the 
movement of the concept with the movement of the universal, rather than the particular, 
makes an important difference here: it means that this movement is conceived as 
beginning and ending with a moment of unity rather than of disunity. The movement as a 
whole thus comes to be thought, as Theunissen notes, in the quasi-religious terms of the 
Heruntersteigen of the universal.11 In this way, although the universal does not stand 
                                                          
11 Theunissen, pp. 43-44. Beginning with one term rather than another also makes a greater difference 
in the sphere of the concept than it did in that of essence. For in the latter, although we began each 
dialectic with the ‘positive’ result of the sublation of the previous stage, this positive term came up 
against a presupposition, by which it was transformed. Since in the sphere of the concept this 
presupposition is not encountered—since the universal continues itself through its differences, rather 
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outside this movement, it still plays a determining role within it, for it is the unfolding of 
its own differences. We might then say that Hegel’s blind spot here is to think that 
because the domination concerned is not external, it cannot be any form of domination at 
all.   
 Now of course, the concept is not presented purely in terms of the 
Heruntersteigen of the universal, and there are tensions in Hegel’s account just because 
this relatively simple privileging of identity is in conflict with the logic he is following. As in 
the Encyclopaedia Logic, then, where Hegel notes that the identity of identity and 
difference in ground is equally the difference of identity and difference, Hegel also on 
occasion describes the concept as original division (e.g. in his analysis of the forms of 
judgement, SL 622/LB 57). Nevertheless, such remarks are relatively isolated and do not 
significantly interfere with the general thrust of Hegel’s presentation. Furthermore, this 
privileging of the universal is not rectified or balanced out even after the whole course of 
the conceptual logic’s development. As we shall see in the second part of this chapter, in 
the absolute method through which the whole of the Logic is reconceived, the beginning 
of the Logic comes to be reconceived as the universal and the subsequent development 
as the process of its self-determination.    
 I shall now consider the manner in which these two forms of identity manifest 
themselves in Hegel’s description of the general tripartite structure of the concept. The 
second form is particularly evident in Hegel’s account of the universal and the particular, 
and the first more prominent in his account of the singular.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
than shining in them—this movement comes to be dominated, in a sense that will be discussed below, 
by the term from which it begins.   
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1.4 The Universal 
 
Like identity in the sphere of essence, the universal is a form of negativity that is accented 
on the moment of its self-coincidence, and thus appears as an ‘utterly simple 
determination’ (SL 601/LB 33). Indeed, Hegel’s initial description of the universal seems to 
recall that of identity:  
 
The concept is, in the first instance, the absolute self-identity that is such only as the 
negation of negation or as the infinite unity of negativity with itself. This pure 
relation of the concept to itself, which is this relation by positing itself through 
negativity, is the universality of the concept’ (SL 601/LB 33).  
 
As a determination of essence, however, identity is a process of ‘shining’ in difference. A 
gap or a delay still separates these two determinations, such that the passage from the 
one to the other is not completely smooth. Identity and difference can then be thought as 
each other’s ‘quasi-transcendental’ condition but each is not wholly immanent to the 
other. In the ‘infinite’ self-relation of the universal, by contrast, there is no remaining 
exclusion of difference. In its self-relation, the universal is at the same time a process of 
differentiation. As Hegel states, the universal is thus the 
 
soul of the concrete which it indwells, unimpeded and equal to itself in the 
manifoldness and diversity of the concrete. It is not dragged into the process of 
becoming, but continues itself through that process undisturbed and possesses the 
power [Kraft] of unalterable, undying self-preservation (SL 602/LB 35). 
 
The universal, then, only is the universal as always already concrete. In this sense it is 
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quite right to say, as Houlgate does, that the universal is only ‘in determining itself to be 
particularity and individuality’ or, even more strongly, that it comes to be nothing but 
particularity and individuality.12 Yet since it is precisely the universal which determines 
itself as particular, this particularity has always already been recuperated by the universal 
and does not fall apart from it. This recuperation-in-advance is achieved through what 
Hegel calls the ‘Doppelschein’ of the universal. This is a form of seeming (Scheinen) which, 
on the one hand, is directed outwards toward ‘another’ (though at this point in the Logic 
it is not clear what this term can mean) but at the same time is always already directed 
back inwards.  
 Now this Doppelschein can take two forms, one of which is appropriate to the 
concept as such, and the other to both determinate (that is, particular) concepts and to 
the inadequate conception of the universal held by the understanding. According to the 
latter, the particularity of the universal is resolved not in the universal as such, but in a 
‘higher universal’ (SL 604/LB 37). But this is an incomplete, and so not a fully conceptual 
resolution, because it necessarily leaves open the possibility that the universal into which 
the particular has been taken up might itself be taken up as a particular moment within a 
universal that is higher still. It leaves open, then, the necessary possibility of a progress to 
infinity, because the unity reached in this case can only ever be that of a provisional 
agglomeration. The understanding therefore does not comprehend that the true, 
conceptual universal no longer leaves open the possibility of the kind of indifferent 
diversity that we observed in the sphere of essence.   
The Doppelschein of the concept as such takes a different form, and in describing 
it Hegel again resorts to the language of positing. Here, particularity is, as it were, always 
                                                          
12 Houlgate, p. 27. This of course does not mean that the universal is nothing but particularity and 
singularity.  
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already recuperated by the universal because it is only posited by the universal. As Hegel 
puts it: ‘The truly higher universal is that in which this outward-going side is taken back 
into the universal, the second negation, in which the determinateness is present simply as 
posited or as Schein’ (SL 605/LB 37, trans. modified). The particularity posited by 
universality is thus not a form of diversity but is always already a totality. In that the 
universal only goes together with itself in determining itself as the particular, it has always 
already returned to itself in the form of the singular.   
Now the above is a description of the conceptual process from the perspective of 
the universal; we might then expect that, in Hegel’s presentation of the particular and the 
singular, this description will be modified such that the process is portrayed from the 
perspective of the latter terms. To some extent this does occur, but, as we shall now see in 
regard to the particular, the process is on the whole still conceived in terms of the 
universal’s self-determination.   
  
1.5 The Particular 
 
The particular is the moment of the tripartite structure of the concept which corresponds 
to difference in the sphere of essence or finitude in the sphere of being—the moment in 
which the negative is divided from itself. Now as we have seen, the universal does not 
logically precede, and is nothing outside of, its particularisation. Furthermore, as we shall 
see in more detail later, the particular itself ‘contains’ the universal and ‘through its 
determinateness also exhibits it’ (SL 606/LB 38). Nevertheless, on the dominant tendency 
of Hegel’s account, it is clear that the relation of dependence between the universal and 
the particular is not equal. For while the particular contains the universal, it contains it as 
that which ‘constitutes its substance’ (SL 605-6/LB 38). The particular is thus only equal to 
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the universal insofar as it is a posited moment of the latter. Once again, then, Hegel has 
recourse to the language of positing here, stating that the particular is ‘the universal’s 
own, immanent moment’ and that ‘it has no other determinateness than that posited by 
the universal’ (SL 605/LB 38, trans. modified). As in Hegel’s discussion of the universal, the 
particular is thus conceived in terms of the self-differentiation of the universal. Hegel even 
goes as far as to say that the particular is ‘the universal itself’ in the moment of its 
‘shining [Scheinen] outwards’ (SL 606/LB  39).   
 The unity achieved through this form of the relation of the universal to the 
particular is again contrasted by Hegel with a lower form of unity, of the kind conceived by 
the understanding. As in the logic of essence, an all-or-nothing comparison is made here 
between an absolutely external difference and an absolutely internal difference. Yet in 
contrast to the sphere of essence, this external difference is not a difference which breaks 
out within the sphere of the concept itself, but is rather that which lies outside it, in the 
realm of the understanding and of nature. Because the understanding can only conceive a 
multiplicity in the form of a collection of distinct entities, the only unity it can attribute to 
them is an immediate unity. The inferiority of such a unity, for Hegel, lies in the fact that 
the universal through which such a diverse multiplicity is unified can only be applied 
externally: ‘There is no inner standard or principle that could apply to them, simply 
because diversity is the difference without unity’ (SL 606/LB 39). This of course means 
that such a diversity could come to be united by many different universals, without any of 
the latter having a claim to ultimate authority.  
As Hegel famously remarks, this is the kind of diversity that can be found in 
nature, but it is not appropriate to the concept. In the truly conceptual unity, the universal 
is ‘the totality and principle of its diversity, which is determined wholly and solely by the 
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universal itself’ (SL 606/LB 39).13 Here there can only be one, inner unity of the particular 
determinations. Because the domain of the particular is thus not diverse, but absolutely 
unified within itself, the particular as such enters into a pure relation of opposition with 
the universal as such. As Hegel puts this, ‘the determinate side of particularity is complete 
in the difference of the universal and the particular, and […] these two alone constitute 
the particular species’ (SL 607/LB 40). In nature, by contrast, there are always more than 
two species in a given genus, and these species are not unified as a totality but according 
to their external or ‘contingent’ completeness (SL 607/LB 40). Nature is thus the absolute 
or own other of logic:  
 
This is the impotence [Ohnmacht] of nature, that it cannot adhere to and exhibit the 
strictness of the concept and runs wild in this blind irrational [begrifflos] multiplicity. 
We can wonder at nature’s manifold genera and species and the endless diversity of 
her formations, for wonderment is unreasoning and its object the irrational [das 
Vernunftlose] (SL 607/LB 40-41).  
 
Now although, in the conceptual unity, the particular determinations are produced 
through the self-diremption of the universal, Hegel wishes to see this process as one in 
which the universal does not dominate, or exert any violence over, its determinations. In a 
frequently quoted passage, Hegel writes that the universal is ‘free power […] but not as a 
                                                          
13 In a manner that foreshadows the absolute method at the end of the Logic, in another passage Hegel 
again invokes the language of essence in describing what it means for the universal to be the principle 
of its determinations: ‘a principle contains the beginning and the essence of its development and 
realisation’ (SL 610/LB 43, trans. modified). A little earlier Hegel had already used the term ‘essence’ in a 
similar context, stating that ‘the particular has universality within it as its essence’ (SL 608/LB 41, trans. 
modified).  
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violent force [ein Gewaltsames]; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful 
communion with itself [ruhig und bei sich selbst ist]’ (SL 603/LB 35-36). It could therefore, 
he writes, also be called ‘free love and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its 
other as towards its own self; in it, it has returned to itself’ (SL 603/LB 36).   
Yet even if we leave to one side the language of positing used by Hegel in this 
section, and if we acknowledge that the universal has no simple priority over its 
determinations, we might of course ask whether there is not a more subtle form of 
violence and domination implicit in such a self-presence—a relation to the other ‘only as 
to itself.’ Furthermore, there is only a lack of violence here insofar as the other precisely 
results from the schöpferische Macht of the universal, that is, insofar as there is no 
genuine other on hand, but only a modified version of the self.14 Even if the term 
‘positing’ is used ‘metaphorically’ here (and we would have to question what this could 
mean in the conceptual logic), then the universal still enjoys a determining role in the 
whole process. It does so not through a simple mastery over its determinations, but 
through its Heruntersteigen to them.   
Now of course, one might suggest that the Heruntersteigen of the universal is 
precisely the moment at which it renounces its privilege and ‘priority’ over the particular 
and freely gives itself over to the latter.15 Nevertheless, as Hegel describes it, this is a 
movement in which, as Derrida might put it, the universal gives itself up while keeping 
hold of itself: its particular determinations remain its determinations and are always 
already unified by it as a totality. This ‘restricted economy’ will be considered in greater 
                                                          
14 In chapter 2 we saw how Miguel de Beistegui characterises the dialectic of identity and difference in 
these terms. At that point in the Logic, such a characterisation was seen to be invalid, though here it can 
be applied to the conceptual movement as Hegel describes it.   
15 My thanks to Stephen Houlgate for highlighting this point.  
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detail in the following chapter through a reading of Derrida’s Glas.  
 As I noted above, this explicit privileging of the universal as one moment of the 
concept, rather than as the totality constituted by the interrelation of all of the moments 
of the concept, is not a necessary consequence of the structure of the concept as such. It 
is Hegel’s interpretation of the latter. For this reason, we can agree here with Adorno’s 
statement that Hegel’s ‘dismissive gesture’ toward the singular (or in this case, the 
particular) precisely ‘contradict[s]  […] his own insight.’16 Yet Hegel’s description of the 
concept as the self-diremption of the universal cannot be merely brushed aside as a 
heuristic, an introductory device, or simply an ‘accidental’ feature of what the Hegelian 
concept comes to be, particularly as this description returns at the culmination of the 
Logic in order to define the movement of the Logic as a whole. Nevertheless, Hegel’s 
presentation of the concept in this way also runs alongside a more subtle presentation of 
the concept as the equality and interpenetration of all of its moments. This latter 
dimension comes to the fore in Hegel’s account of the singular. As we noted in section 
1.3.1, however, and as I shall discuss at the end of the following section, even in this form 
the concept still constitutes a univocal totality.  
 
1.6 The Singular 
 
The final moment of the conceptual process—that of singularity—is the point at which 
the negative comes to coincide with itself again after having separated from itself as the 
particular. This returning movement can be regarded as the second phase of the 
Doppelschein of the universal. As Hegel puts it, the singular is ‘The reflection of the 
                                                          
16 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott 
(London; New York: Verso, 2005), p. 16. 
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concept out of its determinateness into itself. It is the self-mediation of the concept 
insofar as its otherness has made itself into an other again, whereby the concept has 
established [hergestellt] itself as self-identical, but in the determination of absolute 
negativity’ (SL 618/LB 53, trans. modified).  
  The true conceptual form of the singular is once again contrasted with the 
manner in which it is conceived by the understanding or representational thinking 
(Vorstellung). As with the first two moments of the concept, the understanding abstracts 
the singular from the total movement of the concept. It sees the closure of this 
movement as the formation of an atom that is self-sufficient in its separation from the 
whole. In doing so, it again takes the universal to be external to the singular, as that which 
is ‘common to several singulars’ which in themselves are indifferent substances (SL 621/LB 
56). This is again contrasted with an adequate conception of the singular, ‘to which the 
universal in the determinateness itself descends [heruntersteigt]’ (SL 619/LB 53). At this 
point, the unity of the concept is once again grounded in the self-division of the universal, 
which prevents any diverse multiplicity from entering here.  
 This is still, however, to focus only on the more contingent and more obvious way 
in which identity is privileged in Hegel’s account of the concept, namely as the self-
determination of the universal. But it is particularly in Hegel’s subsequent description of 
the singular that a more subtle relation between the moments of the concept comes to 
the fore, which provides a more sophisticated account of its unity.  
 This conception of the unity of the concept is based not on the self-differentiation 
of one of its moments, but on the mutual opposition between these moments as 
‘equiprimordial’ terms. In order to explain this relationship, it is helpful here to return to 
the transition from essence to the concept. As we saw, this transition represents the 
culmination of the logic of opposition through which each stage of essence sublated itself 
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into the next: in being totally opposed to each other, the passive and the active passed 
into each other without remainder. The concept results from, and is defined by, this logic 
of total opposition. Each of the terms—the universal, the particular, and the singular—
contains both of the others within itself, and thus the whole conceptual process. In this 
respect, no moment is subordinate to any other since each contains the others just as 
much as they contain it. Each is therefore the ‘totality’ in which it is also a moment, and 
can then be considered the ‘ground’ of the others:    
 
The universal has proved to be not only the identical, but at the same time the 
different [Verschiedene] or contrary as against the particular and individual, and in 
addition, also to be opposed to them or contradictory; in this opposition, however, it 
is identical with them and is their true ground in which they are sublated. The same 
is true of particularity and individuality which are likewise the totality of the 
determinations of reflection (SL 616/LB 50, trans. modified).
17
  
 
It is through this total opposition that the ‘inseparability’ of the determinations of the 
concept is achieved, and that each moment simply ‘dissolves’ or continues itself in the 
others (SL 620/LW 55). We should note, of course, that this immanent unity of the 
concept does not imply that its moments can no longer be distinguished. As Houlgate 
writes:  
 
Each moment of the concept is thus the whole concept in a different form or with a 
different emphasis. The universal is self-relating being that continues in its 
                                                          
17 Cf. also SL 620-21/LB 55-56; SL 600/LB 32: ‘each of these moments [universality, particularity, and 
singularity] is no less the whole concept than it is a determinate concept and one determination of the 
concept’ (trans. modified).  
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differences: it is thus one, single self-identical being. Particularity, on the other hand, 
is that same universal explicitly differentiated into two (or more) contrasting 
moments […] Individuality, finally, is this explicitly differentiated and determinate 
universal, understood as reflected back into itself and thus as free standing.
18
  
 
Although the Heruntersteigen of the universal does play an important part in Hegel’s 
description of the ultimate unity of the concept, then, it does not have to be invoked in 
order to explain the moment of ‘return’ constituted by singularity. Indeed, Hegel also 
writes that ‘The return of the determinate concept into itself means that it has the 
determination of being, in its determinateness, the whole concept’ (SL 621/LB  56). Here it 
is precisely because the singular is not simply posited by the universal and because it is 
‘reflected into itself’ that it comes to be united with the universal.  
 
It is on the basis of this immanent unity that Gerard Lebrun defends Hegel against the 
criticisms that have often been made against the concept, and which he draws from the 
Althusserian reading of Hegel in particular. The concept, Lebrun remarks, can be neither 
an inner essence which expresses itself through its (phenomenal) determinations nor that 
which subjugates such finite determinations to a given principle. For to conceive the 
concept in such a way would already be to fall back into an essentialist form of thinking, 
one which maintains a certain separation between the inner and the outer or essence and 
appearance and in which the essence maintains a certain power over its determinations.19 
As he writes, in such criticisms of the concept, ‘it is as though Hegel were accused of 
having reinstated in his turn a division that he precisely aimed to dismiss.’20  
                                                          
18 Houlgate, p. 25. 
19 Lebrun, pp. 349–50. 
20 Lebrun, p. 350. 
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 The totality of the concept, he notes, cannot be thought as that which ‘results 
from a reunification of given elements’—as a form of magic trick solution to the problem 
of diversity.21 This would of course amount precisely to the external application of a 
universal that we saw Hegel contrast with the immanent unity of the concept. The 
concept is rather, Lebrun states, that structure within which ‘each of the different terms 
has meaning only to the extent that it exhibits the persistence and continuation of the 
others through it; the function of each moment is to affirm that it is a moment of this 
totality.’22 His reading, then, affirms that the conceptual totality is achieved through the 
self-sublation of its moments as merely finite moments. To this extent he claims that it is a 
‘totality without totalisation.’23  
 Now Lebrun is of course right to point out that objections to Hegel along the 
above lines would fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the concept. The concept, 
even as self-determining, is of course not conceived by Hegel as a violent subjugation of 
finitude. For Lebrun, however, this is the end of the matter. Like Hegel, he does not 
consider whether any more subtle form of ‘violence’ might remain after its most obvious 
form—that of external subjugation—has been ruled out. But here one might of course 
object that there is no longer any ‘external’ violence precisely because each ‘finite’ term 
has already lost any resistance to its inclusion within one, univocal whole. And as Lebrun 
would be the first to agree, this whole does not include simply all that there happens to 
be: rather, all that there is only is what it is as part of and as containing within itself this 
one whole. Because the remainder within the terms has been reduced to nothing through 
the logic of opposition within the sphere of essence, there is no longer a possibility of 
                                                          
21 Lebrun, p. 353. 
22 Lebrun, p. 346. 
23 Lebrun, p. 353. 
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reconceiving or determining otherwise the sense of this whole or that of its moments. 
Rather than a ‘totality without totalisation,’ one might therefore call the conceptual unity 
a form of ‘totalisation without a totalising agent.’  
Furthermore, in this way, as we saw above, the concept cannot but reinstate the 
privilege of terms such as ‘inner, ‘essence,’ ‘identity,’ etc., even if they are not reinstated in 
their essential sense but at a ‘meta-level.’ When this reinstatement takes place, there is 
always the risk that one will come to forget that it has occurred at a meta-level and will 
fall back into a simpler usage of such terms. We have seen that this occurs when Hegel 
comes to privilege one moment of the concept over the others. Likewise, Lebrun himself 
proves not to be immune to this slippage when he writes that the concept ‘neither 
expresses itself nor signals itself through its determinations: it shows itself [s’y démontre] 
by dissolving them and nullifying [en niant] their seeming independence.’24 For these 
reasons, the concern that underlies the Althusserian critique of the concept remains valid 
even if the critique itself misses its mark.   
Why is it, then, that Lebrun does not consider such reservations regarding the 
Hegelian concept? This would seem to be because he remains within the horizon of an all-
or-nothing Hegelian logic that distinguishes only between the violence of external 
subjugation and the peace of a wholly internal harmony. In leaping from the one to the 
other he therefore does not consider that the latter might not simply constitute the 
resolution of all violence. Now in the following chapter we shall see that Derrida, for his 
part, does not disavow a certain ‘originary violence’ or necessary repression. But this 
violence is not ‘overcome,’ for Derrida, by working toward the ‘phantasm’ of a final peace; 
and this means that this violence, in truth, can never be definitively overcome, but only 
continually displaced. This takes place through the affirmation of a remainder which 
                                                          
24 Lebrun, p. 353. 
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prevents any given unity from being ultimate.   
Having now given a characterisation of the general structure of the concept, the 
second part of this chapter will turn to the end of the logic of the concept, which is also 
the ‘end’ of the Logic as such. Here I shall consider how the Logic comes to turn around 
upon itself and reconceive its ‘original’ beginning and subsequent development.  
 
Part 2. The Hegelian Future Perfect 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I wish to consider the manner in which a fundamental 
dimension of Hegel’s thought manifests itself at the level of the Logic as a whole. This 
dimension is what I shall call a logic of originary belatedness or a logic of the future 
perfect, according to which the ‘truth’ of things is not what they at first or immediately 
present themselves to be. It is only later, après coup, that it will be possible to state what 
they will have been. This logic is perhaps most famously encapsulated in Hegel’s remark at 
the end of the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that the owl of Minerva flies only at 
dusk.  
 This logic is manifested throughout Hegel’s Science of Logic insofar as each new 
stage of the work shows what the previous stage will have been, in truth. But as we have 
seen, it first comes explicitly to the fore in the logic of essence, when essence comes to 
reconceptualise the sphere of being. It is also a feature of the concept, insofar as the 
latter reconceives, in turn, the truth of both being and essence.  
This logic of originary belatedness has had an enormous influence on post-
Hegelian thinkers and is one of the most important reasons why we might say that we are 
still living in Hegel’s shadow. In Hegel’s Logic, this belatedness cannot be considered to be 
temporal, but it is its temporal form which has marked the post-Hegelian imagination. It 
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has played a crucial role in T.S. Eliot (notably his Four Quartets), Proust, Borges, Levinas, 
Ricoeur, Freud, and of course in Derrida’s thinking of originary supplementation25       
Insofar as Hegel will have been the precursor of these thinkers, this does not mean that 
their various elaborations of a logic of the future perfect constitute mere footnotes to 
him. In a text referred to by Derrida in Writing and Difference, Borges writes that ‘It may 
be that universal history is the history of the different intonations given a handful of 
metaphors.’26 We might also say that one way of viewing intellectual history since Hegel 
would be as a series of intonations on the logic of the future perfect. But it could only be 
presumptuous here to think that a difference in intonation might not have profound 
consequences. We can see why this might be if we consider what could be called two 
aspects or forms of this logic.  
On the one hand, the logic of the future perfect may be deeply unsettling, insofar 
as it implies the radical instability of the past and the necessary possibility of its continual 
reconceptualisation. It thus serves to make every moment, as Eliot puts it, ‘a new and 
shocking valuation of all we have been.’ This form of the future perfect comes particularly 
strongly to the fore in the logic of essence. It involves an uneasy co-dependence of the 
past and the present, where on the one hand, the past does not precede the reflection 
                                                          
25 Cf. Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Kafka and His Precursors’, in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, 
ed. by James East Irby and Donald A. Yates (London: Penguin, 1970); Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than 
Being, Or, Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague ; London: Nijhoff, 1981), and 
particularly ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’, in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. by 
Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996); Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (London: 
Routledge, 2003). 
26 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Fearful Sphere of Pascal’, in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, 
ed. by James East Irby and Donald A. Yates (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 227. 
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upon it (it is a past that has never been present), yet insofar as this past is also constituted 
by a resistant remainder, it cannot simply be reduced to any given reflection. The 
remainder, then, prevents any particular reflection on this past from being complete, and 
thus prevents the coincidence of past and present. Because of this essential diachrony, 
what the past will have been remains always still to come.  
On the other hand, the logic of the future perfect may be liberating and even, 
perhaps, ‘soothing.’27 That the past is not fixed in its ‘original’ givenness means that what 
appeared to be lost, wasted, or misspent time can ultimately be regained and redeemed. 
Even more liberating, perhaps, is the idea that this past could be redeemed once and for 
all, i.e. that the unsettling possibility of its continual reconceptualisation might give way to 
a reconceptualisation that would capture its definitive truth. This second form of the logic 
of the future perfect, then, would be that which has overcome the first form—that which, 
through the gradual transformation of the opacity of the remainder into complete 
transparency, would have overcome the state of diachrony. The jolting movement 
between past and present would then be bent into a smooth, circular movement. This is 
of course the future perfect of the concept, or of absolute knowing in the 
Phenomenology. As Hegel writes in the final chapter of the latter: ‘Spirit necessarily 
appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not grasped its pure concept, 
i.e. has not annulled time [die Zeit tilgt] […] Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and 
necessity of spirit that is not yet complete in itself’ (Ph 487/584-5). In Hegel, Proust, and 
Eliot, this time of ‘falsity’ or Schein, or this clock-time, is also a necessary condition of 
redemption. It is only by traversing the way of despair in a spirit of self-sacrifice that it is 
possible to reach a truer level of time, or even the eternal. ‘Through time time is 
conquered,’ in Eliot’s words.   
                                                          
27 Cf. Derrida, D 21/30.  
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It would of course be far too large a task for the present thesis to consider the 
above thinkers’ relation to these forms of the future perfect. To the extent that they do 
depart from Hegel, however, I would argue that it is in not ultimately collapsing a version 
of the first form of the future perfect into the second. In the following chapter I shall 
consider Derrida’s questioning and displacement of the transition to the ‘conceptual’ 
future perfect within the Hegelian ‘system’ in general and in the Phenomenology in 
particular. In the present chapter, however, I wish to consider the logic of the future 
perfect at the level of Hegel’s Logic as a whole. As we have seen, the concept is 
completely transparent to itself. Yet this does not mean that the unsettling form of the 
future perfect has completely disappeared, for a question still remains as to the relation 
between the highest truth of the Logic and its ‘history,’ namely, the ‘original’ beginning 
and subsequent development of the Logic. In the following, I shall consider how the 
‘absolute method’ which emerges at the end of the Logic brings a certain closure and 
completeness to the Logic as a whole.  
 
2.1 The Absolute Method 
 
The absolute method emerges from the absolute idea. The latter represents the concept’s 
complete reconciliation with itself after having divided itself into its successive stages: 
those of judgement and the syllogism in the domain of subjectivity, then mechanism, 
chemism, and teleology within the domain of objectivity, and finally life, knowing, and the 
good in the domain of the idea. Uniting both the theoretical and the practical, the 
absolute idea constitutes the perfection of the conceptual process, wherein, as Lebrun 
puts it, ‘the unity of and in difference is brought to its perfect fluidity.’28 Though I am 
                                                          
28 Lebrun, p. 545. 
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unable to give it detailed consideration here, in this unity a privilege is again returned to 
identity in the manner discussed in the first part of the present chapter. Hegel writes, for 
example, that the absolute idea is ‘the rational concept that in its reality only goes 
together with itself’ (SL 824/LB 283, trans. modified). And while he states that it ‘contains 
within itself the highest opposition,’ this is only in the sense that it has ‘in its other[…] its 
own objectivity for its object’ (SL 824/LB 284). As at the beginning of the conceptual logic, 
and to an even greater extent here, there is no longer any remainder of a difference that 
would be resistant to its inclusion within a totality.   
The absolute idea is the highest truth of the Logic, in comparison to which, Hegel 
writes, ‘all else [alles Übrige] is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour [Streben], caprice and 
transitoriness; the absolute idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and 
is all truth’ (SL 824/LB 284). Now, as Angelica Nuzzo notes, this is a strangely definitive 
formulation at this point in the Logic, insofar as it seems to indicate an opposition 
between the ‘finite’ and the ‘infinite’ that should have been overcome. It suggests that, as 
Nuzzo puts it, there is, ‘something, a whole realm of negativity, that remains as an 
uncomfortable rest (übrig) placed in front of the absolute idea and opposed to it in a sort 
of un-dialectical Manichaeism.’29 Nevertheless, Hegel’s highlighting of this opposition can 
be taken merely as an indication that a final sublation of the finite-infinite distinction is 
necessary, one which, at this point, must consist in a reconceptualisation of the Logic as a 
whole. Here it will be a question of showing how the highest truth of the Logic can 
account for the truth of the path that has led to it.  
I would disagree here, however, with the instrumental terms in which Nuzzo 
couches the necessity of this reconceptualisation. For Nuzzo, the absolute method 
                                                          
29 Angelica Nuzzo, ‘The End of Hegel’s Logic: Absolute Idea as Absolute Method.’, in Hegel’s Theory of 
the Subject, ed. by D. G. Carlson (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 189. 
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becomes necessary as a response to what she calls the ‘radical risk’ that the Logic could 
still be ‘hijacked by external reflection.’30 Such reflection might either take any one of the 
particular stages in the Logic as ‘a possible – yet entirely arbitrary – conclusion,’ or might 
exploit ‘the openness that the absolute idea still displays’ by engaging in an endless 
reconceptualisation of the Logic.31 For Nuzzo’s Hegel, then, the question that must be 
answered in reflecting on the beginning of the Logic from the perspective of absolute 
method is, ‘How should such a beginning be understood in order for the logic to be able 
to reach its conclusion?’32    
Such ‘external’ concerns, however, do not need to be introduced here in order to 
explain why the end of the Logic should turn around upon itself to consider its ‘history.’ 
The necessity of bringing a certain closure to the Logic rather develops immanently out of 
the kind of ontological process that the absolute idea is: we might say that the ‘desire’ for 
this closure is then already immanent to it. This can be explained as follows. In returning 
to itself from out of its self-diremption, the concept, in the form of the absolute idea, 
again takes on the form of universality. It contains all the prior particularity of the Logic 
within itself, such that this logical content is fully transparent to it. As the ‘soul of all 
objectivity,’ it can therefore no longer, as Hegel puts it, be ‘resisted’ by any given content 
(SL 825-6/LB 285-6). But if this is the case, then its own ‘past’ cannot remain opaque to it, 
and the reflection on the latter undertaken by absolute method only amounts to taking 
the self-transparency of the  absolute idea to its logical conclusion. Absolute method is 
then, as Jean Hyppolite puts it, the ‘universal self-consciousness of the Logic.’33  
                                                          
30 Nuzzo, p. 193. 
31 Nuzzo, p. 194. 
32 Nuzzo, p. 197. 
33 Hyppolite, p. 167. 
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The absolute method thus reconceives what the course of the Logic will have 
been in truth. Here it will again be a matter of an active reconstruction of this 
development, for the concept is now, Hegel writes, ‘everything, and its movement is the 
universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realizing movement’ (SL 826/LB 
286). As nothing can be left out of this reconstruction, it must begin at the beginning.  
 
2.2 The Beginning of the End 
 
Before discussing Hegel’s reconceptualisation of the beginning, it is first of all necessary to 
briefly present the original beginning. The Logic begins with the category of being. Being, 
here, has the utterly simple immediacy that we considered in chapter 1. Pure being is thus 
not a mediated immediacy or a self-relation; nor is it reached, in Hegel’s view, through an 
explicit abstraction from a process of mediation, for then it would already be mediated by 
what it is not. Pure being simply is what it is. But in being such simple, indeterminate 
immediacy, being proves immediately to be nothing. Insofar as nothing, however, is 
likewise simply indeterminate immediacy, it proves to be indistinguishable from being (SL 
82-83/LS 71-72). In the ‘original’ development of the Logic, the movement between being 
and nothing then comes to be conceived as ‘becoming.’ It is when this process of 
becoming settles into the relative stability of ‘determinate being’ or Dasein that this first 
stage of the Logic comes to an end and immanently provides the basis for the next 
dialectical stage.  
From the perspective of the absolute method, the simple immediacy of the 
original beginning is reconceived as the self-relating negativity of the universal. The 
universal is a form of mediated immediacy or a self-relation, and so is not the same as the 
wholly simple immediacy of the original beginning—for the latter was too simple to be a 
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self-relation. Yet as a conceptual determination, the universal is a form of mediation 
which, in being only self-related and wholly transparent to itself, is as immediate as—and  
thereby, we might say, ‘equivalent to’—pure being. As Hegel puts it, ‘Because it is the 
beginning, its content is an immediate, but an immediate that has the sense and form of 
abstract universality’ (SL 827/LB 287-trans. modified). We might then say that pure 
presence here is reconceived as pure, abstract self-presence.  
 Having reconceived the beginning, it now becomes necessary to reconceive the 
development (Fortgang) of the Logic, or, in other words, to describe the motor of its 
progression. This reconceptualisation is contrasted here with the ‘original’ development. 
For while the latter progressed immanently, the absolute method, Hegel writes, ‘knows 
that universality is only a moment and that in it the concept is not yet determined in and 
for itself’ (SL 829/LB 289). For the absolute method, the universal is not ‘simply abstract’ 
but is implicitly (an sich) the ‘concrete totality.’ Yet this truth is not just ‘known’ by the 
absolute method, but is also explicitly implicit within the ‘objective universal’ itself. As a 
moment of the concrete totality that ‘contains […] within itself the beginning of the 
advance and the development’ (SL 830/LB 290), the universal of the absolute method 
must then come to unfold itself in the manner of the universal within the concept in 
general. Once again, then, this unfolding is conceived in active terms. The second 
moment, which is that of particularity, or the ‘mediated’ moment, is thus reached through 
the universal’s determining of itself as its own other.34  
                                                          
34 Hegel describes the development as both analytic and synthetic. It is analytic in that it is only the 
unfolding of what is already implicitly present in the universal; as Nuzzo stresses, we move forward only 
by remaining in place. But it is synthetic in that it also amounts to the universal’s ‘othering’ of itself, such 
that ‘in its very immediacy and universality’ it ‘shows itself as an other’ (SL 830/LB 291). Now it is not 
possible to pursue this point here, but our objection to this description would of course be that since 
the universal remains the beating heart of this development, the status of the synthetic dimension of 
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Now the second moment that has been generated—the moment of particularity 
or difference—is not an ‘indifferent’ other, but the other of the first moment, ‘the 
negative of the immediate.’ Since each is the other’s own other they therefore come into 
opposition and contradiction. Now while Hegel affirms that ‘the thinking of contradiction 
is the essential moment of the concept’ (SL 835/LB 296), by now it is clear that the 
conceptual form of contradiction is at the same time the resolution of this contradiction 
into a remainderless unity. Thus, Hegel writes that ‘the second negative, the negative of 
the negative […] is this sublating of the contradiction’ (SL 835/LB 297).    
This sublation results in a third moment, which Hegel calls the ‘restoration 
[Herstellung] of the first immediacy’ (SL 836/LB 297)—not, however, simply as that initial 
universal immediacy, but as the singular, i.e. as a form of immediacy that is no longer 
abstract since it incorporates the particular within itself.35 The movement has now 
reached its end point in the singular as the ‘concrete subject’ or ‘the universal […] posited 
in the subject’ (SL 837/LB 299). As we can see, although the movement culminates in the 
singular, the universal still retains its privileged position, for the singular is not only that in 
which the universal realises itself most fully as the ‘identity of its moments’ (SL 838/LB 
299) but is also itself taken up as the universal basis of the next dialectical stage. Now 
once again, this does not mean that the universal is simply privileged: it does not relate to 
the singular as a moment that it has posited in an external manner; it has rather come to 
determine itself as singular. Yet it is still the case that it has determined itself as singular, 
so that we might again say that it keeps hold of itself even in giving itself up.      
 Now of course a lot more could be said about Hegel’s description of the absolute 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the latter cannot be equal to its analytic dimension.  
35 This is why Hegel uses the term Herstellung rather than Wiederherstellung—a point that is not 
captured in Miller’s translation.  
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method and its reconstruction of the logical development. What I wish to point out is 
simply that here we are given an importantly different explanation of what the logical 
science begins with and why the Logic moves forward than that which we were originally 
given. It is important to note, however, that this reconceptualisation of the beginning is 
still an account of what the beginning will have been, in truth; it does not simply replace 
that original beginning or show that that beginning simply was the self-determination of 
the universal all along. Furthermore, in this reconceptualisation the necessity of the 
development is in no way dispensed with. Even from the perspective of the absolute 
method, logical truth consists only ‘in the extended course of the process and in its end’ 
(SL 842/LB 304, trans. modified). 
 
2.3 The Circle of Circles  
 
We can now consider why, for Hegel, this particular reconceptualisation of the beginning 
and the subsequent development differs from all of the other reconceptualisations that 
have been given throughout the Logic, that is, how it can fulfil the role of a final truth of 
the Logic that does not itself remain open to a new reconceptualisation. In other words, 
we can see why it should definitively overcome the unsettling form of the future perfect.  
 The sphere of essence was still marked by this form of the future perfect due to 
the remainder which prevented the closure of reflection on itself. In attempting to 
determine the ‘origin’ purely on the basis of its own reflection, essence thus found the 
origin to continually escape its grasp. It thus oscillated between positing and 
presupposing. For this reason, essence as a whole was characterised by Hegel as the 
incomplete mediation of mediation and immediacy. By contrast, the universal of the 
absolute method is no longer disturbed by such a remainder: since it is a form of 
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mediation which is pure self-mediation, it coincides with—by being ‘as immediate’ as—
the simple immediacy of the beginning. In this way, the reflection on that beginning is no 
longer thrown back on itself, but continues itself within the latter in a circle which 
eventually leads back to itself. This circle, Hegel writes, now forms a system of totality (SL 
840/LB 301-1).36   
Throughout the Logic, Hegel has emphasised that the logical development can 
and must be read in two ways: as a movement forward to new, richer determinations, and 
a movement backward into a ‘ground.’ Yet this is the first time that the movement 
forward is at the same time a movement of return, and vice versa, rather than an 
oscillation from one to the other. The diachrony of essence has thus been replaced with 
the synchrony of the concept. As Hegel puts this:  
 
It is in this manner that each step of the advance in the process of further 
determination, while getting further away from the indeterminate beginning is also 
getting back nearer to it, and that therefore, what at first sight may appear to be 
different [verschieden], the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the 
progressive further determining of it, coincide and are the same’ (SL 841/LB 303). 
 
This is also why nothing gets lost or left behind in this development, for everything can be 
accounted for by the end to which it is transparent. What is ‘returned’ to at the ‘end,’ 
however, is of course not identical to that which constituted the ‘original’ beginning, even 
from the perspective of the absolute method, for ‘The method is the pure concept that 
relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation that is being. But now it is 
also fulfilled being, the concept that comprehends itself, being as the concrete and also 
                                                          
36 We should of course note that while the Logic comes to its circular completion in this way, the circle is 
also broken in that the end of the Logic also leads on to a wholly new beginning with nature.  
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absolutely intensive totality’ (SL 842/LB  304-5).   
The absolute method has now definitively reconceptualised the beginning and 
subsequent development of the Logic, thereby creating what appears to be the most fully 
virtuous circle—one that is no longer troubled by the spectre of the ‘bad’ infinite. The pre-
original sin of the simply immediate beginning has thus been fully redeemed, its initial 
opacity and indeterminacy made fully transparent by the light of the highest ontological 
truth. To this extent, we might then say that this truth has come to give itself its own 
beginning. In the following chapter, I shall consider Derrida’s questioning of the manner in 
which such a circle comes to be established. I shall suggest that, for Derrida, it is reached 
through the appropriation, and thus the disavowal, of a gift that cannot be given to the 
self by itself.     
187 
 
Chapter 6: Derrida’s Glas 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapter is devoted to Derrida’s Glas. One might be tempted to think that 
this work is irrelevant to a consideration of Hegel’s and Derrida’s respective conceptions 
of difference. Since the ‘theme’ of Glas is the role of the family in Hegel, one might 
assume that it deals with too restricted or too ‘ontic’ a domain to really bear on such a 
fundamental difference between the two thinkers. Yet part of what separates Derrida 
from Hegel, as we saw in chapter 3 with regard to linguistics, is that for Derrida such an 
ontic domain cannot be disregarded in considering the ‘truth’ of difference. Indeed, the 
relevance of Glas here consists in its challenge to a certain independence or priority of 
‘pure’ ontology. Glas, however, questions not only the independence of the ontological 
from the ontic but also, more broadly, the independence of the ‘ideal’ from the ‘real’: the 
‘contingent,’ the ‘historical,’ the ‘empirical,’ and even the ‘personal.’1     
There are at least two ways in which one might attempt to elaborate such a 
challenge to Hegel. In chapter 4, it was argued that the transitions from ground to 
existence and contingency to necessity could not be demonstrated to be necessary at the 
purely onto-logical level. One might then take Hegel’s logic as a ‘finished product’ and 
consider a variety of ‘real’ contexts in order to see whether, in reality, things ‘really do 
                                                          
1 The scare quotes here indicate that the sense of these terms will be subject to displacement in 
Derrida’s reading of Hegel. Indeed, for Derrida, as we shall see in the following, drawing a rigorous 
distinction between contingency and necessity supposes that one has already surpassed ‘contingency’ 
and acceded to the standpoint of necessity.  
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happen like that’ (comme ça). Through the accumulation of cases in which things do not 
happen like that, one might then come to question whether the ‘truth’ of a concept can 
be determined without reference to these particular contexts, and whether such a 
determination would not rather be a ‘phantasm’ (Gl 224a/250a). Derrida’s entire oeuvre 
might be seen as constituting such a challenge to Hegel, even where it does not address 
Hegel directly. But this is not the ‘strategy’ he adopts in Glas.    
This is because the ‘phantasm’ is not without considerable power, against which 
the above notion of reality, as Derrida acknowledges with a serious irony, might appear 
‘confusedly empirical’ (Gl 224a/251a, trans. modified).2 In Glas, he therefore takes the 
contrary, genealogical approach, considering not the ‘correspondence’ of Hegel’s 
ontology to ‘reality,’ but rather the path which Hegel takes to lead to the standpoint of 
Wissenschaft, from which Hegel’s systematic works are written. The figure of the family 
allows Derrida to trace Hegel’s indebtedness to the historical (and sometimes personal) 
conditions of, or potential influences on, his ontology and systematic philosophy. The first 
part of this chapter considers Derrida’s account of Hegel’s indebtedness to Christianity in 
particular.         
Derrida’s tracing of this debt does not in itself constitute an ‘objection’ to Hegel, 
insofar as Hegel himself acknowledges that his logical project can only become possible at 
the culmination of a historical development, through which the standpoint of 
Wissenschaft has come to be attained. It is worth repeating that insofar as Derrida 
‘objects’ to Hegel, he does not contend that the latter posits an ‘Absolute’ that would 
guide this historical development from the outset. His objection, as I suggested in 
                                                          
2 As will become evident later in this chapter, there is also the problem that such supposed ‘counter-
examples’ could never be entirely irrefutable, insofar as Derrida seeks in them precisely that which does 
not have to be read or acknowledged.  
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chapters 2, 3, and 5, and as I shall further discuss below, is to a logic of the future perfect 
in Hegel, through which the ‘contingent’ historical sources of philosophical concepts 
come to be reduced and ultimately sublated. This occurs when they are retrospectively 
determined as necessary through their belonging to a single pathway that ultimately 
comprehends itself and its beginning. One of Derrida’s aims in what might be considered 
the second part of Glas is to draw out the mechanism through which this circle comes to 
be formed: the determination of difference as opposition from out of an initially diverse 
multiplicity. In addition, Derrida also draws attention to what he suggests is a certain 
violence or repressive force inherent in this restriction of difference.3  As Henry Sussman 
notes, Glas is then less concerned to offer a logical argument against the Hegelian 
reduction—an argument that would state that such a reduction is ‘impossible’—than to 
unravel the value-system with which it is bound up.4 The second part of this chapter 
considers this mechanism of repression and its axiological underpinnings in the context of 
Derrida’s reading of the ‘Ethical World’ (Sittlichkeit) in Hegel’s Phenomenology. It 
therefore extends and feeds back into the analysis I gave of the transition from diversity 
to opposition in Hegel’s logic of ground—a transition which was prevented from being 
derailed by the remainder through an implicit appeal to ‘common sense.’  
                                                          
3 Glas might then be read as an affirmation of Foucault’s statement, in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’ 
that ‘Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it 
arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its development is not tied 
to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its 
instinctive violence’ (in The Foucault Reader, ed. by Paul Rabinow, trans. by Donald F. Bouchard and 
Sherry Simon  (London: Penguin, 1984), p. 96).  
4 Henry Sussman, ‘Hegel, Glas, and the Broader Modernity’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. by Stuart Barnett 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 269. 
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In the third and final part of the chapter I show how the question of debt that 
runs through Glas is brought to the fore by Derrida through the problematic of the gift. I 
claim that on Derrida’s reading the Hegelian mastery that is achieved through repression 
is a form of ingratitude toward that which both gives to thinking5 and stops thinking in its 
tracks.6   
 
Part 1: Inheriting  
 
1.1 The Double Mark of the Family 
 
Glas begins as an investigation into the role played by the figure of the family in Hegel, 
and it is through this figure that Derrida approaches the Hegelian ‘system’ more broadly.7 
                                                          
5 Where ‘that which gives to thinking’ is to be understood both as that which gives rise to thinking and 
that which continues to animate and disturb thinking.  
6 It should be noted here that my reading considers only the ‘Hegel column’ of Glas. It itself will then 
neither avoid doing a certain violence to Derrida’s text nor losing something of its force.  
7 ‘The system,’ in Derrida’s usage, would seem to refer not just to the system of philosophy envisaged 
by the mature Hegel, but rather to Hegel’s entire oeuvre, including his letters. But in order to 
understand the sense of ‘system’ that Derrida is employing here, it is necessary to carefully consider the 
role that development plays within it. In his commentary on Glas, Simon Critchley contends that Derrida 
rejects Bernard Bourgeois’ developmental reading of Hegel in favour of a systematic reading (‘A 
Commentary upon Derrida’s Reading of Hegel in Glas’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. by Stuart Barnett 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 198). But this, I think, is to separate these two forms of reading in a way 
that Derrida would find unsatisfactory. Derrida does indeed ask: ‘How does one distinguish 
philosophically a before from an after, if the circularity of the movement makes the beginning the end 
of the end?’ (Gl 84a/97a). Nevertheless, I would claim that in Derrida’s view the systematic coherence 
of the whole only comes to be through its development, at the end of which its beginning becomes 
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Why the family? In a certain sense, as Kevin Thompson notes,8 the family might be any 
moment of the system, insofar as the latter implies an internal coherence, in which each 
moment is what it is only in its relation to all the others. In this case, the universal truth of 
the whole will be ‘contained’ in every one of the parts. As Derrida writes: ‘in the Hegelian 
systematics, there is never simply any hierarchic relationship between genus and species: 
each part represents the whole, each region is capable of everything’ (Gl 133-4a/152a). 
This is why Derrida writes that the family is ‘marked twice’ within the system: both as a 
finite moment of it and as that in which the system’s ‘infinite totality thinks, produces, 
and reflects itself.’ The family thus ‘figures […] the system’s totality’ (Gl 21a/28a) where 
the figure is, as we shall see, to be distinguished from a representation, a metaphor, or an 
example.   
Nevertheless, the family is not simply one moment among others. The family 
forms a moment of passage between certain crucial stages in Hegel’s works. It emerges, 
for example, from the transition from Moralität to Sittlichkeit in the Philosophy of Right, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
transparent to it. Its systematic threads will have been there at the outset only when the end has been 
reached. This point is crucial, because it is only if the system is understood in this way that Derrida could 
hope to interrupt it: if its systematicity were present from the outset and its circularity already 
guaranteed, what point would there be in attempting to locate those moments within it which might 
resist this internal coherence? In a more nuanced passage than that quoted by Critchley, Derrida 
therefore states that in reading Hegel, ‘we can neither avoid nor accept as rule or principle teleological 
anticipation, neither accept nor avoid as rule or principle the empirico-chronological delay of the 
narrative, the récit’ (Gl 6a/12a).   
8 Kevin Thompson, ‘Hegelian Dialectic and the Quasi-Transcendental in Glas’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. 
by Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 244. 
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which, as Critchley notes, could be thought as the passage ‘from Kant to Hegel.’9 In the 
shape of the Christian Holy Family, it is also the moment of passage from Religion to 
Absolute Knowing (in French, Savoir absolu—usually abbreviated to Sa throughout Glas) 
in the Phenomenology (Gl 94a/109a). In the early sections of the Hegel column, Derrida is 
concerned primarily with the Holy Family in Hegel’s early writings. As Critchley notes, on 
Derrida’s reading of Hegel, ‘the incarnate human family is an echo of divine filiation’10 
insofar as ‘before Christianity, the family had not yet posited itself as such’ (Gl 34a/42a). 
Nevertheless, Derrida is of course also attentive to the Hegelian logic of the finite and the 
infinite, according to which the ‘infinite’ family is not an abstract universal and must 
therefore be incarnated in human families (Gl 64a/75a).   
 
1.2 Metaphor 
 
It is both because the family is ‘marked twice,’ and because of the relative privilege it 
receives within this system, that Hegelian family discourse, for Derrida, ‘would not know 
how to be [ne saurait être] relegated to the subordinate regions of a rhetoric, an 
anthropology, or a psychology’ (Gl 94a/109a). The figure of the family therefore cannot 
be a metaphor for the system, to the extent that metaphor implies a distinction between 
a literal or ‘proper’ sense and a figurative sense. If the family is indeed integral to the 
system, then no literal sense of the system can be isolated that would not already include 
what might otherwise function as a metaphor for it. Neither can the family function as a 
                                                          
9 Simon Critchley, ‘A Commentary upon Derrida’s Reading of Hegel in Glas’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. 
by Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 200. 
10 Critchley, p. 203. 
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synecdoche, since in containing the whole within itself it is not merely a part of the 
system. As Derrida writes, 
 
Will one rashly say that the finite family furnishes a metaphoric model or a 
convenient figuration for the language of philosophical exposition? A pedagogical 
ease? A good way to speak of abstract things to the student {élève}
11
 while playing 
with the familiarity of abstract significations? Even then what the absolute familiarity 
of a signification is must be known. If that can be thought and named without the 
family. Then one needs to ascertain that the finite family in question is not infinite 
already, in which case what the alleged metaphor would come to figure would be 
already in the metaphor (Gl 21a/28a).   
 
Thus far, Derrida is not offering a critique of Hegel, but is only drawing the consequence 
of the Hegelian logic of the finite and the infinite. But in emphasising the significance of 
what the family figure gives to the system, Derrida begins to raise the question of 
whether Sa will be able to fully appropriate this gift for itself, that is, whether Sa will 
ultimately be able to account for itself purely in its own terms. Here a brief reference to 
the broader context of Derrida’s engagement with metaphor in Hegel in his ‘White 
Mythology’ may be helpful. In the latter, Derrida acknowledges that for Hegel conceptual 
meaning does not historically precede metaphorical figuration. Historically, certain 
images provide thinking with the means to represent ideas. It is only through the gradual 
reduction of the representation that the truly conceptual, or ‘proper’ sense of the idea 
emerges (cf. M 225-6/268-9). Derrida himself uses the figure of the coin to describe this 
                                                          
11 In the quotations from Glas given throughout this chapter, braces indicate Leavey and Rand’s 
interpolations of Derrida’s French terms; square brackets indicate my own interpolations, and 
parentheses indicate Derrida’s interpolations of Hegel’s German.  
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process, the two faces of which are gradually worn away, such that the symbolic value is, 
through the hard work of the negative, ‘returned’ to its truly immediate value. Now, as 
we shall see in the following, Derrida suggests that this reduction is achieved through a 
certain violence. He does not do so in order to ‘save’ representation, but rather to 
complicate the relation between metaphor and conceptuality: for the very distinction 
between the two only makes sense from the standpoint from which metaphor has 
supposedly been surpassed. We shall return to this point later, but for now let us consider 
in more detail what it is that the (holy) family gives to be thought.   
 
1.3 The Passage Through the (Holy) Family 
 
On Derrida’s analysis—which now turns from the Philosophy of Right to the texts of 
Frankfurt and Jena and the Phenomenology of Spirit—the family figures the self-proximity 
of spirit. First of all, the family is not a static unit, but rather a process; it produces itself 
through a smooth movement from an initial immediacy, through a moment of self-
division, to a final moment of reconciliation. Because the moment of division in this 
process is only one of self-division, in the manner we observed in chapter 5 in relation to 
the concept, the family remains in possession of itself throughout its circular course. 
Likewise, Derrida notes, ‘Spirit’s being-(close)-by-self actively produces itself through an 
unlimited negativity’ (Gl 24a/31a), giving itself ‘its own proper element’ (Gl 22a/29a). In 
more ‘general’ terms, what is figured here is also the movement from the universal to the 
particular and then to the singular that we considered in the previous chapter. Now, 
following in the footsteps of Marx, Derrida sees the family figure as the intersection of 
the philosophical and economic senses of ‘speculation.’ Insofar as the family’s self-
production is a process in which nothing is in danger of getting lost along the way and in 
195 
 
which a return is guaranteed, it can be considered as a closed economy.12 Later in Glas 
this original economy is suggested to be not only the figure of spirit’s self-relation but also 
the figure of philosophy itself: ‘the eidos, the general form of philosophy, is properly 
familial and produces itself as oikos’ (Gl 134a/152). Let us now turn to the three moments 
figured by the Holy Family in Derrida’s reading of Hegel’s Spirit of Christianity.   
God the father is of course the first moment of this trinity, and yet this priority is 
immediately displaced. For the father only becomes the father in having a son. Here 
Derrida is attentive to the original division of this universal moment of the trinity, which 
prevents the father from dominating the movement in a straightforward sense (Gl 
31a/39a). The father is rather a ‘concrete universal’ of the form we encountered in 
Hegel’s conceptual logic.    
The second moment of the trinity is the father’s ‘fall into the finite’ (Gl 30a/38a) 
in the form of the son. Though the father does not explicitly dominate this process by 
guiding it from ‘behind the scenes,’ he still continues himself in the son because the latter 
is created through the father’s self-division. The father manifests himself as concrete 
spirit, Derrida writes, ‘by dividing himself in his seed that is his other, or rather that is 
himself as the object for himself, the other for him and that then returns to him, in which 
he returns to himself: his son {fils}’ (Gl 31a/39a). The son himself is both finite and 
infinite: he is infinite both in virtue of being the son of God, but also—and here Derrida is 
again attentive to the possibilities of dialectical reversal in Hegel’s account—by giving ‘to 
God his image’ (Gl 31a/39a); he is finite in that he is ‘God separated from himself’ and in 
                                                          
12 This restricted economy comes to the fore here because, in this part of Glas, Derrida focusses 
particularly on the Holy Family. In his discussion of the ‘Ethical World’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
however, we shall see that the moment of division within the family structure also has the potential to 
lead to a radical break, one which risks not being recuperated.   
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that he represents the passage from the finite to the infinite through his death and 
resurrection.    
The third moment of the trinity, the Holy Spirit, is not a distinct moment within 
this family movement but the form of the relation between the first two moments, or, 
‘the element of the infinite’s relation to self’ (Gl 31a/39a). It is the familiarity itself of the 
family—the unity of the father and son. As Derrida puts it, ‘The spirit is the element of the 
Aufhebung in which the seed returns to the father’ (Gl 31a/40a).13 We might say that the 
element of this element—that which ensures the Aufhebung and the familial unity—is the 
structure of an opposition to an own other. It is because the son is the father’s own other 
that the movement as a whole meets no resistance and requires nothing outside of itself 
in order to effect its reconciliation.   
But what is missing from the above family picture? Why is there no (longer any) 
resistance? Throughout the Hegel column, as Critchley remarks, Derrida’s approach 
largely takes the form of a commentary. Derrida’s critique of Hegel, as he himself notes, 
seeks no spectacular explosion of the Hegelian framework, but rather a minute 
displacement of it which may nevertheless reveal an abyss, or a hidden crypt (Gl 
107/124a).14 In the present case, it is through the slight distance that his commentary 
takes on Hegel’s text that the absence of a mother or a daughter in the family picture is 
                                                          
13 It is important to note, however, that Derrida does not understand the Hegelian Aufhebung as an 
abstract universal that would be externally applied to and indifferent to its content: ‘The Aufhebung is 
not some determinate thing, or a formal structure whose undifferentiated generality applies itself to 
every moment. The Aufhebung is history, the becoming of its own proper presentation, of its own 
proper differentiating determination, and it is subject to the law, to the same law as what it is the law 
of’ (Gl 121a/139a).  
14 Here and elsewhere in Glas I take Derrida to be distinguishing his ‘way out’ of metaphysics from the 
Heideggerian ‘leap’ discussed in the latter’s Der Satz vom Grund (Cf. Gl 216a/242a).  
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revealed. The mother is nevertheless not entirely absent; she represents, as Critchley 
notes, ‘but a ‘short detour’ into materiality,’ whereas the daughter, ‘does not even 
figure.’15 In the second and third parts of this chapter I shall consider Derrida’s analysis of 
the repression of sexual difference on the path to absolute knowing in greater detail, but 
for now I shall turn to the wider significance of the trinity for Hegelian speculation.  
 
1.4 The Holy Family and Ontology 
 
A little later in Glas Derrida comes to claim that the import of Christianity and the Holy 
Family for Hegel is not limited to his conception of spirit. Its deepest significance is rather 
ontological, in that it allows philosophical thought to comprehend unity as the 
reconciliation of an original division by means of interpenetration. The Holy Family thus 
first gives a speculative sense to the copula in the proposition ‘the Father is the Son, the 
Son is the Father’: ‘The spirit of Christianity is rather the revelation of the essentiality of 
the essence that permits in general copulating in the is, saying is. Unification, conciliation 
(Vereinigung), and being (Sein) have the same sense, are equivalent in their signification 
(gleichbedeutend)’ (Gl 56a/67a). It is therefore only by traversing Christianity in its 
historical course that being can become what it is or will have been in truth.   
This is why Derrida contends that Christianity, for Hegel, does not merely provide 
a new basis for ontology but first makes it possible as such. Even if Christianity appears 
historically as a graft or supplement to Greek thinking, still ‘no ontology is possible before 
the Gospel or outside it’ (Gl 56a/67a). Derrida seems to be suggesting here that while 
Hegel of course acknowledges that prior to the advent of Christianity, philosophical 
enquiry into the nature of being had been undertaken, such enquiry lacked the means to 
                                                          
15 Critchley, p. 203. 
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adequately conceive being, and so could not amount to true ontology. This is one reason 
why Derrida states that, for Hegel, the passage through the trinity cannot be considered 
as simply an ‘empirical event in the spirit’s history.’16 It also explains why there can be no 
ontology ‘outside’ the Gospel;17 for if the basic ontological truth is revealed by it, then all 
future ontology must remain within the framework that it provides. Before considering 
how Hegel negotiates this historical debt, we should first place Christianity in the context 
of the path in which it has come to be  determined as ‘absolute religion.’  
 
1.5 Christianity and Judaism, Kant and Hegel 
 
In Glas, Derrida spends some time commenting on Hegel’s analysis of Judaism. At the 
same time—and this is another way in which we might read Derrida’s claim that 
Christianity is more than an empirical event—the supposed sublation of Judaism by 
                                                          
16 One way of understanding Derrida’s claim would be to compare this historical shift to that from the 
objective logic to the subjective logic in Hegel’s Science of Logic. As we saw Theunissen observe in 
chapter 1, the logic of being and the logic of essence both constitute a critical presentation of prior 
metaphysical thinking. It is only with the transition to the concept—the structure of which corresponds 
to the figure of the Holy Family—that Hegel’s presentation of his true ontology begins (Cf. Michael 
Theunissen, Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, 2nd edition (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 24–27). 
17 Just before this point, Derrida writes of the significance of the Christian family: ‘Thus is opened and 
determined the space in which the ontological (the possibility of Wesen, Sein, Urteilen) no longer lets 
itself be unglued or decapitated from the family. And par excellence from the question of the father-to-
son’ (Gl 56a/67a). 
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Christianity is read alongside the Hegelian sublation of Kantianism, due to the structural 
similarities between these two sublations.18   
For Hegel, the ultimate shortcoming of Judaism is to conceive difference as 
radical distinction. God or the infinite is posited as being distinct from, and beyond the 
finite, such that He can never manifest himself in the finite, but can only ever be 
represented by it. The idol remains only ever an idol and ‘the Jew’ can see ‘only a 
metaphor’ in the figure of the tree of life (Gl 73a/86a). Judaism—and by association, 
Kantianism—is thus a form of essentialist or representational thinking which subjects the 
finite to the mastery of the infinite behind the scenes. As we have seen, Christianity 
would overcome this division—which in Hegel’s eyes is the sole source of mastery and 
domination—through the interpenetration of the finite and the infinite. Through this 
interpenetration, the metaphor becomes the figure of an ‘objective ligament,’ to the 
extent that bread and wine, for example, are no longer conceived as signs (Gl 66a/77-8a). 
Christianity, therefore, ‘will have precisely performed this relief of the idol and of sensible 
representation in(to) the infinite of love and beauty’ (Gl 49a/59a).   
What makes this transition possible in Christianity, and what was lacking in 
Judaism, Derrida observes, is love. More specifically, in its passage through Christianity, 
being comes to be determined as subjectivity which pours forth from itself as the ‘free 
love and boundless blessedness’ Hegel famously ascribes to the universal in the 
conceptual logic. The absence of this love in Judeo-Kantianism is what prevents the 
relation of figuration from being seen from the inside, thus obstructing the passage to 
philosophy through the overcoming of representation.     
This would then be the ‘essential difference’ between Judaism and Christianity. 
Now Derrida’s use of this ‘example’ in Glas serves to throw into relief the violence implicit 
                                                          
18 Cf. Critchley, 202; Gl 34a/42a.  
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in the determination of ‘essential’ differences, and not only where religion is concerned. 
Determining differences in this way would already presuppose a perspective from which 
one could exhaustively analyse both of the terms being distinguished. More narrowly, it 
might also suggest, as Critchley remarks, that the desire for a certain kind of family and 
community may be ‘predicated on a reduction of the other’s otherness,’19 that is, on an 
exclusion of what cannot be reduced to the reflection of the same or the same’s own 
other.  
 
1.6 Christianity and Philosophy 
 
Having briefly considered the manner in which Christianity is attributed ‘absolute’ status, 
we can now return to the relation between Christianity and philosophy. Though it has 
surpassed Judaism, even the truly speculative religion remains as religion 
representational. It does not accomplish the complete reconciliation between the finite 
and the infinite that only philosophy will achieve. On Derrida’s reading of Hegel’s Spirit of 
Christianity, this full reconciliation is lacking both in the life and in the death and 
subsequent ascension of Christ. In his life, Derrida observes, ‘He did not know how to 
fight, in the world, against the Jewish reality. From then on he had, paradoxically, to 
repeat Judaism. Like Abraham, he was separated from his family; further he loved no 
woman, begot no child. He even left his mother.’ Equally, following his resurrection, his 
ascension reinstated a cleft between the finite and the infinite: ‘he preferred to 
reconstitute in the presence of his father, in ideality, a disappointed life.’ This departure 
would then leave in its wake a remainder (reste) of time in the form of a displacement of 
                                                          
19 Critchley, p. 204. 
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the present into the past and future. Jesus’ disciples are left ‘suspended between 
memory and hope’ (Gl 91a/105a), a condition that is then transferred to all believers:  
 
Through the death of the mediating term, the reconciliation still remains affected by 
the adverse opposition of a beyond (Gegensatze eines Jenseits), remains distant, in 
the distance of a future (the Last Judgement for the religious community) and in the 
distance of a past (the Incarnation of God). The reconciliation is not present. Present 
in the heart, it is cut off [coupée] from consciousness, divided in two (entzweit). Its 
actuality is broken. (Gl 94a/108a)  
 
As Derrida notes, it is no accident that Christianity is disturbed by this troubling division 
(Gl 93a/107a); indeed, we can say that the latter is inevitable insofar as, qua religion, it is 
still representational. In maintaining a division between the finite and the infinite, it 
entails a delay in the infinite’s self-manifestation: the infinite is not immediately present 
to itself in the finite. Thus, when Derrida writes later in Glas, in regard to the 
Phenomenology, that ‘in absolute religion, division in two (Entzweiung) is not yet 
absolutely overcome by reconciliation,’ (Gl 219a/245a) this is precisely because religion’s 
own internal ‘not yet’ has not been overcome. While one can then say, as Derrida does 
later in Glas, that ‘religion is representative because it needs time’ (Gl 220a/246a), it 
would perhaps be more accurate to say that religion needs time because it is 
representational.   
It is because of the remaining representational character of Christianity that it has 
only partially overcome its historical character. It is not because Christianity is ‘in time’ 
that it remains historical but because it is internally temporal. In order to understand 
more fully the representational basis of this temporality, we might depart from Derrida’s 
focus on the Spirit of Christianity here and supplement it with certain of Hegel’s remarks 
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in the ‘Revealed Religion’ chapter of the Phenomenology. There Hegel states that, in a 
certain sense, it is not the content of the trinity that is deficient, but rather the manner in 
which it is thought. The separation into a ‘Here’ and a ‘Beyond’ means that these two 
sides can only be externally connected to one another (Ph 463/556). But slightly later 
Hegel suggests that, at a more exacting level, it is indeed a matter of content: the 
externality of the connection is ultimately grounded in the fact that the terms are not 
thought conceptually, but through the ‘natural relationships of father and son’ (Ph 465-
6/560). The temporality of Christianity is then ultimately grounded in its failure to fully 
overcome the realm of nature. The latter, as we have seen in chapter 4, is for Hegel the 
paradigmatic realm of contingency. Nevertheless, while Christianity has not fully 
overcome its natural basis, it has done so to a large extent. We might consider it 
analogous to the logical category of ‘absolute necessity,’ which still rests on a minimal 
degree of contingency. This is why Derrida states that Christ’s death and ascension has 
the character of destiny or fate, as opposed to the freedom of conceptual understanding 
(Gl 93a/107a).   
This remaining contingency means that while the bread and wine of Christianity 
are no longer symbols or metaphors, on the other hand they cannot, as Derrida observes, 
be wholly absorbed without losing their divine character (Gl 71a/83a). They remain 
between the metaphorical and the conceptual, and their materiality still sticks in the 
throat. Christianity thus gives food for thought that can only be truly digested and 
assimilated, without any leftovers, by philosophy.   
It is because Christianity contains the kernel of the Idea that it is more than 
merely historical. It is, Derrida writes, a ‘historically determinate religion,’ one among 
others, but its speculative character raises it for Hegel to the status of absolute religion, 
the religion which points the way to the overcoming of time. Derrida quotes the following 
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important passage from Hegel’s Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History concerning this proto-speculative character:  
 
It is this trinity {this tripleness, Dreifaltigkeit} which raises Christianity above the 
other religions. If it did not have this trinity, the other religions might well provide 
more material for thought than it does. The Trinity is the speculative part (das 
Spekulative) of Christianity, and it is through it that philosophy can discover the Idea 
of reason in the Christian religion too (quoted in Gl 31a/40a). 
 
In passing to philosophy, the content and the form of das Spekulative are brought 
together. The moments of the trinity are thought adequately—that is, conceptually—in 
their interpenetration. This is at the same time the transition from necessity to freedom, 
the complete transparency of the self to itself in an eternal self-presence that is the 
overcoming of (historical) time. We shall consider this transition in more detail in section 
three, but for now let us consider ‘how far we have got’ with the question of debt and the 
gift that we are tracing through Glas.   
The transition from Christianity to philosophy might be described by adapting the 
economic formula employed by Derrida later in Glas: we might say that, from the 
standpoint of philosophy, one has to lose God in order to keep (the truth of) God. As 
Derrida writes: ‘in passing to Gottlosigkeit (the harsh godlessness) is the Last Supper 
fulfilled; thus is developed speculatively what was only historical in the Last Supper’ (Gl 
97a/112a, trans. modified). Here it is hard not to imagine that Derrida has Hegel’s famous 
statement from the Phenomenology in mind, that ‘God is attainable in speculative 
knowledge alone and is only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself, for He is 
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Spirit; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of the revealed religion’ (Ph 
461/554).20     
I would like to suggest that, for Derrida, this speculative appropriation and 
‘purification’ of Christian teaching constitutes a certain kind of disavowal of a debt to that 
which gives to thinking. This disavowal-as-appropriation takes place precisely by taking 
the gift ‘as given.’ Taking the gift as given means interpreting it in a way that denies that 
an interpretative ‘choice’ takes place, i.e. claiming that this interpretation is the gift’s self-
revelation of its ultimate, essential contribution to thinking. As Derrida states, for Hegel it 
is not the ‘facts’—the ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit)—of the Gospels that are important, but 
what they will have become in philosophy as ‘speculative dialectics’ (Gl 62a/73a). The 
passage to philosophy will have amounted to the sublation of the very ‘contingency’ of 
the ‘facts’ that allows, or even calls for them to be interpreted in various ways. We can 
elucidate quite what I take Derrida to be getting at if we consider the way in which the 
question of inheritance is raised in his later Specters of Marx.21 There Derrida claims that 
to consider historical inheritance as a matter of cause and effect is precisely to deny the 
task of inheriting, which is always a question of an interpretation that acknowledges that 
something still remains to be thought in what has been bequeathed, just as the line ‘The 
time is out of joint,’ licenses its various French translations. The task of interpretation of 
course does not preclude, but precisely enjoins, a critical engagement with the gift—or 
rather, with what has already been made of the gift, covered over or repressed in it, an 
‘example’ being the exclusion of the mother in the self-constitution of the Holy Trinity. 
                                                          
20 Hegel spells out this statement as follows: ‘Speculative knowledge knows God as Thought or pure 
Essence, and knows this thought as simple Being and as Existence, and Existence as the negativity of 
itself, hence as Self, as the Self that is at the same time this individual, and also the universal, Self’ (Ph 
461/554).   
21 Cf. especially p. 18/40.  
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For Derrida, Hegel would then reject the gift through a seemingly uncritical acceptance of 
it which masks the philosophical desire to master and appropriate it. The transition from 
‘absolute religion’ to philosophy is but the last stage in a long series of such disavowals. 
And since philosophy is predicated on the essential truth of Christianity, it remains in a 
certain sense governed by Christianity, since it does not question it enough.    
Having outlined the broad problematic of this chapter—Hegel’s disavowal of the 
gift—we can now turn to Derrida’s discussion of the ‘Ethical World’ in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. This will make it possible to consider in more detail the mechanism 
through which difference is determined as opposition in the context of the ethical family. 
Before beginning this examination, we should note that one of the reasons Derrida takes 
the family as one of his ‘themes’ in Glas is because it is not simply a locus of repression, 
but of the repression of what is potentially the greatest difference: a rupture that would 
be irrecuperable. In this way, the family figures the Aufhebung as the ‘absolute 
reappropriation of the absolute loss’ (Gl 133a/152a).   
 
Part 2: Family Ties 
 
2.1 Universality and (Universal) Individuality 
 
In what we could call the second major part of the Hegel column of Glas, Derrida’s 
attention turns to the opening chapters of the ‘Spirit’ section of Hegel’s Phenomenology: 
‘The Ethical World. Human and Divine Law: Man and Woman,’ and ‘Ethical Action. Human 
and Divine Knowledge. Guilt and Destiny.’ I shall first give some context to the chapters 
addressed by Derrida, which will also help to see how Hegel establishes a structure that 
already tends toward contradiction.   
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Reason, the previous sphere of the Phenomenology, becomes spirit when ‘its 
certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own 
world, and of the world as itself’ (Ph 263/324).22 Spirit thus refers to the unity of 
consciousness and self-consciousness. At this initial stage in the evolution of spirit, its 
certainty is of the immediate unity of individuality (or singularity – Einzelheit) and 
universality. In the concrete ‘substance’ in which spirit is here incarnated, this unity takes 
the form of an immediate identification of an individual with an ethical principle taken to 
have universal validity. The individuality in question is, it is important to note, that of 
‘self-consciousness in general [überhaupt], not of a singular, contingent consciousness’ 
(Ph 267/329 trans. modified).  
This immediate unity is broken and the ethical substance divided because a 
diverse range of laws are acted on by individuals. Without argument or explanation, 
however, Hegel asserts that ‘the superfluous [unnütze] plurality of properties 
concentrates itself into the essential opposition [Gegensatz] of individuality and 
universality’ (Ph 267/328-9, trans. modified). At this point in the Phenomenology, then, 
we again witness the movement we observed in Hegel’s logic of essence whereby a 
diverse multiplicity comes to be determined as the symmetrical relation between 
opposites. Now Derrida does not focus on this contraction of diversity to opposition but, 
as we shall see, on its later incarnation in the relation between man and woman. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the exclusion of multiplicity he will later attend to 
reflects a more ‘general’ exclusion which takes place at the outset of Hegel’s 
presentation.     
                                                          
22 Or as Hegel puts it later in the Phenomenology, ‘Spirit is the knowledge of oneself [seiner selbst] in the 
externalization of oneself; the being that is the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness’ 
(Ph 459/552) 
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The ethical substance thus divides itself into the law of individuality or the divine 
law on the one hand, and the law of universality or the human law on the other. Yet at 
this point in the Phenomenology, the complexity of the relation between the two 
contrary laws  is such that each  also contains the other within itself. The human law, 
being universal, is the law of full illumination, of clear self-evidence, or ‘the authority 
which is openly accepted and manifest to all [die offene, an dem Tage liegende 
Gültigkeit]’ (Ph 268/329). It is embodied by the ‘nation’ [das Volk], which expresses the 
actuality of spirit as ‘a reality that is conscious of itself’ (Ph 267/329). At the same time, it 
also contains its opposite: in that its content is immediately self-evident, it implicitly lacks 
the full self-consciousness that mediation will later bring. In addition, the nation as the 
universal is itself individualised in the government.23  
Rather than its actuality, the divine law expresses ‘the general [allgemeine] 
possibility of the ethical sphere as such [überhaupt]’ (Ph 268/330, trans. modified).24 Like 
the human law, it has an immediate self-evidence,25 but in the form of an inner and 
unconscious essence which shuns the light of day. Whereas the universal law of the 
nation is rooted in the individuality of government, the individual law is rooted in the 
relation to the ‘natural ethical community’ constituted by the family. We can see then, 
that in both the human, universal sphere, and the divine, family sphere, both individuality 
and universality are represented. The interweaving of universality and individuality in the 
family unit is developed in Hegel’s consideration of the particular duty of the family.   
                                                          
23 Furthermore, Hegel states that the human law is also exhibited by the individual as ‘the actual 
certainty of itself’ (Ph 267-8/329).  
24 This ‘general’ possibility of the ethical ‘as such’ already indicates a certain privilege of the universal 
even within this domain of individuality. 
25 This is perhaps what Hegel means when he rather obscurely states that it possesses an ‘immediate 
consciousness’ of itself.  
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  The divine law includes within itself individuality and universality in the form of 
the relation between an individual and a wider (natural) community. But it is important to 
stress that this relation, as Hegel considers it, takes place in a context (the ethical world 
as a whole) that has already been determined in terms of universality in at least two 
senses. Firstly, each law is, as such, ‘intrinsically [an sich] universal’ (Ph 268/330); as one 
of the two fundamental laws of the ethical sphere, the divine law thus represents the 
universal validity of the principle of individuality. Derrida notes this when he writes: ‘The 
two terms of the opposition are not the singular and the universal but the law of 
singularity and the law of universality. The opposition is determined between these forms 
of generality that these laws […] are, since the opposition works within the ethical reign 
that is the reign of law.’ When Derrida thus speaks here of a ‘dissymmetrical opposition 
between the singular and the universal’ (Gl 142a/161a), it is crucial to note that he is not 
claiming that the universal as one of the opposed terms is placed in a dominant position; 
he is rather suggesting that the opposition between singularity and universality itself 
arises in the element of the universal. Derrida is thus drawing attention to the structural 
condition of the eventual sublation of the distinction between the two laws.   
Secondly, insofar as the family is treated from an ethical perspective, it is not the 
natural , but rather the spiritual relations between its members that will be at issue. 
These relations are universal, as we shall see in more detail later, because they are not 
based on the contingency of the natural feelings that happen to be present in the 
individuals concerned. The divine law is then not just formally universal qua law, but it 
also has for its content the universal individual. As Hegel writes, ‘In the ethical household, 
it is not a question of this man or this child, but of a man and children in general (Ph 
274/337, trans. modified).  
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Accordingly, while the family’s duty is to the individual, it is to the individual in his 
generality, or to the individual as a whole (Ph 269/331), ‘as a universal being freed from 
his sensuous, i.e. individual, reality’ (Ph 270/332). Yet what is left when the individual is 
stripped of his contingent, natural properties is, in a sense, ‘nothing.’ Because at this 
stage of the Phenomenology particularity has not entered as a mediating term between 
the universal and the individual, it is only through the absence of all properties that the 
individual can come into a unity with universality—a universality that is therefore 
necessarily abstract. It is then only the dead individual who can be the object of a 
specifically ethical duty.   
The family’s care for its dead through the practices of embalming and burial on 
the one hand serves to raise the individual from his individuality to the universality of 
spirit. It symbolically prevents the individual from returning to nature and protects him 
from, as Derrida puts it, the ‘dishonouring operations of unconscious desires’ (Gl 
145a/164a). Yet Derrida also notes that only a banal reading of Hegel’s text would 
consider the end of the family’s care to be merely the prevention of natural and 
contingent decomposition. For at the same time, this care serves to preserve the very 
individuality of the individual by, as Hegel puts it, ‘wed[ding] the blood-relation to the 
bosom of the earth, to the elemental imperishable individuality’ (Ph 271/333). Again, of 
course, it has to be noted that the individual is wedded here to the most universal 
individuality of all: nature as such.  
 
2.2 The Familial Bond 
 
Within the family, the purest ethical form of recognition—that is, the recognition in which 
another individual is recognised without the intrusion of natural desire, feeling, or need—
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takes place for Hegel between the brother and sister, and particularly in the form of the 
sister’s recognition of the brother. As he writes,  
 
The relationship in its unmixed form is found […] in that between brother and sister. 
They are the same blood which has, however, in them reached a state of rest and 
equilibrium. Therefore, they do not desire one another, nor have they given to, or 
received from, one another this independent being-for-self; on the contrary, they 
are free individualities in regard to each other’ (Ph 274/336).
26
  
  
Within the ‘natural’ ethical community of the family, the brother-sister relation is thus 
the relation that is most purely ethical: it has its basis in the ‘naturalness’ of the 
community, but the relation of recognition itself is not natural. Now Derrida’s attention is 
drawn to the seeming anomaly that this relation represents in the context of the Hegelian 
‘system’; for the brother and sister would seemingly be the ‘two single consciousnesses 
that, in the Hegelian universe, relate to each other without entering into war’ (Gl 
149a/168a). They therefore represent a 
 
unique example in the system: a recognition that is not natural and yet that passes 
through no conflict, no injury, no rape: absolute uniqueness [unicité], yet universal 
and without natural singularity, without immediacy; symmetrical relation that needs 
                                                          
26 Here we see another implicit exclusion of a multiplicity, such that Derrida asks, ‘‘but then why 
brother/sister and not brothers or sisters? That is because in truth a sexual difference is still necessary, 
a sexual difference posited as such and yet without desire’ (Gl 149a/169a). Derrida seems to mean that 
the brother and sister are required in order, as we shall see, to embody the two essential ethical laws. A 
binary sexual difference is required in order that sexual difference may then be overcome through 
opposition and contradiction.  
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no reconciliation to appease itself, that does not know the horizon of war, the 
infinite wound, contradiction, negativity. Is that the inconceivable? What the greater 
logic cannot assimilate? (Gl 150a/170a) 
  
The anomalousness of the relation consists in its being a relation of recognition between 
two individualities that is peaceful from the outset, whereas recognition, peace and 
individuality are usually only achieved at the end of any dialectical development. Derrida 
even goes as far as to say that such a relation cannot be assimilated by, and is excluded 
from, the system. It is a form of ‘original’ peace which would seem to fall outside the 
violence of the Hegelian dialectic. Derrida therefore suggests that it represents an 
inconceivable relation: ‘Given the generality of the struggle for recognition in the 
relationship between consciousnesses, one would be tempted to conclude that at bottom 
there is no brother/sister bond, there is no brother or sister’ (Gl 149a/168a). 
Nevertheless, such a relation would be of no interest to Derrida if it were simply 
anomalous—if it were not a condition of possibility of the system as well as its condition 
of impossibility. He therefore asks:  
 
And what if what cannot be assimilated, the absolute indigestible, played a 
fundamental role in the system, an abyssal role rather, the abyss playing a quasi
27
-
tran […] scendental role and allowing to be formed above it, as a kind of effluvium, a 
dream of appeasement? Isn’t there always an element excluded from the system 
that assures the system’s space of possibility? The transcendental has always been, 
strictly, a transcategorial, what could be received, formed, terminated in none of the 
categories intrinsic to the system. The system’s vomit. And what if the sister, the 
                                                          
27 Derrida’s French is ‘quasi’ which is translated by Leavey and Rand as ‘almost’.  
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brother/sister relation represented here the transcendental position, ex-position? 
(Gl 151-162a/171-183a) 
  
The seeming anomaly, Derrida suggests, functions then in both an enabling and an 
undermining manner. And it does so by being repressed, allowing a dream or, as Derrida 
will later put it, a phantasm, to rise above it. In other words, it is that which forms a pre-
condition of the system but which cannot be contained within it and must be, in Derrida’s 
words, ‘excluded,’ or as Hegel would put it, ‘overcome.’ Now if the brother-sister is 
related to the systematicity of the system in this manner, then it must be the 
embodiment of what Hegel would call ‘contingency.’ There are two ways in which Derrida 
addresses the ‘contingency’ of this relation.   
On the one hand, he suggests that there is a certain contingency to the manner in 
which the brother-sister relation comes to be determined as the primary locus of the 
divine law by Hegel. In the passage quoted directly above, the ellipsis interrupting 
‘transcendental’ stands in for twelve pages of Hegel’s letters to or about his ‘quasi-sister’ 
Nanette and his future wife Marie. Derrida’s inclusion of these letters may be intended to 
suggest that Hegel’s account of the family is not immune from personal influence—that 
Hegel’s exclusion of the natural from the ethical family may have its reflection in Hegel’s 
own repression of his desire for Nanette and its sublimation into an ethical commitment 
to Marie of the form elaborated in the Philosophy of Right. The importance Derrida 
attributes to this potential personal influence is indicated by the fact that these letters 
interrupt the text of Glas at this crucial point in its development. Later in Glas, Derrida 
also seems to suggest that Hegel’s account of the relation between the woman and the 
public life of the nation is mirrored in Hegel’s relation to his sister, Christiane.    
Furthermore, Derrida also suggests that the very singularity and ‘irreplaceability’ 
of the brother for the sister cannot be fully accounted for by the structural account given 
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in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Derrida indicates that this irreplaceability perhaps has an 
‘empirical’ source in Sophocles’ Antigone, Hegel’s personal investment in which, Derrida 
notes, is signalled by his rare use of the first personal pronoun in his discussion of the play 
in the Aesthetics (Gl 150a/170a). As Derrida writes, ‘Will one say that Hegel has 
transformed into structural and paradigmatic legality an empiric situation described in a 
particular text of the history of tragedies? And that for the needs of a cause—or a sister—
that is obscure?’ (Gl 165a/186a). In the following, however, I shall not focus on these 
suggestions of Derrida’s, partly because such claims gain their force not so much on an 
individual basis as through their accumulation throughout Glas. I shall focus rather on the 
other element of contingency to which Derrida attends. This contingency is internal to the 
brother-sister relation insofar as it has its basis in the natural consanguinity and natural 
sexual difference of the siblings.  
 
2.3 From Diversity to Opposition 
 
For Hegel, overcoming this contingency will be at the same time overcoming its ever 
having been contingent i.e. retrospectively determining it as always already having been 
necessary, from a more elevated perspective. Now as we saw in chapter 5, that which is 
contingent is that which is in a certain sense simply given. As became explicit in the 
sphere of real actuality, this givenness consists in a form of reflection-into-self or 
indifference. In this sense, contingency is derived from, or a fuller explanation of, the 
category of diversity, for the latter is a state where the indifference of beings toward one 
another means that they only allow themselves to be compared according to isolated 
respects of likeness and unlikeness. Diversity licenses a certain ‘relativity’ in that it 
intrinsically calls for ‘external comparison,’ because the indifference of the terms resists 
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their unification within an all-encompassing ‘ground.’ It therefore licenses a multiplicity of 
respects of comparison, even if only between two terms, because an ‘essential difference’ 
between these terms cannot be determined. The overcoming of the diverse character of 
the brother-sister relation, which will be discussed below, will then at the same time 
constitute the overcoming of its contingent basis.   
My reading of Glas here is indebted to that of Kevin Thompson, for whom ‘the 
impossible yet necessary bond between brother and sister […] reveals a problematic 
whose implications will not be able to be confined either to the realm of Sittlichkeit or to 
its treatment of the family. The relation between brother and sister represents a general 
structure endemic to the very nature of the Hegelian system.’28 We can now begin to see 
why the condition of impossibility formed by the brother-sister relation is at the same 
time a condition of possibility for the Hegelian ‘system.’ This is because it is through the 
transformation of a state of indifferent diversity into intrinsic opposition that the 
dialectical movement progresses from one stage to the next. As we saw in the previous 
chapter in particular, it is through this process that, in the Logic, what initially has to be 
taken as simply given ultimately comes to be given by the concept to itself. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the form of ‘diversity’ manifested in the brother-sister relation 
is not the pure form of diversity we considered within the Logic. It is not simply external 
difference, and this is perhaps one reason why Derrida focusses on the brother-sister 
relation, for it is an example within the ‘system’ where a contamination seems to be 
indicated between extrinsic and intrinsic difference.  
 The brother and sister are ‘diverse beings’ (Verschiedenheiten) as Hegel puts it, 
because their difference is a given, natural sexual difference. As Hegel writes, ‘These two 
                                                          
28 Thompson, p. 251. This does not mean, of course, that this ‘general’ problematic can be thought or 
broached without reference to the brother-sister relation.  
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universal beings of the ethical world have, therefore, their determinate individuality in 
naturally distinct self-consciousnesses’ (Ph 275/338). Insofar as this difference is naturally 
given, it is essentially indeterminate: in truth, then, it is not a difference, but a multiplicity 
of various differences, or, as Hegel puts it, a ‘contingent diversity of dispositions and 
capacities’ (Ph 276/338). None of these alone therefore defines sexual difference.  
 On the other hand, however, the brother and sister are not monads that are 
absolutely indifferent to each other; they are intrinsically different from one another 
insofar as the sexual nature of each is not that of the other, yet at the same time the 
‘essence’ of their respective sexual natures remains indeterminate. To this extent, then, 
their difference is both internal and external. With some caution, we might therefore say 
that their respective sexual natures function here as the ‘minimal identity’ or the 
‘remainder’ which allows a multiplicity of differences to circulate between them, and thus 
leaves that in which their difference consists open to continual reconceptualisation.29  
                                                          
29 Caution is needed here, however, because insofar as the sexual natures are also simply given, they do 
not wholly correspond to the notion of the remainder as we have considered it throughout this study. It 
would be misleading, then, to suggest that Derrida departs from Hegel in affirming the importance of 
this diverse relation as a natural relation. As Derrida’s Grammatology makes clear, his aim is absolutely 
not to reassert a priority of ‘nature’ over ‘culture.’ As Derrida writes: ‘Thus, as it goes without saying, 
the trace whereof I speak is not more natural (it is not the mark, the natural sign, or the index in the 
Husserlian sense) than cultural, not more physical than psychic, biological than spiritual. It is that 
starting from which a becoming-unmotivated of the sign, and with it all the ulterior oppositions 
between physis and its other, is possible’ (G 48/70). Indeed, Derrida’s objection to Hegel, as I read him, 
is that it is precisely because Hegel ignores the cultural determination of nature that he can slide from 
the ‘givenness’ of the brother’s and sister’s natures as indeterminate to the givenness of these natures 
as self-evident. As we shall see below, the ‘initial’ givenness or the gift is then made wholly transparent 
and ultimately given by absolute knowing to itself.   
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 As we shall see, this diverse multiplicity comes to be determined by Hegel as 
essential opposition. This takes place when the indeterminate, natural, sexual difference 
comes to embody an essential difference. Now on Thompson’s reading, Derrida’s 
objection to this transition constitutes a necessary claim concerning the impossibility of 
such a transition from diversity to opposition. This leads Thompson to question whether 
Derrida does enough to justify such a claim, and whether in principle it could be justified:  
 
Derrida has never articulated the impossibility of the movement from a given 
multiplicity to its intrinsic opposition. He has instead relied upon this very transition 
to reveal the space of possibility within which the dialectic moves. But if this space is 
the reflection-into-itself of the third, then in fact will not the very attempt to 
maintain its various aspects give way, as Hegel shows, to intrinsic opposition and, 
ultimately, to speculative contradiction? If so, the enigma of affinity remains perhaps 
the most troubling and inescapable matter for one concerned with Derrida’s work.
30
  
 
As I read him, however, it could never have been Derrida’s intention to articulate such an 
impossibility. This is, firstly, because it would amount to the assertion of the necessity of 
contingency that in chapter 5 I argued Derrida cannot make, for this assertion would be 
universal and context-independent. Derrida claims to speak from no such standpoint; as I 
discussed in chapter 3, his claims are rather almost always articulated from within (yet 
also on the margins of) particular contexts. For the same reason, as I noted in chapter 4, 
Derrida cannot be arguing for the weaker, but still universal thesis of the contingency of 
all necessity. Furthermore, even when Derrida articulates the displacement of a 
conceptual opposition within a particular context, this is not achieved through an appeal 
to that which is supposed to be self-evident or which must be acknowledged, but rather 
                                                          
30 Thompson, p. 259. 
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to that which could always be ignored or left unread, depending on the manner in which 
one approaches it. Whether diversity ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ be determined as opposition is 
therefore not the question, since it already presupposes what we might call a rather ‘flat’ 
ontology.   
In the present context, then, Derrida’s aim can be seen as relatively modest. It is 
not to give a positive argument for the impossibility of the transition from diversity to 
opposition, but rather to ask: what happens to a multiplicity when it is determined as 
opposition in Hegel’s text? What drives this process and what might it fail to ‘account 
for’? It is only on the basis of this engagement with this Hegelian determination of 
difference that one might come to ‘speculate’ on what might be repressed more 
generally by operations of a similar type.   
It is in this way too that Derrida comes to displace the opposition between 
contingency and necessity in Hegel, rather than to simply affirm contingency over 
necessity. Indeed, one of the most important points that arises in his analysis of Hegel’s 
ethical world is that the notion of contingency only makes sense, or is only retroactively 
determined, from the perspective of necessity.31 If the standpoint of necessity is not 
acceded to through the determination of an essential difference, then what precedes this 
standpoint can no longer be called contingent. And this is not to say that it then takes on 
another form of necessity by default. This is perhaps why he writes that the family model 
Hegel interrogates is ‘perhaps not as empiric as imagined’ (Gl 165a/186a) and that, more 
cryptically, ‘The greater logic is there to suspend any choice and to prevent you from 
cutting through to a decision between the transcendental sister and the empirical sister’ 
(Gl 164a/185a, trans. modified). 
                                                          
31 This is also the root of Derrida’s objection to Saussure’s thesis of the ‘arbitrariness of the sign’ in 
Grammatology, which Derrida writes is ‘so badly named’ (G 44/65).  
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Furthermore, even if the transition to opposition can only take place through 
repression, this does not entail that a certain level of repression is avoidable, insofar as, 
for Derrida, marks constitute themselves as the marks that they are through their 
exclusion of other marks. As we shall see, Derrida’s departure from Hegel will not consist 
simply in attempting to ‘undo’ this repression—that is, to ‘return’ to a state of ‘nature.’ As 
we saw in chapter 3, the ‘general text’ manifests itself only as the excess over any given 
determination of an ‘essential difference’; it therefore does not simply precede such 
repression, but rather multiplies it, as it were. We shall consider this Derridean response 
in the third part of this chapter. For now, however, let us consider how the transition 
from diversity to opposition takes place in Hegel’s ethical world.   
 
2.4 From Diversity to Opposition in the Ethical World 
 
As the essence of the family, the brother-sister relation is also its ‘limit concept’—the 
point at which the family unit(y) breaks up through the brother’s departure from the 
family home. The essence of the family is thus at the same time the point of rupture in its 
closed economy—that which it would seem unable to take into account. And yet, this 
rupture is reappropriated by means of the general significance that now comes to be 
embodied by the brother and sister, as ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ such that the life of the family 
is continued into, and comes into a new reconciliation with, the public sphere. For it is at 
this point that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are determined as the ‘elements’ in which the two 
ethical laws have their ‘natural selves and operative individuality.’ They now come to 
embody the opposition between the two fundamental laws of the ethical world. The man 
leaves the home and the divine law under which he has thus far lived in order to take part 
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in the public life of the nation; the woman becomes the head of the household either 
through marriage or on the death of the parents (Ph 275/388).    
What was previously the brother and sister’s merely natural difference now 
serves as the basis of their essential difference. As Hegel puts this, ‘This moment loses the 
indeterminateness which it still has there, and the contingent diversity of dispositions and 
capacities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes whose natural existence 
acquires at the same time the significance of their ethical determination’ (Ph 276/338, 
trans. modified). It is here, then, that the merely ‘given,’ natural difference comes to be 
attributed an essential significance. This does not mean that the natural difference is 
simply left behind or discarded. It is rather sublated or overcome (überwunden) in that it 
is raised to the status of an ethical difference by serving as the basis that allows the 
brother and sister to embody the respective ethical laws. As Derrida is careful to note, it 
is only after it has been elevated to this essential difference that its previous form is seen 
to have been merely indeterminate in contrast to the ‘true opposition.’  
The opposition of the two laws is at first peaceful rather than polemical. Each law 
serves to complement or ‘authenticate’ the other, and the ethical realm is ‘a tranquil 
transition of one of its powers into the other, in such a way that each preserves and 
brings forth the other’ (Ph 278/341). Their ‘middle term’ is their ‘immediate 
interpenetration’ in the union between man and woman. This delicate balance is upset by 
the deed, through which each law, Hegel writes, ‘proves to be the non-reality 
[Nichtigkeit]’ of itself and the other’ (Ph 279/343). Yet because the two laws are linked ‘in 
essence,’ acting in accordance with one necessarily ‘evokes’ the other as having been 
contravened and requiring recompense (Ph 283/347). It thus leads to a state of guilt.   
  The ethical contradiction is thus brought to light, or, more precisely, this 
contradiction is itself the bringing to light of what is merely implicit in opposition. 
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Derrida’s attention to the structure of this contradiction reveals a repression of one of its 
moments and a privileging of the other. Yet Derrida does not suggest that one of the 
contradictory terms simply dominates or absorbs the other; it is rather the case that the 
form of contradiction itself cannot but privilege one term over the other. This is because 
contradiction implies the full manifestation, or full illumination of the negative unity of 
the terms. But when these terms are the obscure divine law and the human law of 
daylight, this full illumination cannot but privilege the latter and distort the former. For 
the divine law is that which appears only through its withdrawal from or resistance to 
appearance; contradiction therefore forces it to appear in a form that is alien to it. Thus 
as Derrida writes, ‘the diaphanous law of consciousness (man) and the obscure law of the 
unconscious (woman) must become identical at the bottom of their opposition. But then 
they come before the light, they appear in the light, the law of laws. The opposition of 
noon and midnight resolves itself into noon’ (Gl 169a/191a).32    
The contradiction cannot but then repress the divine law through its very 
comprehension of it. Furthermore, even though both contraries are given ‘equal weight’ 
within the contradiction, the contradiction cannot but, at a ‘meta-level,’ determine the 
obscure, divine, feminine law of individuality as ‘bad’ and the clear, human, masculine 
law of universality as ‘good.’ This is because, in revealing the fundamental unity of the 
two ethical principles, the contradiction locates the fault in an excessively isolated being-
for-self, or individuality. As Hegel writes, ‘In the deed they exist as beings with a self, but 
                                                          
32 Insofar as the two laws here may be seen to figure concealment and unconcealment in general, it is 
clear that the significance of Derrida’s point ranges far beyond this section of the Phenomenology, and 
extends to what might be considered an implicit violence in dialectical contradiction as such. Wherever 
a contradiction arises between what can manifest itself only by withdrawing from manifestation on the 
one hand and what is ‘open to the light of day’ on the other, we might question whether something is 
not repressed in this process.   
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with a diverse self; and this contradicts the unity of the self, and constitutes their 
unrighteousness and necessary destruction’ (Ph 285/349).    
 
2.5 Repression 
 
The repression of the divine law in contradiction is of course also a repression of 
death33—of the death of the individual and the mourning for this individual.34 In a certain 
sense it constitutes a refusal to give time to what ought to stop time and call a halt to any 
productive development. Derrida’s reading of Hegel’s reading of Antigone here reprises 
the theme of his earlier essay on Bataille’s reading of Hegel: the manner in which the 
Hegelian Aufhebung attempts to account for and put to work what should be an 
irrecuperable loss.35 As Derrida puts it, ‘What speculative dialectics means (to say) is that 
                                                          
33 ‘Repression of death’ means here that death is still seen as a way of being. The significance Derrida 
accords this repression cannot be overestimated, insofar as he states that the ‘whole question of 
deconstruction’ is whether ideality as death is ‘to be dead or to be dead’ (Gl 133a/151a). In the 
‘Revealed Religion’ chapter of the Phenomenology, Hegel indicates that in the sphere of absolute 
knowing, not only time but also death as such will be overcome. The self-consciousness reached in this 
sphere ‘does not actually die, as the particular self-consciousness is pictured as being actually dead, but 
its particularity dies away in its universality, i.e. in its knowledge, which is essential being reconciling 
itself with itself’ (Ph 475/571).  
34 For Critchley, this is also a repression of a certain possibility of ethics, insofar as ‘Antigone marks a 
place (‘an impossible place’) within the Hegelian system where an ethics is glimpsed that is irreducible 
to dialectics and cognition, what I would call an ethics of the singular’ (Critchley, pp. 210-11). 
35 ‘From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve,’ in WD pp. 317-351. Cf. 
particularly: ‘The blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be organized the representation of 
meaning, is the point at which destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so irreversible an 
expenditure, so radical a negativity—here we would have to say an expenditure and a negativity 
222 
 
the crypt can still be incorporated into the system. The transcendental or the repressed 
[refoulé], the unthought or the excluded must be assimilated by the corpus, interiorized 
as moments, idealized in the very negativity of their labor. The stop, the arrest, forms 
only a stasis in the introjection of the spirit’ (Gl 166a/187a). This interiorisation through 
repression is precisely not an attempt to eliminate the divine law, but to harness it. We 
can now consider how this takes place by considering how the contradiction lives on even 
after it has come to light.   
For the ethical world represents something of an anomaly in Hegel, insofar as the 
contradiction here does not immediately collapse into a new unity with which the next 
dialectical development will begin. As Derrida puts it, here the contradiction ‘appeases 
nothing’ (Gl 174a/192a). It only reveals the negative unity of the two laws, without yet 
pointing to their positive unity. Each depends on the other in order to be what it is, but 
each is also opposed to the other. Let us consider the structure of this negative unity in 
more detail.  
The divine law lives on or remains in the form of the irony of ‘womankind.’ The 
latter, as Hegel describes it, mocks the universal aims of the nation, and attempts to 
‘change by intrigue’ the universal ends of the government into private ends and ‘pervert’ 
universal property into private property. In Hegel’s description of this phenomenon, it is 
difficult not to hear an echo of his own reprimand to those who would attempt to enter 
the logical science with unbridled enthusiasm: ‘Woman in this way turns to ridicule the 
earnest wisdom of mature age which, indifferent to purely private pleasures and 
enjoyments, as well as to playing an active part, only thinks of and cares for the universal. 
She makes this wisdom an object of derision for raw and irresponsible youth and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
without reserve—that they can no longer be determined as negativity in a process or system’ (WD 
327/380).  
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unworthy of their enthusiasm’ (Ph 288/353). The irony or scepticism of woman is then 
implicitly or explicitly conceived as parasitic on, and obstructive of, the earnest striving of 
the representatives of the universal.   
The human law lives on by ‘consuming and absorbing’ (Ph 287/352), or as Derrida 
would put it, ‘repressing,’ the irony and ‘separatism’ of womankind. It dissolves the 
distinct families into ‘the fluid continuity of its own nature’ (Ph 288/352). In this way, the 
nation prevents the universal ends of the community from being undermined by 
womanly irony. It is a measure of the ‘threat’ posed by the latter that it can only be 
subdued and brought back into line with the purposes of the whole community by means 
of war. Though Hegel of course does not put it this way, war in this instance would then 
have to be conceived as a turning against the initial peace of the sister’s relation to the 
brother—in short, as war on peace. War not only makes the individual feel ‘the power of 
the negative,’ and so realise how fragile he or she is in isolation from the community, but 
also harnesses the essential power of the individual, which, properly directed, ‘preserves 
the whole’ (Ph 289/353). The community as a whole thus flourishes by sacrificing what 
would confront it with death—that is, by repressing the rem(a)inder of death.    
We can now begin to see precisely what interests Derrida in the negative unity of 
the two laws. For this unity is governed by the same paradoxical logic that we 
encountered in Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence. In the present case, this means that each law 
will and will not have been prior to the other. The divine law, as we saw above, is in one 
sense characterised as parasitical upon the human law. Yet as becomes particularly 
evident in war, the human law is also dependent on the divine law for its motive force. 
The ‘publicly manifest spirit’ Hegel writes, has ‘the root of its power in the netherworld’ 
(Ph 287/351). As Derrida is careful to observe, the divine law is not simply a hostile 
principle for the nation; the latter must include the former within its own law, but it must 
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include it as excluded. Furthermore, in doing so it also in a certain respect ‘creates it,’ 
since the divine law is not what it is prior to its relation to the human law. As Hegel 
himself writes, ‘Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with 
the happiness of the family, and by dissolving self-consciousness into the universal, it 
creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an 
internal enemy in womankind in general’ (Ph 288/352, trans. modified). The divine law 
might then be conceived as the ‘quasi-transcendental’ condition of possibility and 
impossibility of the human law. The manner in which repression ‘creates’ its own 
transcendental field or ‘essence’ through its very action is one of the central themes of 
Glas. Such an ‘essence’ does not precede the repression, and yet the repression also 
cannot fully master what it ‘creates,’ because from another perspective it only finds this 
creation before it. This is precisely the logic of the essential remainder or of failed 
mastery that we saw in Hegel’s account of reflection. Suppression [répression] therefore, 
as Derrida puts it, 
 
produces just what—the singularity of the unconscious, the irony of femininity—it 
suppresses [réprime] as its own “essential moment.” It traps itself, and glues, limes 
itself [s’englue] in its own essence. Whence the eternal burst {éclat} of laughter of 
the unconscious—or of the woman, the exclamation that indefinitely harasses, 
questions, ridicules, mocks the essence, the truth (of man)’ (Gl 188a/211a).  
 
Here again, Derrida is only commenting on what is already more or less explicit in Hegel’s 
account of the two laws. Yet Derrida now begins to draw certain conclusions from the 
logic by which they are governed that Hegel does not and would not. The quasi-
transcendentality of the divine law means that, ‘If God is (probably) a man in speculative 
dialectics, the godness of God—the irony that divides him and makes him come off his 
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hinges—the infinite disquiet of his essence is (if possible) woman(ly)’ (Gl 188a/211a). 
Furthermore, in identifying repression with the dialectic itself (Gl 191a/214a), Derrida 
also seems to suggest that the latter will always ‘create’ for itself an irreducible 
remainder that it can only retroactively ‘get behind’ through repeated instances of 
repression which allow the phantasm of absolute mastery to arise. When Derrida remarks 
above that suppression becomes ‘glued’ in its own essence, this is surely a reference to 
the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology, where Hegel states that if cognition were 
thought of as an ‘instrument’ such as the lime-twig used to catch a bird, an unbridgeable 
gap would already have been posited between cognition and its object. The bird would 
then ‘laugh our little ruse to scorn’ (Ph 47/69). Now Derrida seems to be suggesting that, 
in attempting to overcome this kind of division or this notion of the transcendental, Hegel 
reinstates another, quasi-transcendental in which ‘we’ would be caught, and the bird 
would still laugh itself to death.    
Now could one not argue that Derrida misreads or misrepresents Hegel here? For 
after all, the ethical world does not represent Hegel’s ultimate conception of the relation 
between the individual, or individuality, and the state. Might we not then interpret Hegel 
himself as saying that it is precisely because of the repression that the ethical world must 
meet its destruction? For the desecration of Polynices’ corpse brings the wrath of other 
communities to bear on the nation, which necessarily leads to its eventual downfall. In 
other words, might we not say, yes, there is repression as long as the ethical world 
endures, but it is because there is repression that it does not indefinitely endure? Yet this 
objection would be premature, for if we look a little more closely at Hegel’s text, we see 
that it is not because the repression is too excessive that the ethical world collapses, but 
because it is not repressive enough.    
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The community does not collapse just because repression brings war; it collapses 
because whether it wins a given war will depend on the natural gifts with it has been 
endowed. Sooner or later, the community will be outmatched in this regard. As Hegel 
writes, ‘Because the existence of ethical life rests on strength and luck, the decision is 
already made that its downfall has come’ (Ph 289/354). The ethical world thus collapses 
because its subsistence rests on ‘the natural allocation of the two laws to the two sexes’ 
(Ph 282/346), that is, upon a diverse, contingent basis. We should not forget, of course, 
that a state of diversity, as Hegel frames it, is a state of excessive ‘individualism’ (or as 
Derrida might put it, a resistance to totalisation); at root it is thus, at a ‘meta-level,’ the 
feminine, divine law which is to blame for the collapse of the ethical world. The 
opposition here has not been able to overcome this diverse basis sufficiently to prevent a 
tragic denouement. It is not therefore less repression that is needed, but further 
repression in order to overcome the contingency of this still too natural origin.   
Having considered more closely the mechanism of repression involved in these 
chapters of the Phenomenology, we can now proceed to Derrida’s Auseinandersetzung 
with what he takes to be the phantasmatic triumph of repression in the final overcoming 
of sexual difference, which is at the same time the transition to absolute knowledge. But 
to reiterate, his attempt to divert this transition will not consist in simply ‘undoing’ the 
repression. As we have seen above, there is no origin prior to the repression, from which 
a pure unrepressed ‘identity’ could be retrieved. As Derrida writes, ‘In short, can it be 
asked if repression is good or bad?’ If it must be, then the question of its ‘value’ is 
laughable (Gl 197a/221a). To counter Hegelian repression will not then be to reverse the 
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dominance of that which represses and that which is repressed, but to indicate the 
potential inexhaustibility of that which has been repressed by any given repression.36   
 
Part 3. The Outside Inside  
 
3.1 Absolute Knowing, Sexual Difference, and the Phantasm 
 
As we saw in part 1 of this chapter, the transition to ‘Absolute Knowing’ in the 
Phenomenology is the point at which the ‘absolute sense of the absolute family’ is 
illuminated by speculative thinking. As Derrida notes, this transition to Sa is concomitant 
with the overcoming of the remaining sexual difference between the mother and the 
father in the Christian family. This sexual difference is referred to twice in Hegel’s account 
of ‘revealed religion’: once in its first few pages, and in slightly more detail on its last 
page. There Hegel writes:  
  
Just as the individual divine man has a father in principle [ansichseienden Vater] and 
only an actual mother, so too the universal divine man, the community, has for its 
father its own doing and knowing, but for its mother, eternal love which it only feels, 
but does not behold in its consciousness as an actual, immediate object. Its 
reconciliation, therefore, is in its heart, but its consciousness is still divided against 
itself and its actual world is still disrupted [gebrochen] (Ph 478/574, also quoted in Gl 
222/248)  
                                                          
36 This does not mean that Derrida posits an ‘original plenitude’ which would be always ‘more than’ 
what it is determined as being. The gift is rather quasi-transcendental in that it manifests itself only 
through the displacement of the manner in which it has always already been determined. (Cf. Derrida’s 
comments on negative theology in M 6/6).  
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The possibility of the transition to the standpoint of science, and so the possibility of a 
philosophical logic überhaupt, depends then, on the overcoming of this difference. 
Indeed, on Derrida’s reading, the latter would be the overcoming of opposition itself, 
insofar as ‘The opposition of father and mother is equivalent to all the other oppositions 
of the series. Equivalent, then, to opposition itself’ (Gl 223a/249a). Why ‘opposition 
itself’? Derrida might be taken to mean that, on the one hand, in being the final 
opposition before the transition to Sa, it gathers up within itself all of the oppositions that 
have preceded it and proves to have been the ultimate opposition underlying them all. 
On the other hand, due to the interpenetration of the finite and the infinite discussed in 
part 1 of this chapter, the opposition of sexual difference cannot be merely a ‘finite’ 
‘example’ of the ‘general’ structure of opposition, but rather ‘exemplifies’ it. It does so 
because it includes within itself all of the other ‘finite’ terms through which such an 
opposition might be figured, and only is what it is by including them within itself. The 
father is thus not dissociable from, among other things, activity, consciousness, and 
knowledge, and the mother not dissociable from passivity, unconsciousness, obscurity, 
and feeling.   
Now as in the ethical world, what is repressed in the formation of this opposition 
is again the diverse, manifold character of sexual difference. As in the ethical world too, 
Derrida does not conceive the subsequent overcoming of the opposition to take place 
through the simple absorption of one term by the other. The sublation rather consists in 
both of the terms coming to include the other in themselves and thereby figuring the 
whole by themselves. As Derrida puts it, each has an ‘independence’ and ‘absolute 
mastery’—a mastery that is not the mastery of essence but the conceptual mastery we 
encountered in chapter 5, which does not consist in the external application of force.   
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Yet just as the obscurity of the divine law in the ethical world was brought out 
into the light of day through the structure of opposition, here it is the finite actuality or, 
as we saw Critchley note, the materiality of the mother that becomes ideal. It is only 
when it becomes ideal that the smooth family movement from father to son and ‘back’ 
can take place without resistance. This is why Derrida writes that the determination of 
difference as opposition ‘maintains a historical and systematic relation with the 
Immaculate Conception (IC) […] if not with the dogma concerning the birth of Mary, at 
least with its premise or conclusion, the virginity of the mother’ (Gl 223a/250a). The 
obscurity of the mother’s love, which is based on the contingency of natural feeling and 
which is first of all necessary in order to overcome the coldness of the Jewish family, is 
now itself overcome in favour of the whole’s self-transparency and self-comprehension.  
Once again, the opposition is not a means of ‘having done with’ the mother or 
simply absorbing the maternal into the paternal, but rather of ‘idealising’ the mother 
such that she can figure the whole. But in that this idealisation represses what had been 
the essential determination of the mother—her finite, resistant actuality—it serves to 
make the mother more like the father.37 It makes her, we might say, a ‘meta-level’ father. 
It is in this way that the IC is bound up with the ‘phantasm’ mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter, a phantasm that can no longer be avoided, Derrida writes, ‘as soon as the 
difference is determined as opposition.’ The phantasm is that of the ‘infinite mastery of 
the two sides of the relation’ (Gl 223a/250a), the mastery that is achieved through the 
supposed complete transparency of each side to the other.   
                                                          
37 Derrida’s ‘objection’ here will of course not be that the distinctive characteristic of the mother should 
rather be maintained over against that of the father, for this supposedly distinctive characteristic is 
already a function of the repression of multiplicity.  
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  Derrida thus writes that ‘If the sexual difference as opposition relieves difference 
as opposition, the opposition, conceptuality itself, is homosexual’ (Gl 223a/249a); 
conceptuality begins to become such as soon as ‘the sexual differences efface themselves 
and determine themselves as the difference,’ that is, when they determine themselves 
within the element of identity. Now Derrida does not say ‘asexual’ since there is still a 
smooth intercourse between or interpenetration of the moments of the unity to which 
the opposition has led. Generation still takes place, yet this generation is a result of self-
insemination, of the father giving himself his own image. The opposition is therefore 
masculine in an undifferentiated sense, no longer containing any trace of the feminine.    
The ‘phantasm’ that is reached at the end of the Phenomenology is the 
standpoint of Wissenschaft—the unity of thought and being with which the Logic begins. 
Insofar as the Phenomenology is a precondition for the Logic, Derrida’s point would then 
be that the Logic is only made possible through a long series of repressive acts.38 And it is 
here that Derrida states that once the phantasm has been established, there is a certain 
futility to the attempt to present counterexamples to it. This is of course why, as we 
noted in the introduction to this chapter, Glas addresses the genesis of the phantasm 
rather than opposing it directly. As Derrida asks:     
 
                                                          
38 Although it is impossible to enter into this debate here, this is not the only way in which the Logic 
would begin from a series of repressions. Even if the Logic is taken to begin with the pure resolution to 
think immediacy, Derrida would undoubtedly be in agreement with Kierkegaard’s contention that it is 
impossible to begin immediately with immediacy—that this would rather involve an interminable series 
of abstractions from (or repressions of) the fact that one has abstracted the indeterminate from the 
determinate (cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by Alastair Hannay 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009), pp. 96–103). 
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In front of what would the phantasm of the IC have failed? In front of “reality”? But 
measured by the power of the greater logic that thinks the truth of the IC, this 
notion of “reality” also remains very confusedly empirical. Who would dare say that 
the phantasm of the IC has not succeeded? Two thousand years, at least, of Europe, 
from Christ to Sa, without speaking of retroactive effects, of representations, of 
edging and de-bordering effects {effets de bordure et de débordement}, of all that 
could be called the imperialism or the colonialisms and neocolonialisms of the IC. 
Will it be said, to determine the IC as phantasm, that the IC is not true, that that (ça) 
does not happen like that (comma ça), that this is only a myth? That would indeed 
be silly, and the silliness would again claim “sexual experience” as its authority. But 
yes, that (ça), happens like that (comme ça), and what the greater logic 
impeccably—this is the right word—demonstrates is that not only is this myth true, 
but it gives the measure of truth itself, the revelation of truth, the truth of truth. 
Then the (absolute) phantasm of the IC as (absolute) phantasm is (absolute) truth. 
Truth is the phantasm itself. The IC, sexual difference as opposition (thesis against 
thesis), the absolute family circle would be the general equivalence of truth and the 
phantasm. Homosexual enantiosis’ (Gl 224a/251a).  
 
3.2 The Overcoming of Time 
 
Sa is termed by Derrida the ‘final accomplishment of the phantasm, the being-(close)-by-
(it)self of the logos’ (Gl 225a/251a). This self-proximity of absolute knowing is at the same 
time the overcoming of time, insofar as it is the transformation of representation—of the 
remaining distance between the infinite and the finite—into the self-presence of absolute 
knowing. Derrida is careful, however, to note the ambiguity of the manner in which time 
is overcome in the final chapter of the Phenomenology: as Derrida notes, Hegel states 
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that it is both ‘annulled’ (‘getilgt’) and that it is sublated (‘aufgehoben’).39 We can give 
some explanation of this ambiguity if we look more closely at the nature of Sa’s self-
presence.   
At the end of the Phenomenology, a very similar development occurs to that 
which we saw at the end of Hegel’s conceptual logic: just like absolute method, absolute 
knowing comes to reconceptualise the path that has led it to itself, or rather to actively 
reconstruct this path from out of itself—as that which in truth will have been posited by it 
as the pure ‘I.’ At this point, Derrida notes, the phantasm can no longer be rejected as 
‘nothing but’ a phantasm, precisely because there is nothing but the phantasm (Gl 
225a/251a).    
Like the logical concept that we described in chapter 6, Sa is then in one sense 
only a continual process of self-division, but since in this process the self only goes 
together with itself, it is also a process that has always already occurred. As Hegel puts 
this in a passage from the penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology that is quoted by 
Derrida and that points forward to this speculative transparency: ‘Thus the distinctions 
made are immediately resolved as soon as they are made, and are made as soon as they 
are resolved, and what is true and actual is precisely this movement circling in itself (in 
sich kreisende Bewegung)’ (Ph 465/559a, quoted in Gl 230a/257a). This is why time is 
both getilgt and aufgehoben in Sa. Time in the form of the delay caused by the opacity of 
substance is annulled, but time persists in sublated form as the time that absolute 
knowing gives itself. The latter is the time of the eternal present of eternal self-
presence—time conquered.   
 
                                                          
39 Furthermore, Derrida states that this ambiguity is the source of the ‘extraordinary difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of this thought of Sa in/as its time’ (Gl 220a/246a).   
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3.3 The Remains of Time 
 
Derrida now asks, ‘What can there be outside an absolute phantasm? What can one yet 
add to it? Why and how does one desire to get out of it?’ (Gl 225a/252a). The ‘how’ here 
is of course bound up with the ‘why,’ for the ‘way out’ will be reached through an 
attention to that which has been repressed through the logic of opposition that has 
allowed the circle of Sa to be formed. It will require an openness to a certain spectre 
which continues to haunt the peace of the pure self-relation which lives through 
repression. If hospitality is extended to it, this spectre may give pause for thought, 
arresting the sure progress of the absolute knowing that has come to coincide with sense-
certainty. It may then give us to think a remainder (reste) of time which prevents the 
circle of Sa from closing.   
Building on the analysis of the remainder undertaken throughout this study, we 
might first consider what this reste, in the context of Glas, cannot be. It cannot be a reste 
in the sense of a ‘something’ possessing the simple immediacy of what Hegel would term 
‘substance.’ That is, it cannot be a something that would persist in simple indifference, in 
opposition to the dynamism of Sa. As Derrida writes, it can be neither ‘presence, 
substance, nor essence,’ nor ‘permanent, substantial, subsistent,’ nor that which would 
simply fall ‘outside’ the circle as its negative (Gl 226a/252-3a) or fall from it as a leftover 
or ‘to the tomb.’ This is because at this point in the Phenomenology all such forms of 
remaining have been shown to be in truth the Schein generated by the movement 
through which Sa determines itself. All instances of seemingly simple presence are in 
truth the self-presence that Sa has ‘restored’ for itself through its self-mediation. It is 
precisely because of their (seeming) immediacy that such moments can be brought into 
the structure of determinate opposition through which they are sublated. If it is possible 
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to ‘leave’ the circle, then, such a ‘departure’ could only be accomplished, paradoxically, 
by not leaving it, but rather by remaining (otherwise) within it.  
We cannot then ask ‘what is the reste?’ nor even, Derrida adds, ‘what does it 
mean to remain’ insofar as such questions would already enquire into the essence of the 
reste or of remaining. To attempt to leap out of the circle so directly would be to find 
oneself back in the midst of it. It will be rather be a matter of remaining within the circle40 
and of attending to that which constitutes its quasi-transcendental condition but which 
cannot be exhausted by it. If the circle of Sa arises through the opposition which 
represses multiplicity, it will then be a question of letting this multiplicity resonate 
discordantly within Sa. We can now say, then, that the reste of time can only be a fleeting 
moment that is carried off from itself in its very appearance and that resists the attempt 
to comprehend it through its refusal to remain in place. It is this non-sense, for Derrida, 
that provokes thought and sets it in motion, but at the same time prevents thought from 
recovering its origins. In other words, it is that which gives to thinking but which does not 
give itself to be thought through. In order to locate the possibility of this reste within the 
Phenomenology, Derrida casts an Orphic glance back into the sphere of religion.   
Now it is important to note again that Derrida can only hope to displace the circle 
in this way if he does not conceive it as simply there throughout the Phenomenology, as 
that which is guiding the development from the outset. It is only because it is neither a 
simple presupposition nor a telos in the external sense that it is possible to consider what 
might disrupt the passage to it. Derrida acknowledges this when he writes that 
‘Everything that is, all time, precomprehends itself, strictly, in the circle of Sa, which 
always comes back to the circle, presupposes its beginning, and only reaches that 
beginning at the end’ (Gl 226a/252a).   
                                                          
40 As Derrida writes, ‘the remain(s) […] would not fall from it at all’ (Gl 226a/252a).  
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Derrida does not go back to the stage of absolute religion. Even though the latter 
is still held back from Sa because of its ‘picture thinking,’ it is at the same time already on 
the cusp of being thought speculatively. This is why Derrida writes that ‘absolute religion 
is not yet what it already is: Sa’ (Gl 218a/244a). By the stage of absolute religion, it would 
already be ‘too late’ to prevent the smooth slide into absolute knowledge. As Derrida 
puts this, ‘This barely existing limit, exceeded as soon as it is posited, is already no more 
what it is yet and does not even give time to think its time. This limit is what barely 
presents itself between absolute religion and Sa’ (Gl 220a/246a).   
Derrida has go to further back into the sphere of religion in order locate the non-
origin of the reste. As Critchley notes, he does so while still remaining within the circle of 
Sa. This circle, as Critchley points out, is not only that of the Phenomenology as a whole, a 
circle formed through the meeting of its end and its beginning. Insofar as each new 
sphere of the Phenomenology constitutes a reconceptualisation of the beginning and its 
subsequent development, there are also many other circles formed within the wider 
circle. One of these consists in the loop between Sa and the earliest stage of the sphere of 
religion, the religion of light: ‘the first moment of religion (immediate consciousness and 
sense-certainty) counts three moments whose first (the first moment of the first 
moment) is also, like Sa, at the other end, absence of figure, irrepresentable moment. 
The figure withdraws [se dérobe] at the end and origin of religion’ (Gl 237a/264a). It is in 
this ‘origin’ that Derrida finds a certain non-sense ‘prior’ to sense, which allows him to 
enact a ‘bad reading’ of Hegel’s text.   
Indeed, Derrida claims that it is only through such a reading that a ‘way out’ of 
the circle is to be found. As he writes, ‘If one thinks what logos means (to say), if one fills 
with thought the words of the phenomenology of spirit and of the logic, for example, 
there is no means of getting out of the absolute circle’ (Gl 227a/253a). It is only by finding 
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a point in Hegel’s text that be read against what Hegel ‘means to say’, and against 
meaning in general, that the circle can be broken.41 Importantly, Derrida notes that it will 
be impossible to know whether such a reading ‘works’: such a reading, being neither 
finite nor infinite42 ‘has not even taken place [elle n’a même pas lieu]. One must let it fall 
[…] as a margin or epigraph’ (Gl 232a/259a). In part, I take Derrida to mean here that 
what he is attempting  to draw attention to is precisely not ‘something’ that can come 
clearly into the light and thereby provide a straightforwardly ‘convincing objection’ to the 
pretentions of Sa. With his ‘bad reading’ he is rather attempting to locate that which 
could well be passed over in silence or read otherwise—that which does not have the 
power to demand attention.  His reading here is therefore very close to his reading of 
Levinas’ ‘perhaps’ [peut-être] in his ‘At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am.’43  
 
                                                          
41 Beyond the present context, Derrida is also suggesting here that the Hegel column as a whole 
constitutes such a ‘bad reading,’ one which involves immobilising Hegel’s text in representation and 
cutting it up into ‘ensembles of morsels that no longer proceed from the whole and that will never form 
altogether one’ (Gl 227a/254a). 
42 Derrida’s remarks at this point in the text might lead one to question the simplicity of Martin 
Hägglund’s reading of differance as infinite finitude (cf. Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and 
the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 3). Cf. also Derrida’s remark in 
Grammatology that ‘Differance is also something other than finitude’ (G 68/99).  
43 In Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, ed. by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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3.4 Das Lichtwesen 
 
Derrida now turns to the first moment of ‘natural religion,’ das Lichtwesen.44 It is in this 
figure of thought that Derrida locates a perhaps ‘exemplary’ form of ‘pure’ difference, 
whose entanglement with opposition he nevertheless carefully examines. Critchley 
observes that these pages of Glas constitute ‘the core of Derrida’s reading and the 
clearest deployment of its thesis’45  and my reading of this section will be indebted to his. 
But in order not to disavow this debt, I shall also have to disagree with Critchley 
concerning the ‘horizon’ of Derrida’s reading and therefore its broader significance with 
respect to the proximity and distance between Derrida and Hegel. In short, I shall suggest 
that where Critchley sees Derrida as indicating the limits of Hegelian metaphysics through 
a Heideggerian attempt to think being as such, Derrida is rather suggesting that while 
Heidegger indicates the ‘way out’ of the Hegelian circle, he does not follow this path far 
enough.    
Let us first quote at length those remarks of Hegel’s concerning the Lichtwesen on 
which Derrida’s reading is based:  
 
This being which is filled with the concept of spirit is, then, the ‘shape’ of the simple 
relation of spirit to itself, or the ‘shape’ of ‘shapelessness.’ In virtue of this 
                                                          
44 Translated by Miller as ‘God as Light.’ Here I shall use Hegel’s German term, as it maintains the 
connection to the concept of essence that the Lichtwesen also displaces.  
45 Critchley, p. 215. 
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determination, this ‘shape’ is the pure, all-embracing and all-pervading essential 
light of sunrise, which preserves itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is 
the equally simple negative, darkness. The movements of its own externalization, its 
creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are torrents of light 
[Lichtgüsse]; in their simplicity, they are at the same time the genesis of its being-for-
self and the return from the existence [of its moments], streams of fire destructive 
of [all] structured form. The [moment] of difference which it gives itself does, it is 
true, proliferate unchecked in the substance of existence and shapes itself to the 
forms of nature; yet the essential simplicity of its thought moves aimlessly about in it 
without stability or intelligence, enlarges its bounds to the measureless, and its 
beauty, heightened to splendour, is dissolved in its sublimity.  
The content developed by this pure being, or the activity of its perceiving, is, 
therefore, an essenceless by-play in this substance which merely ascends, without 
descending into its depths to become a subject and through the self to consolidate 
its distinct moments. The determinations of this substance are only attributes which 
do not attain to self-subsistence, but remain merely names of the many-named One’ 
(Ph 419/506).  
 
Now although it is clear from Hegel’s remark that the torrents of light are ‘at the same 
time’ the genesis of a being-for-self, or as Derrida puts it, are ‘already destined to work in 
the service of essence and sense’ (Gl 238a/266a), Derrida’s ‘strategy’ here consists in 
driving an infinitesimally small wedge into this ‘at the same time,’ a wedge which is an 
other ‘at the same time’ and which serves to guard the reste of time. Derrida lingers on 
that form of difference displayed by the Lichtwesen’s Ausstrahlung that is not yet 
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difference as dialectical contradiction. Let us draw out from Derrida’s reading the 
respects in which this may be so.46   
Firstly, Derrida picks up on the important point that the light here is, ‘without 
shadow, noon without contrary, without resistance, without obstacle’ (Gl 238a/265a). 
The effusion, like the brother-sister relation, takes place in a ‘not yet’ that is ‘prior’ to the 
determination of difference as opposition. At this point, the relation between lightness 
and darkness is one of indifference, such that the streams of light pour out against a dark 
background, but without relation to it.47   
                                                          
46 As we do so, it will be important to keep in mind that the Lichtwesen figures both ‘the purest pure 
and the worst worst [le pur du pur, le pire du pire]’ (Gl 240a/267a). Indeed, when Derrida later comes to 
think it in terms of the gift, the resonance of the German ‘Gift’ in the French ‘don’ is never far from 
Derrida’s mind. The Lichtwesen figures, as we shall see, both that which gives to thinking and that which 
arrests or poisons thinking. The sun that the Abendland claims to preserve in its heart is, Derrida thus 
suggests, not simply the source of life and clarity but also of destruction and blindness. But this of 
course does not mean that the two are the same—that Derrida would in any way posit an equivalence 
between the one possibility of the Lichtwesen and the other. Here it might be helpful to draw on the 
figure of the ‘disjointedness of time’ from Derrida’s Specters of Marx, which is broached there as both 
the condition of justice as such and a sign of the worst injustice or corruption. This in no way means the 
two are equivalent; Derrida’s point is rather that justly addressing the latter form of disjointedness will 
not be a matter of attempting to set time back on its hinges, but of fostering the other form of 
disjointedness that consists in an openness toward the other (Cf. S 22-23/44-45).  
47 With respect to this ‘original’ indifference between the two principles of light and darkness, Derrida 
might be read as indicating a proximity between the figure of the Lichtwesen in Hegel and Schelling’s 
notion of an ‘Ungrund’ (Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the 
Essence of Human Freedom, trans. by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2006).  
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Secondly, Derrida reads this divine light as a pure outpouring and play: ‘pure and 
figureless, this light burns all. It burns itself in the all-burning {le brûle-tout} it is, leaves, of 
itself or anything, no trace, no mark, no sign of passage. Pure consuming destruction, 
pure effusion of light’ (Gl 238a/265a). Here Derrida seems to hint at an interpretation of 
why the Lichtwesen should ascend unceasingly. For the streams of light would seem to 
manifest the structure of the trace that we met in chapter 3. It is in their very appearance 
that they efface themselves, as they are replaced by further streams which likewise 
efface themselves. This is then where Derrida locates the other ‘at the same time’ within 
Hegel’s account, an ‘at the same time’ with a radically different sense to that of Sa: a 
simultaneity of appearance and disappearance which is not yet the unity of light and 
shadow, but rather their indifference. It is this indifference which explains why there is as 
yet no contradiction, but an immediate passing over of light into darkness.    
Derrida devotes particular attention to this ‘essenceless by-play (Beiherspielen)’ 
of these streams of light, which, as Hegel states, ‘have no self-subsistence.’ The manner 
of their effusion amounts to a continual displacement or evacuation of sense, since it 
does not leave time for the moments to become determinate. As Derrida puts this: ‘The 
word itself (Beiherspielen) plays the example (Beispiel) beside the essence. Here the 
example plays beside the essence so much, holds itself so diverted from {à l’écart de} the 
essence, that it has no essence: pure example, without essence, without law’ (Gl 
238a/266a).48 On Derrida’s reading, there is then as yet no sense to this play of light: it is 
only a shimmering or dazzling that continually eludes any attempt to grasp it.  
                                                          
48 In using the term ‘play’ to describe an ‘example’ that negates itself as such by eluding any category 
through which it might be comprehended, Derrida surely has, among other things, Kant’s analytic of the 
beautiful in mind here. We might view this implicit reference as an attempt to indicate an aspect of 
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Derrida also attends to the manner in which this ceaseless outpouring or 
flickering of the torrents of light might be understood as not yet the constitution of the 
Lichtwesen’s being-for-self. This, I would suggest, is again due to the logic of the trace 
governing the play of light: the vanishing of the torrents into darkness at the same time as 
they appear and their continual replacement by new torrents does not allow for the 
continuity of time that would be necessary for self-constitution. This rapid succession of 
isolated instants thus does not yet give way to the gradual descent of the sun into the 
Abendland—for what Hegel calls the Lichtwesen’s descent into its depths to become a 
subject. As Derrida writes: ‘here the sun does not set—or else it sets immediately, does 
not know any going down, any route that leads back to self, any season, any season in the 
sense of cycle, just a pure season, in the sense of the seminal effusion without return’ (Gl 
239a/266a). Here there are no patches of shade—no unity of light and darkness—in 
which a self might pause to recollect and inwardise (erinnern) itself from out of its 
otherness and prove to be that which mediates its determinations. Spirit therefore 
relates to itself here ‘without mediation or determination’: ‘The pure play of difference is 
nothing, does not even relate to its own blaze {incendie}’ (Gl 239a/266a). It is in this 
process, then, that Derrida locates in Hegel’s text a form of ‘pure’ difference that is not 
yet  the ‘absolute difference’ that is equal to identity, but rather indifference: ‘Letting 
itself get carried away, pure difference is different from itself, therefore indifferent’ (Gl 
239a/266a).      
In place of a being that is for-itself or a subject there is only, as Hegel writes, the 
‘many-named One.’ Yet Derrida hints at a contradiction in Hegel’s description, for if the 
one is essentially many-named—if there is no ‘true name’ of the one—then it is ‘not one.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Kant that Hegel will have repressed in his attempted sublation of the Kantian distinction between the 
finite and the infinite.    
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Drawing on Specters of Marx, we might say rather that it is ‘plus d’un’: both more than 
one in that it is essentially multiple, but also less than one in that it does not add up to 
one totalisable whole (S XX/18). In Derrida’s words, it is ‘a One at once infinitely multiple 
and absolutely different, different from self, a One without self, the other without self 
that means (to say) nothing, whose language is absolutely empty’ (Gl 239a/266a).     
Now as was mentioned above, Critchley takes Derrida to be seeking in Hegel a 
possibility of thinking being ‘prior to its determination with regard to particular beings’49 
and he draws on the above passage on the ‘One’ to support this reading. To my mind, 
however, this is clearly not the path Derrida is following here. It is of course true that 
Hegel speaks of the Lichtwesen above as ‘pure being.’ Yet I take Derrida here to be driving 
a wedge between Hegel’s attribution of the term ‘being’ to the Lichtwesen and the 
description that is given of it. Rather than going ‘back’ to the level of pure being before its 
determination as particular beings, Derrida is rather going even further ‘back,’ to a 
‘prehistory’ of being. He is suggesting that that which effaces itself in its very appearance 
lies between being and nothing, in a space of undecidability that displaces opposition—
even the opposition between being and beings—and that is ‘not yet’ a unity. He explicitly 
states, for instance, that the ‘limitless play’ of light ‘does not yet have any onto-
theological horizon: fire artist without being’ (Gl 238a/266a).   
A few pages before this discussion, but still in relation to the Lichtwesen, Derrida 
writes that ‘There is a “mystery” there, but the “mystical” [“mystique”] does not result 
from some dissembling (Verborgenheit) or from some intimate secret (Geheimnis) of 
knowledge. The mystical is the revelation’ (Gl 234a/261a). Here Derrida is clearly not 
concerned with a Heideggerian unconcealment that is at the same time a concealment; 
here there is nothing to be concealed since there is ‘nothing’ to be revealed in this 
                                                          
49 Critchley, p. 217. 
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encounter with a ‘signifier without signified (Gl 239a/266a). It is the revelation, or rather 
revelation itself that is in question. The latter is not experienced as a coming into 
presence, a ‘clearing’ which would also be an appropriation, nor as the inheritance of a 
historical destiny. It is neither being that is in question nor, moreover, thinking: at issue is 
rather that which deranges or dazzles thinking, that which effaces the experience of 
presence before it arises, preventing any possibility of appropriation or Erinnerung.  
What Critchley’s reading overlooks is precisely Derrida’s attempt to problematise 
a certain Heideggerian nostalgia for an originally ‘pure’ thinking of being, even if for 
Heidegger this origin is immediately covered over (cf. P 54/73-74). Indeed, in reading 
Derrida’s remarks on the ‘many-named One,’ it is difficult not to think of the end of his 
lecture, ‘Différance.’ In this text, it is precisely at the point at which Derrida is attempting 
to distinguish his ‘position’ from that of Heidegger that he writes: ‘There will be no 
unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this without 
nostalgia, that is, outside of the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost 
native country of thought’ (M 27/29).  
 
3.5 Das Abendlicht 
 
While Derrida is concerned with locating a potentially radical difference in Hegel’s text, 
he is also careful to explore how it is that this difference comes to be restricted—that is, 
how the ‘seminal effusion’ is, in Hegel’s words, ‘at the same time the genesis of [a] being 
for self.’ Derrida now asks how it is that this chaotic all-burning comes to be determined 
as its own other, or how the continual ‘now’ that is at the same time the effacement of 
the ‘now’ comes to gain the stability necessary for it to ‘open history.’ Indeed, he directly 
addresses Hegel’s claim that this ‘reeling, unconstrained life must determine itself as 
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being-for-self and endow its vanishing shapes with an enduring subsistence’ (Ph 420/506-
7, my emphasis).50   
At this point we are again brought back to Thompson’s claim that Derrida has 
never given a conclusive argument as to why difference as diverse multiplicity cannot 
pass over into opposition and contradiction. These pages of Glas, I think, make especially 
clear why this is not and could not have been Derrida’s aim. As I read Derrida here, he is 
not attempting to show what must stop or block this transition. At a certain level, and as 
we shall see in more detail, Derrida does not even deny that a certain restriction of 
difference is unavoidable, nor that it has always already taken place. For Derrida, then, it 
is neither a question of stubbornly remaining (in the simple sense) with a supposedly 
original, absolutely indifferent diversity, nor of ‘returning’ to a supposed origin. In the 
following, we shall see how Derrida acknowledges a certain necessary possibility of the 
restriction of the Lichtwesen’s difference; yet such a restriction is only a ‘moment’ within 
an outpouring which immediately carries it off again.    
Derrida frames the question of the passing over of the Lichtwesen into being-for-
self in terms of the guarding of a trace. How can this all burning, he asks, ‘guard the trace 
of itself and breach/broach a history where it preserves itself in losing itself [se conserve 
en se perdant]?’ (Gl 240a/267a). Before considering Derrida’s response, it is important to 
note that the ‘how’ in his question might resonate in at least two, not necessarily 
separable ways: 1. What is it within such a difference that in itself might tend toward its 
                                                          
50 Here Derrida might be read as failing to take up Hegel’s explicit account of this transition, namely: 
‘The immediate being in which it stands in antithesis to its consciousness is itself the negative power 
which dissolves its distinctions’ (Ph 420/507). Nevertheless, Derrida can also be seen as offering an 
explanation of why the Lichtwesen should emerge as this ‘negative power’ or being-for-self at all.   
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restriction? 2. How does speculative dialectics restrict it? Derrida’s response is the 
following:  
 
Here is experienced the implacable force of sense, of mediation, of the hard-working 
negative. In order to be what it is, purity of play, of difference, of consuming 
destruction, the all-burning must [doit] pass into its contrary: guard itself, guard its 
own movement of loss, appear as what it is in its very disappearance. As soon as it 
appears, as soon as the fire shows itself, it remains, it keeps hold of itself, loses itself 
as fire. Pure difference, different from (it)self, ceases to be what it is in order to 
remain what it is. That is the origin of history, the beginning of the going down 
{déclin}, the setting of the sun, the passage to occidental subjectivity. Fire becomes 
for-(it)self and is lost; yet worse {pire} since better (Gl 240a/267-8).  
 
In Derrida’s response we might separate three levels of explanation. Firstly, there is the 
(external) teleological level, which responds to the question: in order for a trace of the fire 
to be retained, how must it be determined? This level already supposes the desire to 
retain such a trace and does not therefore explain why, ‘in itself,’ the fire should guard a 
trace of itself. Secondly, there is the ontological level, according to which if the fire is to 
be what it is, it must take on a relative stability and so keep itself by denying itself as that 
which precisely resists and eludes determination: it must contradict itself. This again 
would presuppose a desire for the trace to be retained, and in addition that there is 
already a horizon of the fire’s truth. It does not yet explain why the Lichtwesen itself 
should open this horizon. Now in invoking these two levels, Derrida would seem to 
suggest that it is in part a desire for presence that underlies Hegel’s statement that the 
fire ‘must’ determine itself as being-for-self. To this extent, he is again pointing to a 
repressive Hegelian gesture. The importance of these levels of argumentation should not 
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be underestimated. Nevertheless, at a third level of explanation, Derrida would seem to 
acknowledge that the fire, in itself, ‘must’ become determinate, if only ‘momentarily.’  
This third level might be called phenomenologico-ontological. It provides the 
underlying ground of the ontological explanation, for it shows the fire itself to provide the 
condition of possibility of its determination as its other. It shows, in other words, how the 
fire by itself opens the possibility of a history of being. This level is introduced where 
Derrida writes: ‘as soon as it appears […] it […] loses itself as fire.’ By taking on a form, 
even the most fleeting one, it itself creates and enters into the ontological horizon of 
presence or self-presence.51 Nevertheless, because of the trace structure of the ‘torrents 
of fire,’ this determination is, in Derrida’s eyes, immediately carried off again: the 
necessary possibility of contradiction here is also the ‘impossibility’ of either maintaining 
or sublating the contradiction, as we shall see in the following and final section.   
 
3.6 The Gift 
 
Having analysed its basis, Derrida continues to follow the process whereby the Lichtwesen 
comes to take on determinate form. This leads him to a reading of Hegel’s statement that 
the ‘pure light disperses its simplicity into an infinity of forms, and offers itself up as a 
sacrifice [Opfer] to being-for-self, so that from its substance the individual may take an 
enduring existence for itself’ (Ph 420/507, trans. modified). In quoting this sentence, 
                                                          
51 When, a few pages earlier, Derrida states his ‘thesis’ concerning the determination of difference in 
Hegel, I take it that he therefore does so not in order simply to oppose himself to Hegel. The thesis runs: 
‘As soon as difference determines itself, it determines itself as opposition; it manifests itself to be sure, 
but its manifestation is at the same time (that is the time of the same as the effacement of the time-
remain(s) in the self (Selbst)) the reduction of difference, of the remain(s), of the gap {écart}’ (Gl 
235a/263a).     
247 
 
Derrida follows Jean Hyppolite’s translation of the German ‘Opfer’ as ‘holocauste,’ a term 
which he states here ‘is more appropriate to the text than the word of Hegel himself’ (Gl 
241a/269a). It is of course important to tread carefully here: on the one hand, Derrida is 
referring to a holocaust in the sense of a burnt offering. This is why he associates this 
sacrifice with the figure of the gift from this point on. Yet here one cannot but also be 
struck by the twentieth-century resonance of the term. Insofar as it is this resonance that 
Derrida is alluding to, his remark might be taken to pertain to what it is for thinking to 
remain attentive to that which overwhelms or poisons (vergiftet) thinking. It would then 
be precisely when the holocaust is determined as ‘the holocaust,’ when it takes on a 
more stable sense and is subject to a certain codification, that its disruptive force on 
‘productive’ thinking is repressed.  
Bearing this resonance of the term continually ‘in mind’ we might now return to 
the more explicit level of Derrida’s discussion of the holocaust in the sense of the gift or 
the burnt offering. The fire of the Lichtwesen, as we have seen, is for Derrida precisely 
that which resists or eludes determination. When it is then determined, in the space of its 
appearance, as fire, then this is at the same time its loss as fire (in this sense the 
holocaust of fire is a unique form of holocaust in that it is not the burning of some thing, 
but the burning and burning up of burning itself). The all-burning, Derrida writes, thus 
‘offers itself as a holocaust [s’offre en holocauste (my emphasis)] to the for-itself,’ a 
‘holocaust of play itself’ which is the ‘origin of logic’ (Gl 242a/268a).    
At stake in this ‘holocaust of the holocaust,’ and even, Derrida suggests here, in 
the Hegel column of Glas as a whole (Gl 241-2a/269a), is the gift and its relation to 
ontology. As Derrida writes, ‘Without the holocaust the dialectical movement and the 
history of Being could not open themselves, engage themselves in the annulus of their 
anniversary, could not annul themselves in producing the solar course from Orient to 
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Occident’ (Gl 242a/269a). Derrida even goes as far as to say that the gift, the sacrifice, the 
holocaust, ‘cannot not give birth to’ ontology (Gl 242a/269a). We can see again here that 
it is not simply a question, for Derrida, of attempting to ‘oppose’ this transition. It is 
rather a question of indicating how, even though it cannot not give birth to ontology, the 
gift still exceeds and is not exhausted by ontology, and thus how it will always already 
have displaced ontology. But this can only become evident if an other way of receiving 
the gift is elaborated. Let us then first consider how Derrida conceives Hegel’s 
appropriation of the gift before addressing his elaboration of this other form of reception.   
On Derrida’s reading, the Hegelian reception of the gift is governed by the 
privileging of a horizon of truth as presence. Now although the fire itself engenders this 
horizon through its very appearance, it is only if one remains with this moment of 
appearance that fire becomes fixed as a contradiction and that the economic calculation 
becomes necessary according to which, as Derrida writes, ‘you must […] keep it in order 
to lose it (truly), or lose it to keep it (truly)’ (Gl 241a/269a). Now for Hegel of course, this 
does not really amount to a loss and this process is not one in which repression takes 
place, precisely because the horizon or the ‘element’ of presence and manifestation is 
privileged from the outset (in the manner we observed in the ‘Ethical World of the 
Phenomenology), such that fire ‘must’ be determined in view of its appearance and thus 
as its ‘own other.’ From a Hegelian perspective it therefore makes no sense to say that 
anything is lost through the fire’s reification in the next stages of natural religion as plant 
life or as the pyramid. Through these transitions, fire only shows itself to be what it will 
have been in truth. Derrida thus notes that, for Hegel, ‘The sacrifice, the offer, or the gift 
do not destroy the all-burning that destroys itself in them; they make it reach the for-
(it)self, they monumentalize it’ (Gl 240a/268a). It is in this way that the gift acquires a 
determinate sense and thereby becomes amenable to conceptual thought. For Derrida, 
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however, this is an example of speculative dialectics’ pretention to ‘take as given’ what 
has in fact already been determined by a certain regard or reflection:      
 
The gift is not; the holocaust is not; if at least there is some such [il y en a]. But as 
soon as it burns (the blaze is not a being), it must, burning itself, burn its action 
{operation} of burning and begin to be […] The speculative is the reflection 
(speculum) of the holocaust’s holocaust, the blaze reflected and cooled by the glass, 
the ice [glace], of the mirror (Gl 240a/270a).   
 
The speculative reflection is at the same time the incorporation of the gift into what 
Derrida conceives as a restricted economy. Because the gift has become determinate, its 
value has thereby already become determinable. As Derrida puts this, ‘From the moment 
this constraint, this constriction of the “must” comes to press the mad energy of a gift, 
what this constriction provokes is perforce a countergift, an exchange, in the space of the 
debt’ (Gl 243a/270a). The path to absolute knowing can be conceived as the Abarbeitung 
of this debt, such that ultimately the debt is no longer recognised as having been a debt 
at all, but rather as that which absolute knowing will have given to itself. What begins 
here as a simple determination of the gift therefore ends with its most comprehensive 
annulment, which for Derrida constitutes speculative ingratitude.   
What, then, would be an other way of thinking and responding to the gift? Here it 
will be a matter of showing how the speculative logic of the gift can be seen to be 
inscribed within a wider ‘logic’ of the gift. Again, it is not a question of demonstrating the 
impossibility of the Hegelian logic, but of showing how it is both made possible and 
exceeded by this other ‘logic.’ Before we consider the latter, it is worth dwelling for a 
moment on what this alternative gift cannot be for Derrida. Here I shall again need to 
distinguish my reading from that of Critchley.   
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For Critchley, the gift exceeds speculative thinking because the latter is a form of 
metaphysics in the Heideggerian sense: it thinks ‘the meaning of Being with regard to 
beings, as self-conscious subjectivity.’52 Now it is true that Derrida refers to Heidegger’s 
text Zeit und Sein in describing the gift which exceeds speculative thought. Derrida writes 
that ‘Before, if one could count here with time, before everything, before every 
determinable being {étant}, there is, there was, there will have been [il y a, il y avait, il y 
aura] the irruptive event of the gift {don}’ (Gl 242a/269a). This leads Critchley to suggest 
that ‘with this allusion […] the ultimate orientation of Derrida’s reading of Hegel becomes 
apparent,’ namely that ‘Derrida appears to be understanding Hegel in terms of the 
ontological difference between Sein (être) and Seiende (étant).’53 If this is Derrida’s 
diagnosis, the remedy would then be to think that which exceeds metaphysics: ‘das Sein 
ohne das Seiende.’54     
What Critchley’s reading misses, however, is the difference between Heidegger’s 
and Derrida’s respective conceptions of ‘metaphysics.’ For Derrida, metaphysics is not 
primarily the thinking of being in terms of beings, but, more generally, a thinking that is 
governed by the ideal of presence. To this extent, though this cannot be examined here, 
Heideggerian ontology would not escape a certain complicity with this metaphysical 
ideal.55 As I read him, Derrida invokes Heidegger in the paragraph discussed by Critchley 
not in order simply to follow in his footsteps, but in order to suggest that Heidegger 
himself did not follow far enough the very path that he opened up. For it is in this 
                                                          
52 Critchley, p. 219. 
53 Critchley, p. 219. 
54 Critchley, p. 219. 
55 Cf. Derrida, P 55/75: ‘I sometimes have the feeling that the Heideggerian problematic is the most 
“profound” and “powerful” defense of what I attempt to put into question under the rubric of the 
thought of presence.’  
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paragraph that Derrida also writes: ‘giving can no longer be thought starting from Being 
{être}, but “the contrary.”’ He quotes Heidegger’s formulation, ‘es gibt Sein’ in order to 
remark that ‘the gift of the es gibt gives itself to be thought before the Sein’ and, further, 
that this ‘displaces all that is determined under the name Ereignis’ (Gl 242a/269a).56     
How, then, might the gift be ‘thought’ beyond the Hegelian economy? In Glas, 
Derrida does not elaborate on this in a theoretical manner in the Hegel column, since he 
is mainly concerned to analyse the Hegelian mechanism of repression rather than to offer 
a ‘positive’ alternative. In lieu of a reading of the Genet column, we will therefore have to 
suggest a response to this question based on the hints that Derrida provides and on the 
conclusions of chapter 3 of this study. In order to do so, we will need to return to the 
figureless figure of the Lichtwesen to see what exceeds its determination as being-for-self 
even in this very determination.    
As we saw, the fire cannot but manifest itself. Indeed the radical difference of the 
Lichtwesen is at the same time the assumption of a certain determinate form. This 
opening of and entry into the horizon of presence is what allows the history of being to 
be opened. As we have seen, Derrida ‘denies’ none of this. Yet the speculative attention 
to this ‘at the same time’ would forget the other ‘at the same time’ we observed above: 
the simultaneity of appearance and effacement that is the trace. According to this other 
‘at the same time,’ any determinate form that the fire takes on is already carried off 
beyond itself into another form in its very appearance. In focussing then on the moment 
of the fire’s determinateness, speculative dialectics would thus forget, or repress, the 
                                                          
56 Derrida’s questioning of the Heideggerian ‘es gibt’ is continued in his later Given Time, where Derrida 
remarks on the desire for the ‘proper’ within which Heidegger’s thinking of the gift is elaborated. At 
precisely this point Derrida also alludes to a potential proximity between this Heideggerian desire and 
the Hegelian ‘circle’ considered in Glas (GT 21-22/36).  
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fire’s continual displacement of any and all determination. The moment of becoming for-
itself inscribed as a necessary moment in this movement is thus, according to the ‘at the 
same time’ of the trace, immediately displaced.  
Speculative dialectics restricts this wider process by fixing on the moment of the 
fire’s determination as being-for-self. It then follows the immanent development of this 
being-for-self through plant life, into the architectural sphere, and so on. In doing so, it 
represses the fact that this being-for-self is at the same time a moment of a continuing 
process of dissemination. In a sense, then, for Derrida the fire never goes out and 
continues to haunt the progressive development of being-for-self. What gives itself here 
is then a gift whose measure cannot be fully grasped, or that is too much to think. We 
might best explain the idea at work here by drawing on a figure that is etymologically 
connected with another name for the gift—the cadeau—introduced by Derrida on p. 
243a/271a. As Derrida notes, cadeau (one of whose English translations happens to be 
‘present’) means, via the Latin catena, ‘chain’ (Gl 243a/271a).57 A chain is of course made 
up of rings, which throughout Glas have figured, among other things, the economic 
closure achieved through repression as contradiction. The Hegelian chain might be seen, 
as Derrida indicates, as consisting of a number of such rings (each figuring a particular 
shape of consciousness), the first and last of which come to meet up with each other to 
form a ‘circle of circles’ (Gl 245a/272a).    
The question of the reste of time has brought us back here, through the question 
of the gift, to the question of the ‘way out’ of such a circle. As has been discussed, it 
cannot be a question for Derrida of simply breaking open the circle of circles, nor the 
smaller circles of which it is composed. It is rather a question of attending to the trace 
                                                          
57 I am indebted to Henry Sussmann’s reading for drawing attention to the figure of the chain in Glas  
(Sussmann, p. 277).  
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structure in something like the Lichtwesen, and to responding to it as a gift that gives to 
thinking but which cannot be made ultimately transparent to thought. In figurative terms, 
the consequence of the trace logic of the same time would be that each ring on the 
Hegelian chain would not be part of one single chain that closes on itself, but rather a link 
in a potentially infinite number of chains. The determinate meaning that each ring 
embodies in any individual chain would be in itself displaced in that the sense of the ring 
would be carried off in different directions by the other chains. As we saw Derrida remark 
in Dissemination, differance inscribes contradictions, not contradiction (D 6, n.8/12-13, 
n.5).  Whereas each ring would inscribe a ‘contradiction’ in any given chain, it would also 
contain within itself a potentially infinite number of contradictions through its 
attachment to other chains. No contradiction would be in itself definitive or 
unproblematic, or even un-contradicted by the same ring’s place in another chain. This 
displacement would thus make of each ring a ‘remainder.’     
What would it be, then, to respond to such a gift? Unlike the Hegelian attempt to 
take the gift as given, this other response would involve an attention precisely to what is 
not given in what seems to be given—to listen for that which is unexpected within what 
has been given and perhaps most importantly for what has been repressed by the 
dominant sense of what has been given. This does not rule out but rather enjoins a 
critical engagement with this dominant sense, an example being that of the repression of 
the mother in the self-constitution of the Christian Trinity.   
Such a response refuses to ‘give back’ or even to ‘recognise’ the gift—not from 
ingratitude or indifference (though it inherently risks appearing as such) but because to 
do so would already be to have determined the value of the debt.58 Its attempt to do 
justice to the inexhaustibility of the gift would be to continue to trace out its ‘seminal 
                                                          
58 Cf. GT 13/26.  
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effusion without return,’ through previously unheard-of chains. Just as it does not give 
back, it also does not appropriate, but acts rather as a medium for the gift’s continued 
growth. It is in this response to the gift that we can glimpse the Derridean, in contrast to 
the Hegelian, future perfect. For Hegel, as we have seen, what is initially taken as given 
ultimately proves to have been given by absolute knowing to itself, as the beginning is 
fully comprehended by the end. For Derrida, by contrast, there is no such appropriation 
of the gift, no return to the ‘ultimate truth’ of the beginning, but only a continual 
displacement of what it will have been. But this is at the same time to say that there will 
have been no beginning.     
 
Supplements 
 
The present study has been concerned with elaborating the point of Hegel and Derrida’s 
greatest proximity and their departure from one another. This investigation could be 
extended by considering how Derrida enacts the deconstructive response to the gift 
outlined above. One way in which this might be done is by following certain figures 
through Derrida’s column on Genet. One could read Derrida’s attention to the figure of 
the flower as an attempt to show how its ‘use’ in Genet disrupts the relative stability of 
the plant life which, for Hegel, interiorises the Lichtwesen. At the most obvious level, the 
flower is a perhaps ‘exemplary’ figure of dissemination, but it is also, Derrida writes, a 
‘sort of sister’ (Gl 245a/273a) and ‘essentially coupable’: ‘To adore flowers, to kneel 
before them, that is possible only on the threshold of culpability’ (Gl 247a/274a). Derrida 
plays here on the dual sense of ‘coupable’ (both guilty and ‘cuttable’), indicating that the 
flower both embodies a debt and that it can always be cut from its present context and 
inserted into a new one, where it will take on a different sense. As Critchley writes, ‘The 
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plant or flower, Antigone or Genet, becomes a figure for the singular entity that receives 
the gift of the light, the life-giving sustenance of the sun, and in so doing, recognizes its 
debt, its devoir.’59 According to this sense or non-sense of the flower, the light of the sun, 
the oldest philosophical ‘metaphor,’ would not simply be absorbed, but would continue 
to be disseminated in an unpredictable manner. Furthermore, it would be necessary to 
consider how Derrida sees Genet’s, in contrast to Hegel’s, negotiation with the gift and 
with debt. In contrast to Hegel’s construction of a system that would comprehend itself, 
one would have to consider how Genet figures something like Hegel’s ‘artificer’: an artist 
who lets his work fall from him and live on without him, that is, also how Genet gives 
without demanding a counter-gift (Gl 257a/286a). But as Derrida seems to suggest in his 
commentary on Hegel, here again it would not simply be a question of affirming a Genet 
over a Hegel:   
 
On the one hand, this is the effacement, the omission of the artist: he is sufficiently 
disinterested to declare that his work lives by itself, animates itself without him, 
removes [emporte] his signature. But by removing it, the work keeps it, and under 
this modernic thematic {thématique modernitaire}, Hegel immediately discloses, on 
the other hand, the ruse or the dissembled, dissembling reverse, the hypocrisy of the 
other one-sidedness. In effect the artist verifies that the work, by being able thus to 
cut itself off and fall (to the tomb) from him, is not his equal, that it has not 
produced an essence equal to its author (kein ihm gleiches Wesen hervorbrachte) 
[…] By his withdrawal {retrait} the artist consequently raises himself above his 
remain(s) and in the same stroke {du même coup} detains it as a small part, a morsel 
of himself (Gl 257a/286a).   
                                                          
59 Critchley, p. 222. 
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